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ABROGATION MAGIC:
THE RULES ENABLING ACT PROCESS,
CIVIL RULE 84, AND THE FORMS

Brooke D. Coleman*

INTRODUCTION

The Committee on the Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure ("Standing Committee") seeks to abrogate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 84 and its attendant Official Forms.1 Poof—after seventy-six years of service, the Committee will make Rule 84 and its forms disappear. This essay argues, however, that like a magic trick, the abrogation sleight of hand is only a distraction from the truly problematic change the Committee is proposing. Abrogation of Rule 84 and the Official Forms violates the Rules Enabling Act Process.2 The Forms are inextricably linked to the Rules; they cannot be eliminated or amended without making a change to the Rules to which they correspond. Yet, the proposal to abrogate Rule 84 and the Forms has received little attention, with commenters instead focused on proposed discovery amendments.3 This essay

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1 COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROC. OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY AND CIVIL PROCEDURE 49–50 (2013) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY RULE DRAFT]. Rule 84 provides, “The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate.” FED. R. CIV. P. 84. The abrogation of Rule 84 will be effective on December 1, 2015, unless Congress acts to amend or defeat the rule change. This essay was finalized and went to publication before December 1, 2015; thus, throughout the essay, references to Rule 84 indicate the change is proposed, not adopted.

2 For a summary of the process, see infra Part II.A.

3 See CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LITIG., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON COMMENTS ON PROPOSED CHANGES TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 2 (2014) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY REPORT] (noting that more than 2,300 comments were received in response to the Civil Rules Committee’s proposed amendments). Letter from Ctr. for Constitutional Litig. to Hon. David G. Campbell, Chair, Civil Rules Advisory Comm. 2, (Apr. 9, 2014), available at http://www.cclfirm.com/files/040914_Comments.pdf (noting that most of the comments received were related to the discovery amendments).
argues that inattention to the proposed abrogation of Rule 84 and the Forms is a mistake, and that the Forms should not just disappear.

I. RULE 84 AND THE OFFICIAL FORMS

Before addressing how the proposed abrogation of Rule 84 and the Official Forms is problematic, this essay will examine the adoption of Rule 84 and the Forms. It will also briefly discuss how courts and scholars have viewed and utilized the forms over the past seventy-seven years.

A. History of Rule 84

The original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938, included Rule 84. The original Rule 84 stated that the appendix of forms was intended to indicate "the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate." Some courts took this language to mean that the forms were merely suggestive. In 1946, the Committee amended Rule 84 to state that "[t]he forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate." The Advisory Committee Note further explained that most courts had understood the original Rule 84 to mean that the "forms . . . are sufficient to withstand attack under the rules under which they are drawn, and that the practitioner using them may rely on them to that extent." The amendment, the Note explained, was meant to confirm this common understanding of Rule 84 and the Forms. It was also intended to tamp down the "isolated results" some courts had reached that were to the contrary.

Thus, Rule 84 and its forms were an original part of the Civil Rules. More than just being part of the text, however, the forms were part of the rulemakers' ethos. Charles Clark explained,

We do not require detail. We require a general statement. How much? Well, the answer is made in what I think is probably the most important part of the rules so far as this particular topic is concerned, namely, the Forms. These are important because when you can't define you can at least draw pictures to show your meaning.

Perhaps because the forms were so ingrained in the ethos of the rules, there has been little activity around Rule 84. In 1989, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the "Civil Rules Committee" or "Committee")

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4 Ramsour v. Midland Valley R.R. Co., 135 F.2d 101, 107 (8th Cir. 1943) (quoting then-Rule 84).
8 Id.
9 Id.; see United States v. Warner, 8 F.R.D. 196, 196 (M.D. Pa. 1948) (confirming the sufficiency of the forms, as set forth in Rule 84).
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tee") proposed an amendment to Rule 84 that would have replaced the appendix of forms with a practice manual. The manual would have included a set of forms similar to those found in the existing appendix of forms. The Judicial Conference of the United States would have had the authority to amend the manual directly. In other words, any changes to the manual or the included forms could have been implemented without resort to the Rules Enabling Act Process. Academics, judges, and members of the bar argued that this amendment violated the Rules Enabling Act by giving the Judicial Conference rule-making power that it did not have under the Act. The amendment was ultimately abandoned, largely due to these concerns.

