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Establishing Legitimacy
Through Inclusive Re-Formation:
The Necessary Process for Re-Forming
the Seattle Police Department

Becky Fish*

I. INTRODUCTION

People across Seattle expressed outrage a young White Seattle Police Officer, Ian Birk, shot and killed an elderly Native American woodcarver, John T. Williams, on August 30, 2010.¹ Mr. Williams was partially deaf and had been standing alone on a street corner holding a piece of wood and a small carving knife.² Almost six months later, King County Prosecuting Attorney Dan Satterberg held a press conference to announce his decision not to charge Mr. Birk for homicide. Mr. Satterberg pointed to Washington’s statute providing police officers an affirmative defense to

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homicide charges so long as they do not act with malice. Mr. Birk’s killing of Mr. Williams—along with other highly-publicized incidents of Seattle Police Department (SPD) officers using excessive force against People of Color, sometimes even accompanied by racial slurs—prompted the US Department of Justice (DOJ) to conduct an investigation of the SPD and initiate litigation against the City of Seattle.

The City of Seattle entered a settlement agreement with the DOJ in 2012 that required reformulation of the SPD’s use of force, bias-free policing, and accountability standards. A court-appointed monitor, with input from a newly-formed Community Police Commission (CPC), was assigned to oversee the settlement. A survey conducted as part of this SPD oversight agreement revealed significantly worse experiences with, and opinions of, the SPD among African-American and Latino residents and a general

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majority opinion that the SPD discriminates based on race. This evidence suggests that the people of Seattle believe that the SPD does not serve or respond to the needs of all of Seattle—specifically, that the SPD does not serve People of Color.

The ongoing SPD reform process has been riddled with highly-publicized arguments between the mayor, city attorney, US attorney, and CPC over who, if anyone, actually represents the people of Seattle. As agreements and plans for the SPD reform process began, then Mayor Mike McGinn and City Attorney Pete Holmes argued over the City Attorney’s role—namely whether the City Attorney represents the people of Seattle or the Seattle City Government. Subsequently, the DOJ fought the CPC’s request to intervene in the litigation as an independent party representing the people and communities of Seattle. US District Court Judge James L. Robart ultimately denied the CPC’s request to intervene. Prior to Judge Robart’s decision, US Attorney Jenny Durkan told the CPC that its role was important but limited and that the DOJ would fight to limit the settlement agreement to two parties (the DOJ and the City of Seattle), adding “[y]ou

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10 United States’ Combined Response to the CPC’s Motion to Partially Intervene and to the City and the CPC’s Motions to Extend Certain Deadlines (Document 96), U.S. v. City of Seattle (No. 12-1282) 2013 WL 6185219.
don’t own the community . . . [a]nd you are not the only people getting community input.” 12 In response, then CPC Co-Chair Diane Narasaki argued that the community is cynical about the reform efforts because of the widely-held perception that many communities do not have an opportunity to be heard. 13 These disagreements highlight not only the limitations of relying on existing forms of representative democracy but also the desire of reform leaders to include the people of Seattle in the SPD reform process.

The abuse of power that led to the DOJ litigation, the lack of public trust in the SPD, and the uncertainty about the role and representation of community members in the reform process are symptoms and causes of a deeper problem. The SPD is facing a crisis of legitimacy. To become a truly legitimate police force, the SPD and the City of Seattle must change not only the policies and practices of the SPD but also the process by which those policies and practices are formed.

The SPD, like executive agencies generally, on paper, derives its power from the consent of the governed 14—meaning that the people over whom the SPD exercises authority have agreed to delegate law enforcement power to the SPD. While foundational documents (the Washington Constitution and the Seattle City Charter) declare that the SPD’s power derives from the

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13 Id.

14 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All political power is inherent in the people, the governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and are established to protect and maintain individual rights”); Charter of the City of Seattle, Preamble (2007) (“Under authority conferred by the Constitution of the State of Washington, the People of the City of Seattle enact this Charter as the Law of the City for the purpose of protecting and enhancing the health, safety, environment, and general welfare of the people; to enable municipal government to provide services and meet the needs of the people efficiently; to allow fair and equitable participation of all persons in the affairs of the City; to provide for transparency, accountability, and ethics in governance and civil service; to foster fiscal responsibility; to promote prosperity and to meet the broad needs for a healthy, growing City”).

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consent of the governed, subsequent legislation relating to the SPD largely places limits on police authority or enshrines the rights of police officers as employees, but does not grant specific powers to the police vis-à-vis the people. The Washington public authority defense statute that shielded Mr. Birk from criminal prosecution, as well as similar provisions in the Seattle Municipal Code authorizing police officers to discharge their firearms under certain circumstances, seems to be a rare positive grant of power to the SPD. However, the Washington statute that shielded Mr. Birk was originally enacted to limit the scope of the public authority defense in response to the US Supreme Court’s decision in \textit{Tennessee v. Garner}, and the Seattle City ordinances related to the SPD essentially assign standards for when use of force is reasonable. Thus, those rare laws that seem to be positive grants of power to the SPD are meant to limit rather than grant police authority. Thus, the SPD’s legal authority still rests textually in the consent of the people subjected to its authority.

The SPD is facing a crisis of legitimacy because the reality of how the SPD was formed, how its policies are determined, and how it is held accountable do not conform to the theory that the SPD derives its power from the consent of the governed. This article will examine how the SPD may be re-formed as a legitimate police force charged with keeping peace in the City of Seattle. First, both popular and legal theories of legitimacy emphasize the necessity of political participation by people most burdened

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item See \textit{WASH. REV. CODE} §§ 43.43.010, 43.43.030, 43.101.095, 10.93.070; \textit{SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE} § 3.28.
\item \textit{WASH. REV. CODE} § 9A.16.040(3).
\item \textit{SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE} § 3.28.115.
\item \textit{WASH. REV. CODE} § 9A.16.040; 1986 c 209 § 3 note ("The legislature recognizes that RCW 9A.16.040 establishes a dual standard with respect to the use of deadly force by peace officers and private citizens, and further recognizes that private citizens’ permissible use of deadly force under the authority of RCW 9.01.200, 9A.16.020, or 9A.16.050 is not restricted and remains broader than the limitations imposed on peace officers"); \textit{Tennessee v. Garner}, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985); Martin, \textit{supra} note 3.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
by the exercise of government power in order for such power to be legitimate. Second, the SPD was textually formed under a theory that the people consented to its power; however, current and historical restrictions on political participation by People of Color and other oppressed groups undermine the validity of this “consent.” Third, the SPD’s racially discriminatory exercise of power and the political and economic disempowerment of people with criminal convictions further undermine the SPD’s legitimacy. Fourth, Seattleites have demanded limitations on or revocation of SPD power by litigation, public protest, and noncooperation. Thus, in order to establish true legitimacy in the SPD re-formation process, current SPD powers must be presumed illegitimate and people most burdened by the exercise of SPD powers must be specifically empowered in the re-formation process.

II. THEORIES OF LEGITIMACY

The first step in determining the legitimacy of a government or government exercise of power is to analyze what mechanisms or processes of formation and accountability legitimize government power. If the SPD derives its power from the consent of the governed, we must determine what modes of popular consent are legitimate in order to determine whether the SPD does, in fact, have the consent of the governed to exercise any power and, if so, to what power the people have consented.

A. Popular Theories: Critiques from Black Critics Confronting the Legal System

Throughout US history, scholars and theorists not rooted in the US legal system, so not dependent on Anglo-American texts, have concluded that

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19 The US legal system is rooted in constitutions (federal and state) proposed by a small group of White men and courts that depend on precedent decided overwhelmingly by a narrow segment of White men. Over 80 percent of judges that have served on the federal bench are White men. See FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL
the US criminal punishment system is illegitimate.\textsuperscript{20} These scholars and theorists propose theories that, in many ways, have been mirrored by the legally-based theories of democracy and legitimacy articulated by legal scholars (discussed in section B). The US criminal punishment system developed to oppress Black Americans following the formal abolition of slavery and evolved to continue oppressing People of Color.\textsuperscript{21} Throughout this evolution, Black activists and scholars in particular have confronted this system and advocated disregard for the authority of the US criminal punishment system because it targeted and oppressed Black people without justification while simultaneously denying Black people full citizenship or the ability to participate in the formation of the law.\textsuperscript{22}

Ida B. Wells, a prominent anti-lynching activist in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,\textsuperscript{23} exposed the falsity of any criminal justice argument for lynchings.\textsuperscript{24} Wells critiqued the rhetoric used to defend lynchings, often perpetrated by mobs of White men, that Black men raped White women, arguing “the South is shielding itself behind the plausible screen of defending the honor of its women. This, too, in the face of the fact that only one-third of the 728 victims to mobs have been charged with rape, to say nothing of those of that one-third who were innocent of the charge.”\textsuperscript{25} Wells further argued that the law refused to protect Black men, so Black men should arm and defend themselves.\textsuperscript{26} Wells’s advocacy exposed the use of the criminal punishment system to create narratives that could justify

\textsuperscript{20} See infra notes 23–49.
\textsuperscript{22} See infra notes 23–49.
\textsuperscript{24} See generally PAULA J. GIDDINGS, IDA: A SWORD AMONG LIONS (Amistad 2008).
\textsuperscript{25} Id. at 61 (emphasis in original).
\textsuperscript{26} Id. at 70.
horrific violence against Black people, a function the criminal punishment system continues to perform today.

Hubert Harrison, founder of the New Negro Movement and organizer in the Socialist Party of New York in the early twentieth century,27 also argued that a government that oppresses people is owed no respect by the oppressed. He explained,

[A] subject is one “who owes allegiance to a government, its laws and officials without having, as a right, the power to make or remake that government or those laws,” while a citizen is “the source of that government” to whom allegiance is owed.28

Thus, a person is not a citizen unless she or he is the source of her or his government’s power and is also able to check that power. Harrison further argued that the law does not respect or protect Black people, so Black people do not need to respect the law and thus must personally defend themselves as necessary.29 Harrison articulated clearly that denial of democratic power, and thus denial of the ability to check or consent to government power, is a denial of citizenship.

Doctor Martin Luther King Jr. similarly articulated the position that people should not be bound by discriminatory laws when they were also excluded from the political process that created the laws. He explained, “an unjust law is a code which the majority inflicts upon the minority, which that minority had no part in enacting or creating, because that minority had no right to vote in many instances, so that the legislative bodies that made

29 Id. at 299–306.
these laws were not democratically elected.”\textsuperscript{30} Dr. King further declared that “we will not obey unjust laws or submit to their unjust practices.”\textsuperscript{31} Though Dr. King is often remembered for his role in challenging cultural racism, he also exposed the illegitimacy of laws that imposed an unjust burden on a minority of the people while simultaneously denying that minority an opportunity to shape those laws. This theory was mirrored decades later in John Hart Ely’s political process theory of constitutional review (discussed in Section B).

