Presidentially Appointed Environmental Agency Saboteurs
Document Type
Article
Abstract
This essay explores situations where the president appoints an administrator to lead the EPA whose political philosophy and personal ideology diverge radically from, and are inimical to, the EPA’s core mission and mandates. For purposes of this essay, such administrators are referred to as “environmental agency saboteurs." The essay offers several explanations for presidential appointment of environmental agency saboteurs, along with examples of past and present EPA saboteurs; considers a number of legal and political options available for challenging environmental agency saboteurs and whether such countervailing forces are adequate; and raises for future contemplation several options for resisting environmental agency saboteurs.
Recommended Citation
Madeline Kass,
Presidentially Appointed Environmental Agency Saboteurs, 87 U. Mo.-Kan. City L. Rev. 697
(2019).
https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty/936
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3345490