It was not until almost twenty years later that the Civil Rules Committee engaged in a renewed discussion of Rule 84 and the forms. The October 2009 meeting was dominated by a discussion of how Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal had been received in practice. Following that discussion, the Committee moved on to discuss whether the forms were necessary or whether, because of the passage of time, they had become irrelevant. The Committee wondered whether it should update all of the forms to reflect some complexities of practice, namely those that had developed in patent litigation or because of Twombly and Iqbal. It ultimately decided that further study was necessary.

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12 Id.
13 Id.
18 See generally October 2009 Civil Rules Minutes, supra note 15. These two seminal pleading cases are discussed in Part II.B.
19 October 2009 Civil Rules Minutes, supra note 15, at 14 (“It must be asked whether illustration remains as important in the maturity of the rules as it was in their infancy.”).
20 See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
21 October 2009 Civil Rules Minutes, supra note 15, at 14 (“Even if pleading forms are to be maintained in some form, is it possible even to attempt forms for more complex claims?”).
22 Id. at 16-17.
In April 2011, the Civil Rules Committee once again discussed the forms. The Committee noted that the forms, while important in 1938, did not carry the same import now because the rules are “mature.” The members once again struggled with whether the right action was to eliminate the forms altogether or whether it was appropriate to find some way to amend the forms to make them more useful. The Committee again concluded that further study was necessary.

By the November 2011 meeting, the Committee launched a Forms Subcommittee. In March 2012, the Committee encouraged the Forms Subcommittee to come to the next meeting with a proposal—abrogation, amendment, or steady-state. In November 2012, the Subcommittee proposed abrogating Rule 84 and its forms entirely. According to the Subcommittee, it confirmed that “very few professionals or practitioners” use the forms. Instead of using the Official Forms, the Subcommittee concluded that most lawyers used other forms, such as those available in their law firms or through their local courts. The Committee discussed pro se parties, but found that “there seems to be little indication that pro se parties often find the forms, much less use them.” Because the rulemaking process was not “nimble” enough, the Committee members discussed the advantage of having other bodies such as the Administrative Office of the United States Courts responsible for the promulgation of similar forms. Ultimately, the Committee appeared to coalesce around abrogation as the appropriate solution, with the caveat that some forms like Form 5 (waiver of service of process) might be worth keeping and integrating into existing rules.

24 Id. at 32.
25 Id. at 33.
29 Id. at 19.
30 Id. at 20.
31 Id. at 21.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 20–21.
34 Id. at 21.
That exact proposal—abrogating Rule 84 and nearly all of its forms—was circulated for public comment in August 2013. Forms 5 and 6, the forms for waiver of summons and service of process, have been incorporated into Rule 4. Otherwise, the current proposal has eliminated Rule 84 and all of the remaining forms. This proposal was approved by the Standing Committee and by the Judicial Conference. It was also approved by the Supreme Court of the United States in May of 2015, but with some modification. The Court changed Rule 84's Advisory Committee Note to add, in pertinent part, that “the abrogation of Rule 84 does not alter existing pleading standards or otherwise change the requirements of Civil Rule 8.” The proposal now awaits action by Congress.