The Black Panther Party, formed in Oakland, California, in the late 1960s, argued that police were illegitimate because of their oppressive practices. The Party demanded “an immediate end to police brutality and murder of Black people, other People of Color, [and] all oppressed people inside the United States,” and also declared the right of such oppressed people to defend themselves against this illegitimate institution.\textsuperscript{32} The Party’s first point in its platform, however, was a demand for true democratic power: “We believe that Black and oppressed people will not be free until we are able to determine our destinies in our communities ourselves, by fully controlling all the institutions which exist in our communities.”\textsuperscript{33} These driving principles of the Black Panther Party articulate a theory that a police force that discriminates and oppresses people is not legitimate and is owed no deference.

\textsuperscript{31} Martin Luther King Jr., The Case Against Tokenism (1962), reprinted in id. at 106, 110.
\textsuperscript{33} Id. at Point 1.
Assata Shakur, an exiled political prisoner and former member of the Black Panther Party and the Black Liberation Army, further emphasized both the current and historical illegitimacy of the US government. Shakur argued that democratic representation was a farce,

Those who believe that the president or the vice-president and the congress and the supreme kourt run this country are sadly mistaken. The almighty dollar is king; those who have the most money control the country and, through campaign contributions, buy and sell presidents, congressmen, and judges, the ones who pass the laws and enforce the laws that benefit their benefactors.

In her “To My People” speech recorded from prison, Shakur further criticized the hypocrisy of the history of the United States that criminalizes acts of poverty and resistance by People of Color while refusing accountability for the White people in power who “stole millions of Black people from the continent of Africa,” who “rob[bed] and murder[ed] millions of Indians by ripping off their homeland,” and who “murder[ed] over two hundred fifty unarmed Black men, women, and children, or wound[ed] thousands of others in the riots they provoked during the sixties.” Shakur’s critique emphasized both the current problem of political exclusion of People of Color as a source of institutionalized racism and the historical foundation of the United States and its institutions.

Though himself a legal scholar, Paul Butler, a civil rights and criminal law scholar and professor of law at Georgetown University, draws on critiques of the US criminal punishment system in hip-hop music and

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36 Id. at 139.  
37 Assata Shakur, To My People, Speech Recorded in Prison (Jul. 4, 1973) reprinted in id. at 49–53.  
culture to find a legitimate theory of criminal justice that “would enhance public safety and treat all people with respect.” Butler argues that hip-hop is the medium that best represents the interests of people burdened and harmed by the criminal justice system, as “[m]any people in the hip-hop nation have been locked up or have loved ones who have been.” Butler argues that criminal justice theories proposed by hip-hop artists are more legitimate because they come from the people most bearing the burden of the system: “These voices are worth listening to; they evaluate criminal justice from the bottom up. Our current punishment regime has been designed from the top down, and that, in part, explains why many perceive it to be ineffective or unfair.” In summary, Butler proposes that those targeted or burdened by the criminal justice system must contribute to the system’s formation in order for the system to be trusted.

Butler explains that hip-hop respects “African-American and Latino men. It rejects the stigma that the criminal justice system puts on them.” Rather than stigmatizing the prisoners, “prison, according to the artists, stigmatizes the government.” Butler made this idea concrete, explaining “[w]e are supposed to be disgusted with the people the law labels as criminals, but that would mean we are disgusted with one in three black men.” In other words, Butler suggests that hip-hop encourages society not to lose respect for or disempower people labeled as criminals, but rather to lose respect for and disempower a system that labels so many Men of Color as criminals. He explains that hip-hop “champions the human rights of those that society chooses to call criminals as enthusiastically as the rights of the falsely

60 Id. at 124.
61 Id. at 134.
62 Id. at 131.
63 Id.
64 Id.
accused.45 In many ways hip-hop champions the rights of people convicted and imprisoned in the criminal justice system in the way that legal scholar William J. Stuntz (discussed in Section B) argues courts should.46 Butler suggests that hip-hop’s vision of a better criminal justice system comes close to the Rawlsian theory that “the law is most just when it is made by people who don’t know how they will fare under it.”47 This theory supposes that lawmakers would be incentivized to improve the status of the least well off if they may themselves end up in the position of the least well off.

Butler further highlights hip-hop’s argument that prisons are a means of political oppression rather than just and humane punishment. He quotes Robin Kelley, scholar of African-American and African Diaspora and professor of history at the University of California at Los Angeles,48 to say “[p]rison is not designed to discipline but to corral bodies labeled menaces to society; policing is not designed to stop or reduce crime in inner city communities but to manage it.”49 Hip-hop traces both the under-policing of wealthy people and corporations and the over-filling of prisons with poor people and People of Color to the exaggerated political influence of corporate wealth.50 Thus, hip-hop traces the failures and illegitimacy of the criminal punishment system to corruption of the democratic process by the outsized influence of money.

45 Id. at 144.
47 BUTLER, supra note 39, at 133 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 1971)).
50 Id. at 139–40, 143–44.
These popular theories of policing and criminal justice argue that the legitimacy of any policing policy or system depends on the process by which it was formed and the outcomes it produces. Specifically, these theories argue that the current US criminal punishment regime is illegitimate because it was formed by a process that excluded People of Color and it functions to target and oppress People of Color. These theories offer guidance for evaluating the legitimacy of existing SPD policies and for determining the process by which the SPD should be re-formed.

B. Legal Theories: Critiques from Scholars Working Inside the Legal System

Legal scholars have also proposed theories of democracy and popular sovereignty that mirror the popular theories discussed in the previous section. Their analyses, like the US legal system, rest in Anglo-American texts, and are thus limited as representations of the understanding of democracy held by the multi-racial and multi-cultural US population. Nonetheless, legal scholars have developed legal theories of political legitimacy that recognize this limitation and find protection for the rights and voices of excluded groups in these Anglo-American texts.

It is important to remember that the ideas of the “founders” or the words in the texts establishing government in the United States are not the only—or the best—sources for rules to determine the legitimacy of government bodies or actions. Reflecting on the celebrations planned in 1987 for the bicentennial anniversary of the US Constitution, Justice Thurgood Marshall explained,

I do not believe that the meaning of the Constitution was forever “fixed” at the Philadelphia Convention. Nor do I find the wisdom, foresight, and sense of justice exhibited by the Framers particularly profound. To the contrary, the government they devised was defective from the start, requiring several amendments, a civil war, and momentous social transformation to attain the system of
constitutional government, and its respect for the individual freedoms and human rights, we hold as fundamental today.  

Justice Marshall continued to note that “We the People,” in the minds of the framers of the Constitution, categorically excluded Black people and women. Justice Marshall noted that “We the People” has become more inclusive, and that the United States has ended slavery, one of the most despicable institutions preserved by the framers. Justice Marshall argued, however, that the credit for these improvements “does not belong to the Framers. It belongs to those who refused to acquiesce in outdated notions of ‘liberty,’ ‘justice,’ and ‘equality,’ and who strived to better them.”  

As Justice Marshall argued, legitimate and just government may be best achieved by recognizing the limitations and hypocrisies of the ideas and texts upon which the US government is founded. Justice Marshall additionally suggested that, rather than celebrating the original creation of the US Constitution by exalting the framers, “[s]ome may more quietly commemorate the suffering, struggle, and sacrifice that has triumphed over much of what was wrong with the original document, and observe the anniversary with hopes not realized and promises not fulfilled.” Justice Marshall’s suggestion emphasizes the importance of looking beyond the legal establishment for the true drivers of legitimate and just government—namely, looking to the people who bear the burden of government policies and institutions.

52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
The political process theory of constitutional interpretation proposed by respected constitutional law scholar John Hart Ely\textsuperscript{55} emphasizes the same two-prong analysis—examining both the process by which policies are formed and disparities in the application of those policies—that Black activists and scholars articulated to critique the criminal punishment system (as discussed in the previous section). Ely credited the Warren Court, which ruled on many precedent-setting criminal procedure cases, with acting on a theory of constitutional interpretivism that prioritized an inclusive democratic process for the first time in the Court’s history.\textsuperscript{56} Ely found the first reference, though not application, of such a theory in a famous footnote in the Court’s 1936 decision in \textit{United States v. Carolene Products}.\textsuperscript{57} In that footnote, the Court questioned whether legislation that “restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation” and that involves “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” loses its presumption of legitimacy just as it would if it contradicted a specific prohibition of the Constitution.\textsuperscript{58}

Exploring the implications of this footnote, Ely argued that “popular control” and “egalitarianism” are both concerns about democratic participation.\textsuperscript{59} He suggested that constitutional interpretation should “focus not on whether this or that substantive value is unusually important or fundamental, but rather on whether the opportunity to participate either in the political processes by which values are appropriately identified and accommodated, or in the accommodation those processes have reached, has


\textsuperscript{56} JOHN HART ELY, \textit{DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW} 73–75 (Harvard University Press 1980).

\textsuperscript{57} United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 at n.4 (1938).

\textsuperscript{58} ELY, \textit{supra} note 56, at 75–76 (quoting Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 at n.4).

\textsuperscript{59} Id. at 76–77.
been unduly constricted.\textsuperscript{60} Thus, Ely’s political process theory narrowed in on the same signs of illegitimate government—political exclusion and discrimination/disparate treatment—identified by the Black theorists and activists discussed in the previous section. While Ely himself suggested that political process theory may serve as a better check on racism and abuse in policing and criminal justice,\textsuperscript{61} legal scholars have since applied his political process theory to the problem of racist and abusive policing. The suggestions resulting from these scholars’ applications of political process theory vary depending on their underlying assumptions.

Dan M. Kahan and Tracey L. Meares, criminal law scholars and professors of law at Yale University,\textsuperscript{62} suggest that political process theory should replace existing criminal procedure jurisprudence, which applies heightened scrutiny to any police policy implicating constitutional rights.\textsuperscript{63} Kahan and Meares argue that current criminal procedure jurisprudence, pioneered by the Warren Court, is premised on “the effective exclusion of African-Americans from the political process and the systematic use of law-enforcement resources to suppress them,” which have since abated.\textsuperscript{64} Though, as will be discussed in Section IV, the validity of the assumption that racial oppression has abated is dubious, Kahan and Meares’s proposal to apply political process theory to policing programs offers a somewhat less paternalistic and more populist approach to criminal procedure than the current use of strict scrutiny.

