Document Type
Article
Abstract
Much of the scholarship on term limits and its consequences has also failed to engage a rich comparative analysis. Scholars have either made predictions about what would happen if term limits were adopted based on their personal viewpoints or developed hypothetical models or simulations to make predictions about the future. This Article provides an in-depth and contextualized case study of the court system of another common law democracy where judges do not have life tenure. Judges of the ISC are forced to leave the Court at sixty-five years of age. As a result, they have spent less than five years on the Court in the last few decades. The revolving doors of judges and chief justices has led to increasing doctrinal instability in the ISC as well as pandering incentives for judges seeking employment after they leave the Court.
Recommended Citation
Sital Kalantry,
The Unintended Consequences of Term Limits of Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court: Lessons from a Comparative Study of the Indian Supreme Court, 30 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L 43
(2022).
https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/faculty/881