B. The Forms

While Rule 84 has not often been part of the rulemaking agenda, the forms themselves have been modified roughly thirty times since their initial adoption in 1938. The Committee has generally changed the forms in three different

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35 Preliminary Rule Draft, supra note 1, at 3.
37 See CCL's Nannery Attends Meeting of Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Ctr. for Constitutional Littig. (June 2, 2014), http://www.cclfirm.com/blog/category/1092/ (stating that the proposed amendments, including abrogation of Rule 84, were approved at the May 2015 Standing Committee meeting); Vin Gurrieri, Judges Vote to Nix Rule Creating Patent Complaint Forms, LAW360 (Sept. 17, 2014 5:50 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/578149/judges-vote-to-nix-rule/.
39 Id.; see also Brooke D. Coleman, Scholarship Matters to the Court... in Federal Civil Rulemaking...Maybe, Kind of, Sort of, PRAWFSBLAWG (May 5, 2015), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2015/05/scholarship-matters-to-the-court-in-federal-civil-rulemakingmaybe-kind-of-sort-of.html.
40 See supra note 1.
41 It is somewhat difficult to determine how often the forms have been amended since 1938. When the forms were restyled in 2007, the numbering and content of the forms changed significantly. See infra notes 50–52 and accompanying text for discussion of the restyling project. The advisory committee notes that indicated how the forms had been changed to date were also eliminated in that project. However, pre-2007 versions of the forms include notations that indicate when changes were made to the forms. By counting the changes reflected in the pre-2007 version of the rules and the current version of the rules, the forms have been amended roughly thirty times. For ease, some major changes to the forms were counted as just one change. For example, in 1963, old Forms 3–13, 18, and 21 were amended to reflect changes Congress made to the jurisdictional amounts required for federal question and diversity cases. Report of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to the Judicial Conference 11 (1962) [hereinafter 1962 Standing Committee Report], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-1962.pdf. While many forms were changed that year, there was only one real change so it was counted as such. Similarly, changes to the magistrate judge rules and forms in 1992 were counted as just one change. See Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure, Summary of the Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Rules of Practice and
contexts. First, when the Committee has amended a rule, a change to the corresponding form is sometimes required. Thus, the forms are amended in combination with a specific rule amendment. Second, the Committee has made changes to bring the forms in line with changes in federal statutory law. Finally, the Committee has made ministerial changes to the forms—changes that are mostly administrative or technical.

The first context is the most significant. When a meaningful change is made to a form, that change is made in combination with an amendment to that form’s corresponding rule. The changes made to Rule 4 and its attendant form provide an apt example of this point. Rule 4 was amended in 1993 to provide for waiver of service of process. With Rule 4, Forms 1A and 1B were adopted to illustrate how the summons and waiver of service of process worked. With the addition of those forms, Form 18-A was abrogated. Form 18-A provided the service illustration before the 1993 amendments to Rule 4, but with the adoption of the modified Rule 4 and Forms 1A and 1B, Form 18-A was no longer necessary.

There are additional examples of these kinds of changes to the forms. In 1993, Form 35 (current Form 52) was modified to reflect changes made to Rule 26(f), namely the requirements for the parties’ report regarding their Rule 26(f) planning meeting. Form 52 was modified again in 2010 for the same reason. When the Committee amended Rule 14 to provide that a defendant did not need to obtain leave of court in order to bring in a third-party defendant, it amended Forms 22-A and 22-B, now Forms 4 and 16, to reflect that change. When the Committee made changes to Rule 34 in 1970, it modified Form 24 (current Form 50) to reflect those changes.

All of these changes to the forms have one thing in common—they were made in concert with a change to the forms’ corresponding rules. When a rule


42 See generally 1992 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 41 (discussing proposed amendments to Rule 4).

43 These forms are now Forms 5 and 6. The forms were renumbered following the Rules’ restyling in 2007. For discussion of the restyling project, see infra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.

44 1992 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 41, at 201–03.