\textsuperscript{60} Id. at 77.
\textsuperscript{61} Id. at 172–77.
\textsuperscript{64} Id. at 1173, 1184.
Their approach would allow the court to independently evaluate a police policy where the costs are borne by a powerless minority but would not second guess policies where the costs are borne generally—i.e. the courts would defer to a community’s desired police policy if the entire community internalized the burden of that policy. They argue that this theory would likely vindicate most community policing initiatives, though it would still invalidate those that effectively burden a disempowered minority.

However, as will be discussed, Kahan and Meares do not fully account for the interests of people who may be found guilty of breaking the law as a result of a particular policing policy. While people bearing a heightened risk of criminal victimization due to ineffective policing policies or lax enforcement, including Communities of Color, certainly bear the burden of policing policies for the purposes of political process analysis, people who are arrested, charged, and/or convicted and punished because of policing policies also bear the burden of these policies. Though Kahan and Meares note that Communities of Color tend to have more concern for and feel a “linked fate” with the People of Color who are punished as lawbreakers than do White communities, they fail to include the people

66 Id. at 1172 (citing ELY, supra note 56, at 83; South Carolina State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
67 Id. at 1174–75.
68 Id. at 1177.
who are punished as “lawbreakers” in their vision of community and in their analysis of whether the interests of such “lawbreakers” have adequate representation in the political process.

Analyzing the influence that theories of democracy and government legitimacy have had on criminal procedure, David Alan Sklansky, a criminal procedure scholar and professor of law at the University of California at Berkeley,\(^\text{70}\) argues that unwarranted disparate treatment actually impedes political participation.\(^\text{71}\) In other words, Sklansky argues that the second prong of political process theory (a discrete minority bearing the burden of policing) actually creates the first prong of political process theory (that discrete minority is discouraged and excluded from the democratic process). He criticizes Kahan and Meares, as well as originalist constitutional law scholar Akhil Reed Amar\(^\text{72}\) who finds support for a theory that government in the United States derives its power from the consent of the governed,\(^\text{73}\) for failing to account for the problem of unwarranted disparate treatment.\(^\text{74}\) The version of democracy proposed by Amar, Kahan, and Meares, and found in the criminal procedure opinions of Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, views judicially made rules “as the abrupt imposition of a decision from above[,] . . . the polar opposite of democracy.”\(^\text{75}\) However, Sklansky suggests that this vision of democracy


\(^{71}\) See generally David Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1699 (2005).


\(^{74}\) Id. at 1808.

\(^{75}\) Id. at 1791.
that vests legitimacy in popular participation in the formation of laws and
government must be balanced by a vision of democracy that prioritizes
“opposition to entrenched patterns of unjustified inequality.”76

Sklansky cites political science scholar Ian Shapiro’s77 theory of the
“spirit of democratic oppositionalism” to explain the importance of police
practices in understanding democracy.78 Unjustified inequality, such as
racial profiling in policing, undermines the legitimacy of government “[b]y
insulting its targets, undermining their trust in law enforcement, and giving
them a sense of second-class citizenship.”79 Racial profiling and other
practices of unwarranted disparate treatment “reentrench patterns of social
hierarchy”80 by disproportionately imprisoning, bringing under state
control, and impeding the social and political participation of People of
Color.81 He explains,

[these practices also train] members of minority groups in patterns
of public subservience . . . [and encourage them] to adopt roles of
exaggerated deference and severely diminished self-agency—roles
that can easily carry over to other arenas of social life.82

76 Id. at 1808.
77 Ian Shapiro, Yale University Department of Political Science, http://political
science.yale.edu/people/ian-shapiro (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
78 Sklansky, supra note 71, at 1808 (citing Ian Shapiro, Three Ways to Be a Democrat,
22 Pol. Theory 124, 138 (1994)).
79 Id. at 1815–16.
80 Id. at 1816.
81 Id. at 1816 (citing Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the
Economics, Civil Liberties, and Constitutional Literature of Criminal Profiling More
Generally, 71 U. Chi. Rev. 1275 (2004); Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race,
Policing, and the Drug War, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 571, 594–97 (2003); Dorothy E. Roberts,
Foreword: Race, Vagueness, and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89
J. Crim. L. & Criminology 775, 815–16, n.143 (1999).)
82 Id. at 1816 (citing Devon W. Carbado, (E)raceing the Fourth Amendment, 100 Mich.
L. Rev. 946, 974–134 (2002); Ian F. Haney López, Racism on Trial: The Chicano
Fight for Justice (2003)).
Finally, these practices also confirm “racial stereotypes: suggesting, through higher rates of arrest, prosecution, and incarceration, that the profiled groups really are more prone to crime.”\textsuperscript{83} Sklansky’s analysis emphasizes the persistent oppression and political disempowerment of People of Color by means of disproportionate policing and criminalization. This reality must be taken into account when evaluating the legitimacy of policing policy.

William J. Stuntz, a criminal justice scholar and former professor of law at the University of Virginia and Harvard University,\textsuperscript{84} further criticizes the problem of political disempowerment by policing and criminalization.\textsuperscript{85} He argues that inadequate representation of criminalized people (people convicted of crimes) in the political branches, combined with the Supreme Court’s focus on front-end criminal procedure (policing and adjudication) over back-end punishment and substantive criminal law (crime definition and sentencing), have left rights and interests of criminalized people unprotected.\textsuperscript{86} He argues that this dynamic has exacerbated racism in the US criminal punishment system.\textsuperscript{87} While he advocates for the use of political process theory for constitutional review,\textsuperscript{88} Stuntz argues that interventionist judicial review of criminal procedure precludes legislatures from deciding certain procedural rights vis-à-vis police and so precludes them from appreciating police racism and abuse.

Stuntz argues that because constitutional law jurisprudence most strictly regulates policing, then adjudication, then punishment, legislatures regulate inversely, where they have room—spending and legislating most on

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Id. at 1816 (citing Richard Banks, \textit{Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War}, 56 STAN. L. REV. 571, 577–78, 598 (2003)).
\item Stuntz, \textit{supra} note 46, at 781 (2006).
\item Id. at 783.
\item Id. at 781.
\item Id. at 818.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
prisons, then criminal adjudication, then police.  However, suspects, who get the most constitutional protection from state action, have the most political power while convicted criminals, who get the least constitutional protection, have the least. Stuntz explains,

Tens of millions of mostly innocent criminal suspects can win political battles, at least sometimes. Two million mostly guilty felony defendants will find those battles harder to win. Several hundred thousand already-convicted prisoners may find victory impossible. To put the point in concrete terms, abused suspects like Rodney King have a lot more political appeal than prisoners like Willie Horton—and the Kings outnumber the Hortons by a considerable margin.

This observation is compounded by the political disempowerment people suffer simply by virtue of being suspected of a crime. While Rodney King undoubtedly had more political appeal than Willie Horton, he was famously not vindicated by the court battle to hold the Los Angeles Police

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89 Id. at 783–84.
91 Willie Horton was a Black man who was convicted of armed robbery and rape while on temporary release from his life sentence for murder as part of a Massachusetts weekend furlough program. In 1988, an attack ad featuring Horton was launched against Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis who was running for president. See, e.g., David A. Love, The Willie Horton Ad Revisited 25 Years Later, MSNBC THE GRIO (Oct. 21, 2013, 10:33 AM), http://thegrio.com/2013/10/21/the-willie-horton-ad-revisited-25-years-later/; Eric Benson, Dukakis’s Regret, NEW YORK MAGAZINE (Jun. 17, 2012), http://nymag.com/news/frank-rich/michael-dukakis-2012-6/.
92 Stuntz, supra note 46, at 783.
Department accountable for brutally beating him. Nonetheless, criminal suspects still could represent a powerful political interest group as they are great in number and mostly innocent of any serious wrongdoing.

Stuntz argues that the Warren Court’s criminal procedure decisions, including those related to police conduct under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, exhibited Justice Warren’s belief “that elected legislators would never adequately protect the interests of criminal suspects and defendants.” However, such constitutional rules incentivize legislators to focus their energy on crime definition and sentencing rather than on policing. Stuntz argues that this incentive to focus on criminal convicts and defendants rather than suspects, combined with the racism that permeates the criminal justice system, actually exacerbates racism through “tough on crime” policies. He explains that legislators follow their instincts and “[o]ften, what comes naturally is racism.” Stuntz suggests that racism is reinforced in the minds of legislators by the removal of their power to make rules controlling policing that encourages them to ignore the many People of Color who are entirely innocent but still targeted, and often abused, by police—“If black suspects and crime victims were as politically

95 Id. at 791–92.
96 Id. at 783–84.
97 Id. at 806.
visible as black criminals, we might see more politicians willing to be tough on both crime and racism.”98

Unlike Kahan and Meares’s application of political process theory, Stuntz’s application of political process theory accounts for the persistence of racial oppression and the importance of political representation of criminalized people. He argues that “[t]he proper role of constitutional law is to reject that majoritarian preference, to ensure that all parts of the citizenry live by the same rules and bear the same punishments when those rules are violated.”99 He suggests the use of citizen review boards and similar institutions to provide popular regulation of police power.100

Stuntz’s analysis highlights the hierarchy of political influence wielded by criminal suspects, criminal defendants, and criminal convicts. This analysis is important in identifying what groups are excluded from or severely limited in the political process. Recognition of this hierarchy of political influence should inform the efforts of the CPC and other bodies involved in the SPD re-formation.

While both the popular and legal theories discussed in this section largely offer means to determine the legitimacy of existing policies, they also offer guidance for the formation of legitimate new policies. The City of Seattle should draw on these theories not only in evaluating the current legitimacy of the SPD but also in re-forming its police force and policies. Traditional models for reform typically seek to change only policies or practices that are causing problems so as not to reinvent the wheel. However, this is not

98 Id. at 806–07 (citing United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 1993); Michael Cooper, Officers in Bronx Fire 41 Shots, and an Unarmed Man Is Killed, NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 5, 1999, at A1; Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420 (1988); and Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388 (1988)).
99 Stuntz, supra note 46, at 821 (citing ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 251–61 (1988)).
100 Id. at 833.
the best approach for the SPD. Unlike the proverbial wheel, both the invention and the functionality of the SPD are deeply flawed.

