Abstract
The argument develops as follows. Part II provides a general background on how the court has determined whether an investigative technique or device is a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and the implications for finding that something is a search. This section focuses primarily on Katz v. United States, the pivotal case in which the Supreme Court departed from previous Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by recognizing that the Fourth Amendment's core value is the protection of individual privacy, not the protection of places. In light of this background, Part III provides examples of how the Supreme Court has applied Katz to certain factual situations, and what factors it has traditionally considered to determine if a reasonable expectation of privacy exists. Part IV examines the reasoning of the Kyllo decision and evaluates it in terms of those traditional factors. Part V looks closely at the landmark case in canine sniffs, United States v. Place, and analyzes the Court's reasoning in finding that a dog sniff was not a search. Finally, Part VI explores how and why the reasoning in Place and other dog-sniff cases has been eroded by the Court's reasoning and holding in Kyllo.
Recommended Citation
Amanda S. Froh, Rethinking Canine Sniffs: The Impact of Kyllo v. United States, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 337 (2002).
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