Abstract
In the corporate governance debate, the short-term versus longterm contention has grown into perhaps today’s most controversial topic. In this debate, descriptions of institutional investors tend to present a dichotomic nature. These investors are alternatively portrayed as homogenously short-termist or as consistent “forces for good,” focused on targeting underperforming companies. This Article moves beyond this dichotomy. It shows empirically that aggregate institutional investor behavior presents nuances that depend on a variety of factors, including individual firm characteristics, institutional ownership levels, and institutional propensity toward activism.
Recommended Citation
K.J. Martijn Cremers and Simone M. Sepe, Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 387 (2018).
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