III. THE FORMATION OF THE SPD

To apply these theories to the SPD’s legitimacy crisis, the texts and history surrounding the SPD must be examined. Like government powers generally, the SPD’s powers are textually derived from the consent of the governed. The Washington State Constitution and the Seattle City Charter both contain declarations to this effect, and courts have interpreted such declarations as enshrining the power of the people over their government. Subsequent legislation has largely been enacted to limit rather than to grant authority to the SPD. Thus, the SPD’s power rests in a general idea that the people of Seattle have consented to the SPD’s authority to keep peace and arrest law-breakers. However, just as Justice Marshall emphasized in relation to the US Constitution, the “people” has historically included only a small subset of the people actually subjected to these government authorities and has excluded or ignored People of Color, women, and other marginalized groups.

A. Textual Formation and Regulation of the SPD

The United States government was formed under a theory of consent of the governed. As provided in the Declaration of Independence, “Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.” This proposition is further embodied by the familiar preamble to the US Constitution, which declares,

WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and

101 See Marshall, supra note 51.
102 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this CONSTITUTION for the United States of America.103

In the nineteenth century case of McCulloch v. Maryland, the US Supreme Court held that the people created both the state and federal governments in concluding that a part of the people (a state government) cannot tax or be supreme over the whole of the people (the federal government).104 The formations of the State of Washington and the City of Seattle were premised on the same notion that legitimate government is created by the consent of the governed—by a delegation of power from the people governed to the government that will govern them.

The Washington State Constitution begins with the assertion that “[a]ll political power is inherent in the people, the governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and are established to protect and maintain individual rights.”105 This assertion is bolstered by other provisions of the state constitution noting that “the people of the State . . . ordain this constitution,”106 and that the legislature cannot irrevocably grant authority to any person or body.107

The Washington Supreme Court has interpreted these constitutional provisions as preserving ultimate sovereignty in the people rather than in the institutions of government.108 The court held the people could limit their government’s power to levy taxes explaining,

[U]nder our form of government, ultimate sovereignty, so far as the state is concerned, rests in its people, and so long as the

103 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
105 WASH. CONST. art I, § 1.
106 WASH. CONST. pmbl.
107 WASH. CONST. art I, § 8 (“No law granting irrevocably any privilege, franchise, or immunity, shall be passed by the legislature.”).
108 See, e.g., Love v. King Cnty, 44 P.2d 175, 177 (1935); Martin v. Tollefson, 163 P.2d 594, 596 (1945).
government established by them exists, that sovereignty remains with them, except in so far as they have expressly surrendered it to a higher sovereignty.\textsuperscript{109}

In resolving a question of state versus municipal government authority, the Court asserted that “[t]he people, under our system of government, are the source of all governmental power, and they adopted the constitution for the purpose of creating certain agencies through which that power should be exercised.”\textsuperscript{110} These interpretations by the court affirm that government institutions in Washington State do not have irrevocable power, but rather they may exercise power to which the people of Washington State consent.

Taking an originalist approach, former Washington State Supreme Court Justice Richard B. Sanders\textsuperscript{111} proposes that state constitutions function as contracts by which people delegate power to state governments.\textsuperscript{112} He argues that the history and philosophy underlying the drafting of the US and state constitutions support the conclusion that these constitutions were meant to grant a limited number of specified, rather than many general, powers to the newly formed governments.\textsuperscript{113} Whenever state governments

\textsuperscript{109}Love, 44 P.2d at 177.
\textsuperscript{110}Martin, 163 P.2d at 596.
\textsuperscript{111}As a side note, Washington voters removed Justice Sanders from the Court in 2010 following his comment that "certain minority groups" are disproportionally represented in prison because they have a crime problem," Steve Miletich, \textit{Two State Supreme Court Justices Stun Some Listeners with Race Comments}, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010, http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2013226310_justices22m.html (quoting Richard B. Sanders).
\textsuperscript{113}Id. at 272 (“Indeed, Federalist Number 48 warns: ‘It will not be denied that power is of an encroaching nature and that it ought to be effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it.’ Similarly, Hamilton warned: ‘Nothing is more common than for a free people, in times of heat and violence, to gratify momentary passions, by letting into the government principles and precedents which afterwards prove fatal to themselves.’ Why would the people who were so protective of their liberty confer upon their own state government the virtually unlimited power of the British Parliament? Given the preoccupation with the corruptive influence of power in the eighteenth and nineteenth
exercise powers “beyond those necessary to protect and maintain individual rights, courts must look for specific manifestations of the people’s consent that evidence constitutional grants of that authority.”

Similarly, the Seattle City Charter, the establishing document for municipal power, begins with the proposition that “the People of the City of Seattle enact this Charter as the Law of the City for the purpose of protecting and enhancing the health, safety, environment, and general welfare of the people.” The charter further aims “to allow fair and equitable participation of all persons in the affairs of the city.” With these purposes, the charter declares that the Chief of the SPD shall be the chief peace officer of the City . . . shall maintain peace and quiet of the City . . . [and] shall have like powers and responsibilities as the Sheriff of King County in similar cases, and shall perform such other duties as may be imposed by ordinance.

The charter authorizes police officers to “make arrests for any crime or violation of the laws of the state or any ordinance of the City committed within the City,” and requires the SPD to maintain records of such arrests. Although the charter authorizes the SPD to generally keep peace and make arrests for criminal violations, it does not authorize specific procedures or practices by which the SPD may do so.

Legislation relating to the SPD largely functions to limit the SPD’s authority. Washington statutes have established a process for police officer certification and placed limitations on the availability of affirmative centuries, when most of our state constitutions were drafted, is it not more likely the powers conferred upon the state were few and surrendered reluctantly?”

\footnote{Id. at 269.}
\footnote{Charter of the City of Seattle, preamble (2007).}
\footnote{Id.}
\footnote{Id., art. VI, § 5 (2007).}
\footnote{Id.}
\footnote{WASH. REV. CODE § 43.101.095.}
defenses to homicide for police officers. The latter statute was originally proposed to limit the scope of acceptable police homicide—in other words, to limit rather than grant police authority, in response to the US Supreme Court’s decision in *Tennessee v. Garner*. However, the bill “was amended during debate to grant wider protections for use of force by police.” One of the bill’s sponsors, former State Senator and Washington Supreme Court Justice Phil Talmedge, noted that the originally proposed bill was “roundly criticized by law enforcement.” Just as it was did in the case of Mr. Birk’s shooting of Mr. Williams, the statute as enacted functions to protect, or almost authorize, police officers in Washington State to commit homicide in certain circumstances.

Municipal, rather than state, legislation contains the majority of regulations pertaining to the SPD. The Seattle Municipal Code regulates how the SPD may dispose of unclaimed property, what fees the SPD may charge for records, and what identification SPD officers must display when wearing an SPD uniform. The Seattle Municipal Code also establishes an Office of Professional Accountability and a Police

120 WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.040(3).
121 WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.16.040, 1986 c 209 § 3 (“The legislature recognizes that RCW 9A.16.040 establishes a dual standard with respect to the use of deadly force by peace officers and private citizens, and further recognizes that private citizens’ permissible use of deadly force under the authority of RCW 9.01.200, 9A.16.020, or 9A.16.050 is not restricted and remains broader than the limitations imposed on peace officers”); Martin,* supra* note 3; *Tennessee v. Garner*, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (declaring that “[t]he use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever circumstances is constitutionally unreasonable. . . . A police officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead”).
122 Martin,* supra* note 3.
123 *Id.* (quoting Phil Talmedge).
124 *Id.*
126 *Id.* §§ 3.28.070–090.
127 *Id.* § 3.28.040.
128 *Id.* §§ 3.28.800–920.
Establishing Legitimacy through Inclusive Re-Formation

Officers’ Bill of Rights. However, none of this legislation, including the Police Officers’ Bill of Rights, grants powers to the SPD vis-à-vis the people. The Office of Professional Accountability was created to “to receive and investigate complaints of misconduct by Seattle Police Department personnel,”—to be a mechanism for the people to check the authority of the SPD. The Police Officers’ Bill of Rights functions to protect SPD officers as employees by requiring certain notice and investigation procedures when an officer is accused of misconduct.

The Seattle Municipal Code does contain two specific grants of authority to the SPD. First, SPD officers are specifically authorized to enter premises and kill a dog who has bitten a person. Second, SPD officers are specifically authorized to discharge a firearm at another person when necessary for self-defense, defense of others, to apprehend or prevent escape of a person who has committed a serious felony, or to apprehend an escaped felon. However, SPD officers are not allowed to use a firearm “unless all other reasonable alternatives have been exhausted or would appear to a reasonable police officer to be ineffective under the particular circumstances.” Though these provisions are phrased as grants of authority, they function to limit the circumstances under which certain violent actions by the SPD are authorized to keep the peace.

B. Historical Formation and Regulation of the SPD

As the textual basis for the SPD’s authority to keep peace and make arrests rests in the consent of the governed, evaluation of the SPD’s

129 Id. §§ 3.28.320–380.
130 Id. § 3.28.800.
131 Id. §§ 3.28.320–380.
132 Id. § 3.28.030.
133 See id. § 3.28.115.
134 Id.
135 Wash. Const. art I, § 1 (“All political power is inherent in the people, the governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed, and are
legitimacy depends on a determination of who consented to this authority and how. This determination requires examination of the history surrounding the incorporation of the City of the Seattle and the formation of the SPD, as well as examination of the history surrounding the formation of police policy in the United States generally. This examination reveals that the “consent” to grant power to the SPD is not legitimate as to the entirety of “the people,” because large segments of the population, particularly those bearing the burden of criminal punishment and policing polices, were historically and continue presently to be excluded from the political process that checks government power.

Like the United States generally, the City of Seattle was founded as a government by White settlers who drove out the Native people who had previously occupied the area.136 Similarly, the State of Washington “was founded through the displacement of its native peoples by legal and extralegal means.”137 In response to the “agreements” proposed by Seattle’s White settlers, the city’s namesake, Chief Sealth of the Duwamish Tribe, expressed disbelief that, given their differences, the White settlers could or would protect his people:

established to protect and maintain individual rights”); Charter of the City of Seattle, Preamble (2007) (“Under authority conferred by the Constitution of the State of Washington, the People of the City of Seattle enact this Charter as the Law of the City for the purpose of protecting and enhancing the health, safety, environment, and general welfare of the people; to enable municipal government to provide services and meet the needs of the people efficiently; to allow fair and equitable participation of all persons in the affairs of the City; to provide for transparency, accountability, and ethics in governance and civil service; to foster fiscal responsibility; to promote prosperity and to meet the broad needs for a healthy, growing City”).