45 Id. at 205.

46 Id. at 88, 209–11.

47 1962 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 41, at 4–5. In that same year, Rule 25 was amended to simplify the practice for notifying the court and parties of the substitution of parties upon death. Id. at 14–15. Form 30, current Form 9, was also added to illustrate that amendment. Id. Finally, the Rules 49, 52, 58, and 79 amended the practice for entering judgment. Id. at 17. Forms 31 and 32, current Forms 70 and 71, were added to illustrate those changes. Id.

was changed in a way that necessitated modification of a form, that particular
form was amended as well. The converse is not true. In other words, there
does not appear to be one example of a form being significantly modified in the
absence of a corresponding change to the rule.

The only other time meaningful changes have been made to the forms is in
the second context. There have been a number of changes to the forms in order
to reflect statutory changes made by Congress. For example, Form 2 (now
Form 7) was amended in 1993 to include changes to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
1332 that eliminated the amount in controversy for federal question cases and
increased the amount in controversy for diversity cases to $10,000. Form 16
(now Form 18) was amended in 1963 to reflect changes made by Congress to
the patent statute. While some of these changes have been made without
modification of the forms’ corresponding rules, the statutory changes, like the
rule changes, drive the amendment of the forms. The forms, in this context,
have been changed to reflect changes in the law, and thus, are not changes
made in isolation.

In the third category are changes made to the forms that are administrative.
The style changes made in 2007 are an example. The forms were modified
stylistically and re-numbered. The style project was not meant to make any
kind of substantive change, so the Committee did not change the substance of
the forms. The other changes made to the forms in this context are purely
ministerial, and thus, are often not put through the entire Rules Enabling Act
Process. For example, in 2003, Forms 19, 31, and 32 were amended to substi-

49 1992 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 41, at 204. In that same year, Forms 33
and 34 were modified to reflect changes made by Congress through the Judicial Improve-
ments Act of 1990. Id. at 205–09. Corresponding changes were made to Rules 72 and 73. Id.
at 190–97.
50 See 1962 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 47, at 11. That same year, Forms 3–
13, 18, and 21 were amended to reflect changes made by Congress to the requisite jurisdic-
tional amounts. Id.
51 See Edward H. Cooper, Restyling the Civil Rules: Clarity Without Change, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1761, 1761 (2004) (discussing the style project and how its goal was to
“translate present text into clear language that does not change the meaning”); REPORT OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 28–29 (Sept.
2006) [hereinafter SEPTEMBER 2006 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT], available at
ing the restyling of the forms).
52 SEPTEMBER 2006 STANDING COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 51, at 29.
53 Id. It noted, however, that some of the forms may have been inconsistent with “current
practices.” Id. (“For example, the ‘complaint’ forms call for allegations that are far briefer
than are commonly found in cases filed in the district courts. Similarly, the advisory com-
mittee did not change the choice of examples in the forms; the ‘negligence complaint’ form
continues to use the example of an automobile striking a pedestrian.”).
stitute date references of "19__" with "20__." This change was approved and adopted without public comment.

Finally, it is worth noting that abrogating a form is atypical. It seems that only two forms have ever been abrogated. As already noted, Form 18-A was abrogated in 1993 once revised Rule 4 and Forms 1A and 1B were adopted. The only other form that has been abrogated is Form 27, the Notice of Appeal under Rule 73(b). That form was abrogated because the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure were adopted in 1968, and those rules included a notice of appeal that made Form 27 unnecessary.

C. Scholarly Treatment of the Forms

Early scholarship relating to Rule 84 and the Official Forms is quite sparse. With the exception of Charles Clark, early scholarship did not deeply explore the forms and their place in the civil justice system. Like the Civil Rules Committee, scholars began paying more attention to the forms in the wake of Twombly and Iqbal. Even then, however, scholars have not focused extensively on the forms. The forms are often a part of a larger discussion. For example, recent scholars have focused on how courts have used Form 30 to determine whether parties’ affirmative defenses must meet the standards laid out in Twombly and Iqbal. Other scholars have argued that the Court, in adopting Twombly and Iqbal, vio-

