•  
  •  
 

Authors

Katie Axtell

Abstract

Part II of this Note presents the factual background and procedural history of Davey v. Locke. Part III discusses the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Section A provides a basic background on the Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence. Section B applies the Court's precedent to Davey, and concludes that the Ninth Circuit sidestepped a true "prohibition" analysis. Sections A, B, and C of Part IV discuss the differing neutrality examinations within free exercise, free speech, and establishment jurisprudence, respectively. Section D discusses the overlapping application of neutrality criteria in establishment and free speech funding cases. Section E concludes that in Davey the Ninth Circuit improperly grafted free speech criteria under an establishment neutrality paradigm onto its free exercise neutrality examination in Davey. Part V discusses the federalism implications of the impending Supreme Court decision. Section A explains Washington's asserted interest in the separation of church and state. Section B proposes that states' more protective establishment provisions should provide a compelling justification for an incidental burden of a religious observer's free exercise sufficient to survive strict scrutiny. Section C argues that Washington State's Establishment Clause is a sufficiently compelling justification for Washington not to fund Davey's theological education. Part VI concludes the Note.

Share

COinS