Our good father in Washington... sends us word that if we do as he desires he will protect us. Then in reality he will be our father and we his children. But can that ever be? Your God is not our God! Your God loves your people and hates mine! He folds his strong protecting arms lovingly about the paleface and leads him by the hand as a father leads an infant son. But, He has forsaken His Red children, if they really are His. The white man’s God cannot love our people or He would protect them.\textsuperscript{138}

Chief Sealth’s speech decried the harm that White settlers had vested upon the Native Americans who had lived on the land that is now Seattle and expressed the lack of trust he had in a government formed by these settlers.\textsuperscript{139}

Among the earliest legislation that the SPD was authorized to enforce were ordinances targeting Native Americans. Under the first town charter of 1865,\textsuperscript{140} the territorial White government adopted ordinances aimed at preventing the sale of alcohol to Native Americans, removing Native Americans “to points outside of the town limits,” and punishing “those who might harbor them.”\textsuperscript{141} As it expanded and incorporated as a City, Seattle formally created the SPD with an elected chief of police. Seattle was incorporated as a City in 1869 with a charter establishing a marshal as one of the City’s officers.\textsuperscript{142}

Seattle’s early electoral politics reveal a pattern by which the actions and power of the SPD were controlled, or at least heavily influenced, by the limited voting franchise of the time. The City was initially known as an “open town” where “extravagance ran riot, debauchery and crime were...
almost unchecked. . . . Gambling of every known variety flourished openly as did harlotry and drunkenness, under the fostering eyes of the police.”143 Seattle’s first brothel prostituted Native American women to White men as there were few women in Seattle’s White population.144 Though there was a brief crackdown on such activities resulting from popular demand and electoral replacement of the city’s government, with the Klondike gold rush of 1897, “Seattle again became a ‘wide-open town,’ the same as it had been ten years earlier.”145 Seattle’s mayoral politics in the early twentieth century continued to revolve around the city’s policing system—voters expressed disapproval of the SPD’s tolerance of brothels and gambling and perceived collusion “with promoters of vice and crime.”146

Though this history may be seen as an example of the governed exercising control over their government, the franchise during this time was limited to male, English-speaking US Citizens aged 21 or older who met a residency requirement and explicitly excluded Native Americans not taxed by the State.147 The franchise was expanded to women in 1910148 and to people aged 18 or older in 1974.149 The prohibitions on voting by Native Americans not taxed by the State and by non-English-speakers were also eventually removed in 1974.150 However, to this day, people convicted of an “infamous crime” are barred from voting until and unless their civil rights

143 Id. at 549.
145 BAGLEY, supra note 140, at 552.
146 Id. at 549–55.
147 WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 1, original text, amend. 2 (1896).
148 WASH. CONST. art VI, § 1, amend. V (1910).
149 WASH. CONST. art VI, § 1, amend. LXIII (1974).
150 Id.
are affirmatively restored.\textsuperscript{151} Thus, the franchise was historically limited to a small subset of the people who are now and were then still subjected to the authority of the government and so of the police.

The franchise that influenced Seattle’s policing policy was further dependent on the franchise recognized by the federal government.\textsuperscript{152} Amar observes that the consensus “that the People were sovereign and that governments were therefore necessarily limited . . . existed, of course, among a very limited set of prominent white male property owners.”\textsuperscript{153} He further criticizes the hypocrisy of the framers of the US Constitution who preached legitimacy by popular political participation while denying rights of political participation and the basic humanity of People of Color, women, and the poor:

\begin{quote}
In several crucial respects, the Federalist Constitution seemed to fall short of perfecting the sovereignty of the People of America. To begin with, many persons, slaves being the most obvious example, found themselves excluded from ‘the People’ by a definitional fiat that seriously eroded the moral force of the Federalist vision of popular sovereignty.\textsuperscript{154}
\end{quote}

In addition, Amar recognizes that “[i]ndians, women, and the poor also faced barriers to equal political participation.”\textsuperscript{155} Though himself an originalist, Amar recognizes the serious problems with and limitations of reliance on the United States’ foundational texts and ideas.

Dr. King also criticized the hypocrisy of textual declarations that the United States was committed to equality when the country did not respect

\begin{footnotes}
\item[151] \textit{WASH. CONST.} art VI, § 3 (1896).
\item[152] See \textit{WASH. CONST.} art. VI, § 1, amend. II (1896) (requiring that voters must be US citizens).
\item[153] Amar, \textit{Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra} note 73, at 1451 n.101.
\item[154] \textit{Id.} at 1463.
\item[155] \textit{Id.} at 1463, n.164.
\end{footnotes}
the basic rights of People of Color. In his iconic speech delivered at the 1963 March on Washington, Dr. King declared,

[W]e’ve come to our nation’s capital to cash a check. When the architects of our Republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which every American was to fall heir. This note was a promise that all men—yes, black men as well as white men—would be guaranteed the unalienable rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. It is obvious today that America has defaulted on this promissory note insofar as her citizens of color are concerned. Instead of honoring this sacred obligation, America has given the Negro people a bad check, a check which has come back marked “insufficient funds.”156

Just as Dr. King’s analogy to a bounced check exposed the falsity of the declaration that all people would be treated equally in the United States, declarations that the United States, the State of Washington, or the City of Seattle derive their powers from the consent of the governed are similarly false.

Even though the SPD was textually empowered by the consent of the governed, history reveals that only a small subset of the governed actually participated in delegating authority to the SPD. This history limits the legitimacy of the SPD, and modern policing and criminal punishment regimes further limit legitimacy by unjustifiably targeting People of Color who were historically excluded from the formation of government and by specifically disempowering people targeted and burdened by the criminal justice system.

IV. LIMITATIONS ON THE LEGITIMACY OF THE SPD

The SPD’s legitimacy is undermined both by its politically exclusive formation and by ongoing systems exclusion. The SPD fares poorly under political process theory, as the people most burdened and targeted by the SPD are excluded from the political process that can hold the SPD accountable. The SPD has a well-documented history of racially discriminatory practices, and this discrimination is further compounded by other criminal punishment institutions (state prosecutors, courts, and prisons), as discussed in Section A. Thus, the SPD targets groups that were excluded from “the people” when the SPD was formed. Further, Washington State specifically disempowers people targeted by the criminal justice system by revoking political participation rights and impeding economic opportunities, so those bearing this burden continue to be excluded from the political process.

A. Racial Discrimination by the SPD and the Criminal Punishment System Generally

Racial discrimination in Washington’s criminal justice system and particularly by the SPD has been well-documented in connection with policy-making and with litigation aiming to expose and end these practices. These analyses reveal that the SPD disproportionately targets, arrests, and uses force against People of Color and that People of Color subsequently receive worse treatment than similarly situated White people in Washington’s criminal punishment system. The Washington State Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System (formed in response to the 2010 comments by two sitting Washington Supreme Court Justices hypothesizing that racial minorities were over-represented in Washington prisons because they committed more crimes) found that “race and racial

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157 See generally ELY, supra note 56.
158 Task Force, supra note 137, at 626–27.
bias matter in ways that are not fair, that do not advance legitimate public safety objectives, that produce disparities in the criminal justice system, and that undermine public confidence in our legal system.”159

Katherine Beckett, a sociologist at the University of Washington,160 conducted an in-depth analysis of SPD drug arrests in order to determine whether drug laws were selectively enforced against Black people, in connection with selective enforcement litigation brought against the City by the American Civil Liberties Union and The Defender Association Racial Disparity Project.161 In 2000, the arrest rate for Black Seattle residents was 10.2 times the arrest rate for White Seattle residents; this arrest rate ratio was larger than all other mid-sized US cities, including Detroit, Baltimore, and Portland.162 In 2006, Seattle had the second-highest (after Minneapolis) Black/White drug arrest rate ratio among mid-sized US Cities; Black Seattle residents were arrested for drug offenses 13.57 times as often as White residents.163 From 1999–2001, “a majority of users of serious drugs, with the possible exception of crack cocaine, [were] white,” and most needle exchangers in Seattle reported obtaining their drugs from a White person; however, “64.2 percent of those purposefully arrested for delivery of serious drugs . . . were black.”164

Ethnographical observations of two well-known open air drug markets (at Third Avenue and Pike Street Downtown and at Broadway and Denny Way in Capitol Hill) conducted in connection with this analysis indicated that

159 Id. at 629.
162 Id. at 9 (internal citations omitted).
163 Id. at 56 (internal citations omitted).
164 Id. at 11 (internal citations omitted).
54.4 percent of those buying drugs in the downtown market were White while 80 percent of those buying drugs in the Capitol Hill market were White.\textsuperscript{165} Further, 56.8 percent of those observed delivering (“dealing”) drugs at both markets combined were White, though 49.5 percent of those delivering drugs at the downtown market were White compared to 83.6 percent of those at the Capitol Hill market.\textsuperscript{166} Nonetheless, in the Capitol Hill market, “9.1 percent of the observed deliverers were black, but 30 percent of the delivery arrestees were black. . . . [T]his comparison indicates that blacks are 3.9 times more likely to be arrested for delivery of a serious drug in Capitol Hill than Whites engaging in the same behavior.”\textsuperscript{167}

Beckett further compared these racial disparities in arrest rates with multiple public health and population surveys, which revealed that People of Color neither use nor sell drugs at higher rates than White people.\textsuperscript{168} Beckett gathered data from federal research of Seattle residents, surveys of public school students, reports from the Medical Examiner’s Office, surveys of needle exchange participants, drug treatment program admissions information collected by the state, and the observational study of two of Seattle’s open air drug markets to get an accurate picture of Seattle’s drug markets and of actual conduct, rather than arrests, by people of different races.\textsuperscript{169}

For example, the federal Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) survey of Seattle residents indicated that White Seattle residents use serious drugs (18.6 percent reporting serious drug use in the past year, 7.9 percent in the past month) at approximately the same


\textsuperscript{166} Id. at 44.

\textsuperscript{167} Id. at 70.

\textsuperscript{168} Id. at 21, 24, 30–31, 93–94 (internal citations omitted).