55 See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
57 Id. at 2.
58 See Clark, supra note 10; see also Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 2 F.R.D. 456, 460 (1943) (discussing the forms as an integral part of the Civil Rules).
59 However, at least one article discussed Rule 84 in the context of pleading before Twombly was decided. See Mary Margaret Penrose & Dace A. Caldwell, A Short and Plain Solution to the Medical Malpractice Crisis: Why Charles E. Clark Remains Prophetically Correct About Special Pleading and the Big Case, 39 GA. L. REV. 971, 1006–08 (2005) (discussing the advantage of the “minimalist pleading approach” adopted in 1938).
60 At least one commentator has argued that some of the forms can be helpful to litigators. Thomas Y. Allman, Local Rules, Standing Orders, and Model Protocols: Where the Rubber Meets the (e-Discovery) Road, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2–3 (2013) (“Less visible but equally important efforts have been made to accommodate e-Discovery by amendments to standard forms. For example, there are now many useful forms available for Rule 26(f) reports and discovery plans, as well as for joint or individualized proffers of scheduling orders or case management orders.”).
61 Melanie A. Goff & Richard A. Bales, A “Plausible” Defense: Applying Twombly and Iqbal to Affirmative Defenses, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 603, 629 (2011) (showing that courts have used Form 30 to determine whether Twombly and Iqbal apply to the pleading of affirmative defenses).
lated the Rules Enabling Act, in part because those cases are in contrast with Form 11 and, thus, Rules 8 and 84. Still more have argued that the forms provide the baseline for understanding what the rules require, meaning that cases like Twombly and Iqbal have to be read in light of Form 11. Or perhaps, as other scholars have argued, it is the case that Form 11 did not survive those cases.

Beyond Forms 11 and 30, a debate has developed over Form 18, the form that governs drafting a complaint for patent infringement. There, scholars argue that Form 18 is out of step with patent litigation practice. Courts, as will be discussed in the following section, are similarly struggling with how to use Form 18 when assessing a complaint pleading patent infringement.

Finally, very few scholars have weighed in as to whether abrogation of Rule 84 and the rules is appropriate. The proposal to abrogate Rule 84 and its forms altogether is a fairly recent one. The response, while sparse, has been to argue that the forms should stay in place.

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62 Jeremiah J. McCarthy & Matthew D. Yusick, Twombly and Iqbal: Has the Court “Messed Up the Federal Rules?”., 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 121, 121-22 (2011) (“Absent a convincing explanation from the Court as to how the pleading standard enunciated in Twombly and Iqbal is consistent with Rule 84, whether the promulgation of that standard was in conformity with the Rules Enabling Act will continue to be an open question.”).


64 Nathan R. Sellers, Note, Defending the Formal Federal Civil Rulemaking Process: Why the Court Should Not Amend Procedural Rules Through Judicial Interpretation, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 327, 389 (2011) (“Rulemakers may also decide that some changes need to be made to Form 11 to honor Rule 84.”).

65 See, e.g., Richard A. Kamprath, Patent Pleading Standards After Iqbal: Applying Infringement Contentions as a Guide, 13 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 301 (2010) (arguing that the Federal Circuit’s McZeal decision can be harmonized by recognizing that Form 18 has a limited purpose); Stacy O. Stitham & David Sweznam-Burland, Fractious Form 18, 45 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2012) (arguing that Form 18 should be eliminated or revised better reflect the complexity of patent litigation).

66 Kamprath, supra note 65.

67 See infra Part I.D.

68 Lonny Hoffman, Rulemaking in the Age of Twombly and Iqbal, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1483, 1552 (2013) (“[I]t is as important for rulemakers to recognize the danger of making changes that would send the wrong signal. On several prior occasions since 2007, rulemakers have discussed the forms in the back of the rulebook, suggesting that it may be time to get out of the forms business. The counsel of those who have recognized that abrogation of forms now could send the wrong message should be heeded. Whatever the deficiencies of the forms may be, this is the wrong time to think about eliminating them from the rulebook.” (footnotes omitted)); A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to Twiqbal Apologists, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1710, 1733-38 (2013) (“I, for one, would pursue the abandonment of plausibility pleading by urging the rulemakers to restore notice pleading and revise other complementary Rules—such as . . . the Official Forms—to develop a more thoughtful, comprehensive, and effective approach to controlling initiation of actions and access to discovery.”).
D. Courts and the Forms

