Maximum Vertical Price Fixing from Albrecht Through Brunswick to Khan: An Antitrust Odyssey
The article attempts to sort out some of this confusion caused by the legal journey from Albrecht to Khan by portraying that long road as a successful example of the antitrust injury doctrine's ability to bring substantive antitrust law into compliance with the goals of antitrust. First, the article examines how the existence of successive monopoly provides an incentive for maximum vertical price fixing and how maximum vertical price fixing leads to an increase in consumer welfare. Second, it examines manufacturer alternatives to vertical price restraints, finding them less attractive in terms of social welfare. Third, the article analyzes other competitive concerns raised by the Albrecht Court, finding them largely baseless. Fourth, it looks at how the prohibition of maximum vertical price fixing frustrates every one of the suggested goals of antitrust. Finally, the article analyzes the antitrust injury doctrine and shows how its application to maximum resale price fixing forced substantive antitrust law into conformance with the goals of antitrust.
James M. Fesmire, Maximum Vertical Price Fixing from Albrecht Through Brunswick to Khan: An Antitrust Odyssey, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 721 (2001).
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