\textsuperscript{169} BECKETT, supra note 161, at 17.
rates as the Seattle population as a whole (18.5 percent reporting serious drug use in the past year, 8.5 percent in the past month). A similar SAMHSA study revealed that public school students reported drugs at roughly the same rates across races. Further, White Seattle residents reported selling illegal drugs more frequently than Seattle residents as a whole (5.2 percent of White Seattle residents reported selling illegal drugs in the past year, compared to 4.7 percent of all Seattle residents); 76.1 percent of those who sell illegal drugs in Seattle are White. Thus, Beckett’s analysis demonstrates that differential arrest rates by race cannot be attributed to differential behavior across races. Rather, the SPD’s disproportionately high arrest rates of People of Color represent racially discriminatory policing.

While the DOJ did not make a “finding” of discriminatory policing in its recent investigation of the SPD, possibly due to the difficulty of proving an Equal Protection claim, it expressed concern about the SPD’s treatment of People of Color. Over half of the cases that the DOJ determined to be “unnecessary or excessive uses of force” involved People of Color. The DOJ’s analysis further indicated that the SPD’s inappropriate pedestrian encounters (so-called “social” contacts treated as Terry stops) disproportionately involve Youth of Color, and that SPD officers “may stop a disproportionate number of people of color where no offense or other police incident occurred.” The investigation further revealed a troubling

170 Id. at 21 (internal citations omitted).
171 Id. at 24 (internal citations omitted).
172 Id. at 41.
174 Id. at 6.
175 Id.
176 Id.
pattern of SPD officers using and tolerating racially-charged language.\textsuperscript{177}

The DOJ explained,

\begin{quote}
[A] number of individuals reported incidents in which racial epithets were used or minorities were singled out for harsh treatment. We also reviewed the video of the notorious incidents involving an officer’s threat to “beat the f’ing Mexican piss” out of a suspect. It is troubling that the use of this racial epithet failed to provoke any of the surrounding officers to react, suggesting a department culture that tolerates this kind of abuse. Of greatest concern, neither of the two supervisors present admonished the officer at the scene. Nor did anyone report the incident to OPA until a third-party video of the incident was posted publicly. The number of people present, the failure to correct the officer, and the failure to immediately report the conduct all could be seen as a reflection of a hardened culture of accepting racially charged language.\textsuperscript{178}
\end{quote}

These examinations of the SPD reveal racially discriminatory practices that are not justified by policy or behavior. This racial disparity in treatment is exacerbated by subsequent parts of the criminal justice system.

The racial disparities found in arrests and other police encounters are also present in subsequent stages of the criminal justice system, for example, in charging decisions and sentencing. In response to a 1980 report that revealed that Washington had the highest rate of disproportionate minority representation in prisons of any state,\textsuperscript{179} the Washington Courts formed the Minority and Justice Task Force. The Task Force found that “bias pervades the entire legal system in general and hence [minorities] do not trust the court system to resolve their disputes or administer justice.

\textsuperscript{177} Id. at 28.
\textsuperscript{178} Id. at 27.
\textsuperscript{179} Task Force, supra note 137, at 627 (citing Scott Christianson, Corrections Law Developments: Racial Discrimination and Prison Confinement—A Follow-Up, 16 CRIM. L. BULL. 616, 617 (1980)).
For example, a 1995 study found “prosecutors were 75
[percent] less likely to recommend alternative sentences for black
defendants than for similarly situated white defendants.”181 Though
ultimately insufficient to invalidate Washington’s felon disenfranchisement
law under the Voting Rights Act (VRA) on rehearing, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized data regarding search,
arrest, and imprisonment disparities between races as “compelling
circumstantial evidence of discrimination in Washington’s criminal justice
system.”182

In the Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System’s preliminary
report, the Task Force found racial discrimination in policing,183 and also in
prison sentences184 and imposition of Legal Financial Obligations
(LFOs).185 The imposition of LFOs can leave people in significant debt,

180 Id. at 635 (quoting CHARLES Z. SMITH, WASH. STATE MINORITY & JUSTICE TASK
FORCE, WASH. STATE SUPREME COURT, FINAL REPORT 10 (1990), available at http://
181 Id. at 647 (citing ROBERT D. CRUTCHFIELD ET AL., WASHINGTON STATE MINORITY &
JUSTICE COMM’N, A STUDY ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN THE PROSECUTION
OF CRIMINAL CASES IN KING COUNTY WASHINGTON: FINAL REPORT (1995), available
182 Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 590 F.3d 989, 1009–11 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d on question of
law by rehearing en banc, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010).
183 Task Force, supra note 137, at 657–58 (citing J. Mitchell Pickerill et al., Search and
POL’Y 1, 13, 15 (2009)).
184 Id. at 648 (citing Rodney L. Engen et al., Discretion and Disparity Under Sentencing
Guidelines: The Role of Departures and Structured Sentencing Alternatives, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 99, 116–17 (2003); see also CRUTCHFIELD, supra note 181, at 32, 34,
72 tbl.13b; Kenneth E. Fernandez & Timothy Bowman, Race, Political Institutions, and
Criminal Justice: An Examination of the Sentencing of Latino Offenders, 36 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41, 63, 66–68 (2004); Sara Steen et al., Images of Danger and
Culpability: Racial Stereotyping, Case Processing, and Criminal Sentencing, 43 CRIMINOLOGY 435, 451 (2005)).
185 Id. at 649 (citing KATHERINE A. BECKETT ET AL., WASH. STATE MINORITY &
JUSTICE COMM’N, WASH. STATE SUPREME COURT THE ASSESSMENT AND
CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS IN WASHINGTON STATE, 23–25
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even after decades of making regular payments,\textsuperscript{186} and, until recently, this legal debt barred people from restoring their civil rights (including the right to vote).\textsuperscript{187} In 2009, Washington made progress on this issue in 2009 by passing a law that provisionally restores the right to vote once a person with a felony conviction is no longer under the authority of the Department of Corrections; however, a person’s right to vote may still be revoked if she or he does not make adequate payments toward her or his LFO debt.\textsuperscript{188}

The Task Force explained why such disparities undermine the legitimacy of Washington’s criminal justice system: “Put simply, we have found disparity and mistrust. Together, we must fix it for the sake of our democracy.”\textsuperscript{189} Unjustified different treatment by government institutions, such as the SPD, indicates that such institutions cannot be trusted by the people they govern and thus cannot be legitimate.

\begin{flushleft}
\textbf{B. Systemic Exclusion of People Burdened by Policing from the Political Process}
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While many people bear the burden of SPD practices—including people wrongly suspected and harassed by police and people left unprotected by police—those who are actually criminalized (arrested, charged, and convicted) may bear the greatest burden of SPD practices. As discussed above in Section A, the SPD has a record of disproportionately targeting People of Color for minor drug crimes. Those targeted by the SPD are subjected to the burdens imposed by the criminal punishment system, which

\textsuperscript{186} Id. (citing Alexes Harris et al., \textit{Drawing Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary United States}, 115 Am. J. Soc. 1753, 1756, 1773-82 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.82.090 (Supp. 2011)).

\textsuperscript{187} WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1896); Beckett, \textit{supra} note 161, at 5–6 (citing ACLU 2004; JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT & AMERICAN DEMOCRACY Table A3.3 (New York: Oxford University Press 2006)).


\textsuperscript{189} Task Force, \textit{supra} note 137, at 671.
may include large monetary fines or restriction of liberty achieved by threat or use of physical violence.

The political and economic oppression of people with criminal convictions—particularly felony convictions—is a problem throughout the United States. In her bestseller *The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness*, Michelle Alexander, a civil rights and criminal law scholar and professor of law at The Ohio State University, examines how the US criminal punishment system is used as a tool of racial oppression. She explains,

> [o]nce a person is labeled a felon, he or she is ushered into a parallel universe in which discrimination, stigma and exclusion are perfectly legal, and privileges of citizenship such as voting and jury service are off-limits. . . . [People convicted even of a drug felony are] [b]arred from public housing by law, discriminated against by private landlords, ineligible for food stamps, forced to “check the box” indicating a felony conviction on employment applications for nearly every job, and denied licenses for a wide range of professions.

Alexander argues, “[t]hese restrictions amount to a form of ‘civic death’ and send the unequivocal message that ‘they’ are no longer part of ‘us.’” People with felony convictions face both legal and economic barriers, which impede their abilities to support themselves and their families and prevent their participation in the political process.

As in the United States generally, people with felony convictions in Washington are subjected to these “collateral” consequences. Like most

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191 ALEXANDER, supra note 21.
192 Id. at 94.
193 Id. at 142.
194 See generally id. at 140–77 (ch. 4, The Cruel Hand).
states, Washington restricts the civil rights of and imposes LFOs and other economic hardships on people with felony convictions. Beyond the harshness of such consequences, political and economic restrictions on people with felony convictions undermine the legitimacy of the criminal justice system’s policies and institutions because the people who bear its consequences are politically disempowered.

Washington law creates barriers for people with felony convictions to hold accountable the institutions that convicted them by restricting convicted felons’ abilities to vote and serve on juries. The Washington State Constitution provides that “[a]ll persons convicted of infamous crime unless restored to their civil rights and all persons while they are judicially declared mentally incompetent are excluded from the elective franchise.” 195 Similarly, Washington restricts people with felony convictions from participating in jury service until their rights are restored: “[a] person shall be competent to serve as a juror in the state of Washington unless that person . . . [h]as been convicted of a felony and has not had his or her civil rights restored.” 196

However, Washington has begun to roll back these barriers to formal political participation by people with felony convictions. Washington law provides some mechanisms by which people with felony convictions may restore their rights to vote and to serve on juries. Recent legislation provides that the right to vote is provisionally restored once a person convicted of a felony in Washington State is no longer “under the authority of the department of corrections,” or once a person convicted of a felony in another state is no longer incarcerated. 197 Washington law provides additional mechanisms through which rights may be restored by the

195 WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (1896).
197 Id. § 29A.08.520.
Governor, the Indeterminate Sentence Review Board, or the sentencing court. Further, Washington has somewhat decreased the exclusion of jurors based on felony conviction by drawing juries from a list that merges the list of all registered voters with a list people holding drivers licenses and/or identicards in each county. Despite these mechanisms for restoring civil rights, many people with felony convictions are still barred from political participation.

Washington law allows people with felony convictions to restore these rights while they are still paying their LFOs, however, the sentencing court may revoke this provisional restoration if the person “has willfully failed to comply with the terms of his or her order to pay legal financial obligations,” and the prosecutor “shall seek” such revocation if the person has failed to make three payments in a year toward his or her LFOs. LFOs thus bar many people from restoring their rights of political participation. One examination of the effect of LFOs found that “[a]s a result [of the previous requirement to pay off LFOs before civil rights are restored], an estimated 3.6 percent of the adult population and 17.2 percent of all adult African American men living in Washington State were disenfranchised at the end of 2004.” While the 2009 legislation allowing provisional restoration of civil rights before LFOs are paid in full likely lessens this effect, many people with felony convictions, as discussed below, are kept out of jobs and may be unable to make the required consistent monthly payments to

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198 Id. § 9.96.010.
199 Id. § 9.96.050.
200 Id. §§ 9.94A.637, 9.92.066.
201 An identicard is a form of photo identification used when an individual does not hold a valid driver’s license. See WASH. REV. CODE § 46.20.117(1) (2012).
202 WASH. REV. CODE §§ 2.36.010(8), 2.36.054 (2013).
203 Id. § 29A.08.520.
204 Beckett, supra note 161, at 5–6 (citing ACLU 2004; JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT & AMERICAN DEMOCRACY Table A3.3 (2006)).
maintain their civil rights. Further, people are certainly barred by Washington law from voting or serving on juries while they are in prison or under state supervision (including probation).

Economic disempowerment of people with felony convictions also impedes their ability to participate in the political process. As Alexander explains, people with felony convictions face legal and systemic, rather than incidental or extralegal, discrimination in finding work, finding housing, and accessing government support.205 These barriers are just as present in Seattle as they are in the rest of the country. For example, it is very difficult for young people with only minor juvenile felony convictions to find work, even at fast food restaurants.206 It similarly became harder for people with felony convictions to gain skills and qualifications that may help them find work when the University of Washington rolled out its plan to ask applicants about criminal convictions in the fall of 2013.207 In addition, legal debt is a huge economic burden and barrier. A 2004 sample of people convicted of crimes were on average required to pay $11,471 in LFOs over their lifetime, with Washington charging 12 percent interest on unpaid LFOs; so, even if making consistent $50 monthly payments, an average person with a criminal conviction would still carry LFO debt after 30 years of making payments.208

This economic disempowerment translates to political disempowerment. The US Supreme Court held in *Citizens United v. Federal Election*
Commission, that a prohibition on corporate independent expenditures on political advertisements was a ban on speech. The Court’s holding that the manner in which a corporation spends its money is a form of speech implies that money is, at the least, a means of amplifying political speech. Though the decision was controversial, the dissent primarily took issue with other aspects of the decision (e.g., the status afforded to corporations and whether disproportionate political influence should be limited) and did not quibble with the proposition that money translates to or amplifies political influence. Thus, when the system of collateral consequences of criminal convictions (legalized employment discrimination, LFOs, etc.) impoverishes people with felony convictions and their families by extension, it impedes their abilities to make their voices heard in the current political system.

Without money to contribute to political campaigns or to distribute political speech and without the right to vote or to serve on juries, people with felony convictions are left with little, if any, voice in the political system. Thus, the people most burdened by policing practices and the criminal justice system are also unable to hold their government accountable.

V. POPULAR EXPRESSIONS OF PROTEST AND REVOCATIONS OF CONSENT

Despite the disempowerment of many who are swept into the criminal justice system by the SPD, people have expressed disapproval of the SPD’s exercise of authority through means other than formal elections, arguably revoking their consent to be governed. People in Seattle have attempted to limit or revoke the power of the SPD through litigation, public protest, and non-cooperation.

210 Id. at 393–479.
In 2005, The Defender Association, a King County public defender organization representing indigent defendants, brought a selective enforcement lawsuit against the SPD demonstrating racial bias in SPD arrest practices.\(^{211}\) This lawsuit led to voluntary SPD policy changes for drug arrests in Seattle’s West Precinct (the site of many of the discriminatory arrests).\(^{212}\) The 2012 DOJ litigation argued that the SPD has a pattern or practice of using excessive force and raised concern about the SPD’s discriminatory policing, leading to an ongoing agreement for SPD reform and oversight.\(^{213}\) Though this latter litigation by the federal government may not obviously seem like an expression of the people of Seattle, the federal government, like the state government, may act as an agent of the people. As Amar explained, “federalism enabled the American People to conquer government power by dividing it. Each government agency, state and national, would have incentives to win the principal’s affections by monitoring and challenging the other’s misdeeds.”\(^{214}\)

However, as evidenced by turmoil in the execution of the consent decree, not all people agree that the DOJ is a representative of the people of Seattle.\(^{215}\)

Additionally, groups of Seattleites have convened public protests of the SPD both in response to general SPD policies and practices and in response to specific incidents. The Seattle chapter of the Black Panther Party (BPP) protested SPD practices both by their existence and publications and by


\(^{214}\) Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, supra note 73, at 1450.

\(^{215}\) See, e.g., supra notes 9–13.
public rallies and demonstrations. The Seattle chapter of the October 22nd Coalition demonstrates annually in protest of police brutality and over-criminalization. Public rallies and protests have also followed incidents of egregious SPD violence, such as the SPD’s response to the World Trade Organization protesters in 1999, and the killing of John T. Williams in 2010.

Finally, Seattleites have refused to recognize the authority of the SPD by non-cooperation and direct action. Following the 1965 killing of a Black man by allegedly drunk, off-duty, White SPD officers for which the officers involved were punished only by short suspensions, Black and civil rights community groups called for civilian oversight of the SPD. When elected officials ignored these demands, the Central Area Civil Rights Committee (CACRC), with support from the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) and


advice from the ACLU, formed “Freedom Patrols,” where community volunteers peacefully followed and monitored the actions of the SPD in the Central Area.221

The Seattle BPP opted out of protection from or authority of the SPD, and responded to the lack of protection and excessive intrusion by the SPD, by developing independent self-defense and survival programs to protect Black Seattleites.222 As one of the Seattle BPP founders, Elmer Dixon, explained,

We [black Americans] were no longer going to be hosed by police, bitten by police dogs, bombed in our churches. . . . We were a symbol. The impression we wanted to give was that we were not cowards. We were men. . . . We were not going to beg for our rights. . . . We were trying to forge change by whatever means we could.223

Additionally, the BPP conducted its own reviews of killings of Black people by White SPD officers as official inquests too readily found such killings “justified.”224

Further, many individuals have refused to cooperate with the SPD. Individuals in the anti-authoritarian Occupy and Anarchist movements in Seattle have refused to comply with police limits and to participate in grand

221 Id.
jury investigations. Finally, columnist Larry Mizell Jr. and singer Choklate Moore explained that many young People of Color, who have only experienced neglect or abuse from police, avoid police or do not cooperate with police. Butler advocates such non-cooperation as a mechanism for democratic accountability, noting “[w]hen the law is selectively applied, or doesn’t serve to make communities safer, providing information about lawbreakers is not a virtue.”

Thus, despite the legal disempowerment of people bearing the brunt of the burden of SPD practices, Seattleites nonetheless have expressed their disapproval of or desire to revoke SPD authority. These popular expressions of discontent, in their own right, challenge the legitimacy of the SPD’s authority. Further, applying political process theory, the discriminatory outcomes of the SPD’s exercise of power and the political disempowerment of the people most burdened by the SPD’s exercise of power seriously undermine the legitimacy of SPD authority.


229 BUTLER, supra note 39, at 99.
VI. THE NECESSARY PROCESS FOR RE-FORMING THE SPD TO ESTABLISH LEGITIMACY

In order to legitimize the SPD’s power, the SPD must truly be re-formed with input from the entire population, particularly those bearing the burdens of police and criminal punishment policies. The re-form effort must be premised on two propositions: (1) current SPD policies and power afforded to the SPD must be presumed illegitimate; and (2) people actually bearing the brunt of the burden of the SPD’s exercise of power (people punished based on SPD arrests and investigations) must be specifically empowered in the re-formation of the SPD.

A. The SPD’s Current Powers Must be Presumed Illegitimate

First, as discussed previously, the SPD was formed by a subset of the people subjected to its authority, and those most harmed by the SPD’s exercise of power, those punished and labeled as felons, have been politically disempowered. Further, the SPD has exercised its power in a way that discriminates against People of Color, who were and are excluded from the political electorate that empowered the SPD. Finally, Communities of Color and anti-authoritarian activists have expressed disapproval of the SPD’s exercise of power via litigation, public protest, and noncooperation. Both analyzing whether the SPD has the consent of the governed and applying political process theory to this history and system leads to the conclusion that the SPD does not legitimately have the power to govern or police the people of Seattle, particularly Communities of Color.

230 See generally supra notes 136–56.
231 See generally supra notes 190–210.
232 See generally supra notes 158–89.
233 See generally supra notes 211–29.
It may be argued that, as its formation is enshrined in the Seattle City Charter, the SPD cannot be “illegitimate” absent some legal or political action declaring it so (e.g., a court ruling that the SPD has no authority, a legislative amendment to the city charter revoking the SPD’s power, or a voter initiative disbanding the SPD). However, as Justice Marshall argued, the real value of formative texts like the Constitution (or the Seattle City Charter) does not come from literal, deferential interpretation but from modern interpretation that strives for substantive justice, equality, and legitimacy.234 The textual declaration that the SPD derives its power from the consent of the governed must be read with an acknowledgement that many people were and are excluded from giving or revoking consent to the SPD’s authority through the formal political process. Substantive legitimacy through consent requires recognition of the many ways people voice consent or disapproval (protest, noncooperation, etc.).

In the case of the SPD, not only have groups organized to specifically voice disapproval of SPD exercises of power, but 65 percent of people in Seattle believe the SPD does not treat people of all races equally and 45 percent believe the SPD often uses excessive force.235 Although the burden of SPD actions may be concentrated, the population at large perceives serious problems. Particularly in light of the ways in which People of Color, women, and others were excluded from the political process that formed the SPD,236 the re-formation effort should respect and respond to widespread concern about the SPD’s exercise of power rather than continue to recognize the power granted by a very limited franchise a very long time ago.

Thus, in the re-formation process, any current authority exercised by the SPD must be presumed illegitimate. Both legal and popular theories of

234 See Marshall, supra note 51.
235 Anzalone & Stryker, supra note 8, at 1.
236 See generally supra notes 136–56.
democracy require that government power must be accountable to those most burdened by it and that it must not be exercised in a way that discriminates against a disempowered minority.\textsuperscript{237} As the SPD has exercised its power in a way that discriminates against People of Color, and those who are punished and labelled as felons because of the SPD’s exercise of power are disempowered politically, the SPD is not a legitimate democratic institution and does not have the consent of the people it governs.

Rather than revising or removing those policies or practices of the SPD that the DOJ has identified as problems, the re-formation process should start from scratch and build a new conception of what, if any, powers we the people wish to delegate to a police force. Such a presumption will likely not lead to violence or lawlessness. For example, British Police generally do not carry lethal weapons, and British society has not descended into chaos.\textsuperscript{238} A presumption of illegitimacy is important to ensure that the Anglo-American culture and ideas that originally formed the SPD do not continue to control and exclude other voices from the re-formation process. Such a presumption may allow greater space for more voices that would otherwise be silenced because they do not fit within the narrow areas that the DOJ has identified as problematic.

Though a presumption of illegitimacy may be protested by existing police officers, this consequence has been realized even with the limited changes that the DOJ has sought to implement, and the result has not been a catastrophe or a total loss of social order. Some within the SPD have responded to the changes resulting from the Consent Decree by so-called “de-policing,” and by filing lawsuits to attempt to block new policies.

\textsuperscript{237} See generally supra notes 19–100.

A May 2014 report to the CPC indicated that SPD enforcement of low-level infractions and misdemeanors dropped dramatically in recent years, though there is no agreed upon explanation for the drop. Though often criticized, this “de-policing” may be part of the necessary process for effective reform. If the drop in enforcement of low-level crimes stems from the SPD’s doubt about all formerly-used practices, this drop in enforcement may represent a presumption or fear by SPD officers that formerly-used practices are unauthorized or illegitimate. If the prior policing regime is presumed illegitimate, we must “de-police” (abandon that regime) before we can build a new, legitimate policing regime in its place. However, the drop in enforcement may instead stem from a frustration with the reform process or a desire to create obstacles to or protest the intervention and changes to SPD policies. If the latter is true, this may signal a potentially soon-to-come shift in the institutional culture, or at least personnel, of the SPD.

Additionally, on May 28, 2014, 126 SPD Officers filed a lawsuit against the DOJ, the City, and the court-appointed monitor overseeing the consent decree (among other defendants), alleging that the newly implemented use of force policy violates their constitutional rights and puts them in unreasonable danger. US Attorney Durkan criticized the lawsuit as an


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attempt by some SPD officers to hinder reform efforts, and declared a message for SPD officers, “[r]eform is on the way. Get on the train, or leave.”241 Further, Monitor Merrick Bobb noted his concern in a recent report that “the internalization of the objectives and goals of the Consent Decree by the SPD will require a redoubling of additional, focused efforts.”242 There is, at least, a sizeable contingent of SPD officers resisting reform efforts. Such resistance may be a positive sign for meaningful change as it may portend an exodus of those in the SPD who are resistant to new policies and ideas. However, depending on the magnitude of this resistance, it may instead represent an institutional culture within the SPD that will defeat the current reform efforts.

However, a recent rejection of a lawsuit by the Seattle Police Management Association (the union for management-level SPD officers) to block a 2014 city ordinance allowing the chief to hire from outside the SPD to fill management positions243 may pave way for a necessary shift in the institutional culture of the SPD. The presumption of illegitimacy necessary for meaningful re-formation must be internalized and embraced by the SPD. To further this goal, SPD officers should be included, certainly, as community members, in the re-formation effort, but should be included on the same footing as other community members. SPD officers’ input should be shared publicly and weighted equally with other input. Further, the end

or reduction of the immunity from prosecution and serious punishment and
the preferential promotions that SPD officers have been afforded in the past
may help cement the understanding among SPD officers and management
that the SPD must be accountable to the people of Seattle for its actions. If
SPD officers or management are not willing to work in a police force that is
truly accountable to the people it polices, then they are not well-suited to be
part of a legitimate police force.

B. Those Most Harmed by the SPD’s Exercise of Power Must be
Specifically Empowered in the Re-Formation Process

Second, those most burdened and harmed by the SPD’s current exercise
of power must be empowered and must have a controlling role in the re-
formation process. This proposition flows from the political process theory
of legal or constitutional legitimacy that views as suspect government
action or policy formed with constraints on political participation and
resulting in unequal treatment of a minority group,244 and from the demands
of Black activists and theorists whose communities have been harmed and
oppressed by police power.245 This may be accomplished by the CPC both
taking a more central and controlling role in the re-formation process and
reaching out to and specifically empowering prisoners and people with
criminal convictions (whose opportunities for political participation are
generally limited) in the re-formation process.

The CPC, formed as part of the 2012 settlement agreement between the
City of Seattle and the DOJ, aimed to include people with criminal
histories, but is largely made up of representatives of people bearing the
burdens of SPD policy (i.e., Communities of Color and criminal
defendants), alongside police and business representatives.246 However,

244 See generally Ely, supra note 56.
245 See generally supra notes 19–50.
   ttle.gov/policecommission/ (last visited June 28, 2014).
even the CPC was denied formal power in the re-formation process; it was allowed to continue to “comment” on the process but not to “delay” the process to ensure its voice was heard by the Court overseeing the SPD reformation.247

Such limitation of power in the re-formation process to the DOJ and/or the City government will not truly give the SPD legitimacy as these agents are not representative of the people subjected to SPD power because they are elected by a franchise that disempowers people with felony convictions. The City of Seattle is the party that will be held liable in litigation concerning SPD conduct and thus has financial interest in denying the claims of SPD abuse from the people of Seattle. The DOJ also relies on the SPD in many of the criminal cases it prosecute and has even partnered with the SPD in an initiative to curb gun violence.248 Thus, not only is the DOJ limited in its representative capacity, it also has an interest in denying claims against the SPD.

Although the CPC may not be the “only one” getting input from the community,249 the CPC has made a concerted effort to empower in the re-formation process large numbers of Seattleites and particularly Communities of Color and other groups disproportionately targeted by the SPD. In prefacing its policy recommendations, the CPC explained that despite its own diversity, the CPC did extensive outreach to better represent Seattle’s many communities. The CPC noted,


[it] was particularly interested in gaining an understanding of the views of people in Seattle who have traditionally not had a voice and who may have substantial concerns with police practices, including communities of color, people who are homeless, immigrants and refugees, youth, people who are mentally ill, persons with substance abuse problems and members of the LGBT community.250

This outreach included holding over 140 meetings across the city and collecting 2,952 surveys from individuals.251

This effort by the CPC recognizes the deficiencies in the traditional political process and, in so doing, aims to assess what SPD power the people of Seattle actually consent to, rather than what SPD power the political system will recognize. Despite Judge Robart’s denial of the CPC’s motion to intervene (to gain status as an independent party), the parties involved in the re-formation process have committed to working with the CPC, with Ron Ward, the assistant monitor,252 expressing the hope that the CPC would be assertive, as “[w]ithout that assertiveness, I don’t think we will get real change.”253 Due to this buy-in from other parties, the CPC may still exercise a controlling role in the re-formation process with its status as amicus curiae only. However, as the body that best remedies the democratic deficiencies of the past and of the political process, the CPC’s consent

251 Id.
253 Carter & Miletich, supra note 252.
should be necessary for any new policy to be approved. In other words, even though he is not legally obligated to do so, Judge Robart should grant the CPC formal party status to ensure, as much as possible, that the SPD is re-formed with the substantive, rather than merely textual, consent of the governed.

In its recently announced recommendations for changes to the SPD’s accountability structure, the CPC emphasized that “[c]ivilian oversight of police accountability must be robust because, in the end, the police are answerable to the public for upholding [the values of Constitutional policing and the protection of civil rights].”\textsuperscript{254} The CPC recommended increasing independence and transparency (including clearer names for the offices) of the existing SPD accountability offices in addition to a continued role for the CPC itself in overseeing the accountability process.\textsuperscript{255} Further, in this recommendation, the CPC emphasized that the majority of its members should be “drawn specifically from communities that have had difficulties in their interactions with SPD.”\textsuperscript{256} While the CPC specifically identified the need to include representation from different racial groups, youth, LGBT communities, and people experiencing homelessness, mental illness and substance abuse disorders,\textsuperscript{257} it did not specifically identify the need for representation of people who are criminalized and incarcerated (although the initial membership included representatives for these groups).

The CPC should further improve its own democratic representation by specifically empowering and seeking input from people with felony convictions and prisoners. As Stuntz argued, in the spectrum of people who


\textsuperscript{255} Id. at 2–4.

\textsuperscript{256} Id. at 5.

\textsuperscript{257} Id.
bear the burden of police action, people convicted of crimes hold the least political capital.\textsuperscript{258} Additionally, people convicted of crimes (where such convictions result from and depend on police action, such as investigation) bear possibly the most profound burden of police action as they may lose their liberty and are economically and often politically disempowered for years following their convictions. The CPC is well-positioned to empower people with criminal convictions in the SPD re-formation process, and was formed with a desire to do so. Existing prisoners’ groups, such as the Black Prisoners Caucus (who have organized to analyze and address problems with incarceration and the criminal justice system),\textsuperscript{259} as well as other prisoners who wish to participate, should have a central role in SPD reform.

These two steps are necessary to ensure that the SPD’s power is authorized by the consent of the governed not only textually but substantively. Just as Dr. King argued that the promise in the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence that all people would be treated equally was a bounced check, both the terms “consent” and “the governed” in the Seattle City Charter are promises waiting to be fulfilled. By affording the CPC not only an advisory role but a determinative role (i.e., veto power) in the re-formation process, Judge Robart can facilitate a process by which the community’s consent is truly the source of the SPD’s power. By specifically including people who have been historically excluded from the political process and who, likely not coincidentally, are most burdened by the SPD’s exercise of power, the CPC can be a body that truly represents “the governed.” The CPC can promote substantive legitimacy by

\textsuperscript{258} See generally Stuntz, supra note 46, at 80–84, 87, 89–91, 94–97.
acknowledging that “the governed” includes all people subject to the SPD’s authority, not only those who are socially desirable, easy to reach, or politically powerful.

VII. CONCLUSION

Currently, the SPD exercises power, including violent force, over the people of Seattle even though those most burdened by this exercise of power never consented to such power and continue to be excluded from the political process. Black activists and scholars have long identified such a dynamic as rendering police power illegitimate, and even legal theories, which are rooted in or deferential to Anglo-American texts, recognize the democratic problems with this dynamic. The SPD is not unique in its formation by an exclusive franchise and subsequent discrimination against excluded groups—particularly against People of Color. In the current SPD re-formation process, Seattle is well-positioned to serve as an example to other cities and to develop a truly legitimate police force. To do this, current SPD powers must be presumed illegitimate and people most burdened by the exercise of SPD powers, namely people punished or labeled as felons by SPD arrests or investigations, must be specifically empowered in the re-formation process.