It is beyond the scope of this essay to engage in an exhaustive search of how courts are using the forms. However, some preliminary research in the context of pleading under Rule 8 and Form 11 reveals that courts utilize the forms when assessing complaints under the rules. In a search for pleading cases where the court used Form 11, eighty-four cases were found. Because Form 11 was previously called Form 9, a similar search for pleading cases where the court referred to Form 9 resulted in 204 cases. The numbers are low, but hardly insignificant. Courts are using the forms to resolve questions of how the rules apply.

For example, in a recent First Circuit case, García-Catalán v. United States, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint. The plaintiff slipped and fell while visiting a commissary at Fort Buchanan in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico. She filed her claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act, pleading that she “slipped and fell on liquid then existing there.” The district court dismissed the complaint because it found that she had failed to state a plausible claim under Twombly and Iqbal. The First Circuit disagreed, specifically citing Form 11 and arguing that the plaintiff had “plainly modeled” her complaint on that form.

Courts have cited forms beyond Form 11 too. In the context of whether Twombly and Iqbal govern a parties’ statement of an affirmative defense, courts have used Form 30 in their reasoning. At least one appellate court has

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69 For a more exhaustive inquiry into how courts use the forms, see Professor Spencer’s article for this symposium. See Spencer, supra note 15.

70 The search was conducted in ALLFEDS in Westlaw, with coverage of federal cases going back to 1790. The search used the following query: “pleading” and “Form 11.” The search was limited to cases after 2007 because that is when Form 9 became Form 11. A similar search was conducted in the U.S. Federal Cases Lexis database, with the search term pleading, and the search within those results of “Form 11.” That search resulted in 86 cases.

71 The search was conducted in ALLFEDS in Westlaw, with coverage of federal cases going back to 1790. The search used the following query: “pleading” and “Form 9” and “Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” The last search term was entered in order to eliminate criminal Form 9 from the search results. A similar search was conducted in the U.S. Federal Cases lexis database, with the search term pleading, and the search within those results of “Form 9.” That search resulted in 225 cases.


73 Id. at 100.

74 Id. at 101.

75 Id. at 102.

76 Id.

77 Id. at 104.

78 Barry v. EMC Mortg., No. DKC 10-3120, 2011 WL 4352104, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 15, 2011) ("Given Rule 84’s focus on illustrating ‘the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate,’ the additional factual detail contained in Form 30 is hardly superfluous. In prohibiting conclusory, implausible allegations, Twombly and Iqbal thus merely made explicit principles long implicit in the general pleading requirements of the Federal Rules."); Falley v. Friends Univ., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1258 (D. Kan. 2011) (quoting the same “fails
also used Form 13 in resolving whether a complaint satisfied Rule 8. Much of the debate regarding the forms, however, appears to have been centered in patent litigation. In 2012, the Federal Circuit found that “to the extent the parties argue that Twombly and its progeny conflict with the Forms and create differing pleadings requirements, the Forms control.”

This means that at least three circuit courts have found that the forms survived Twombly and Iqbal and have, in fact, incorporated the forms into their decisional law. At the district court level, courts are similarly using the forms to decide cases. It may be only a matter of time before more circuits act affirmatively with respect to the forms.

II. ABROGATION VIOLATES THE RULES ENABLING ACT PROCESS

A. The Rules Enabling Act Process

The Rules Enabling Act of 1934 delegated to the Supreme Court the responsibility for promulgating federal courts’ rules of procedure. The original Section 2072 did not prescribe any particular rulemaking process; it simply delegated the authority and left the details to the Court. Initially, the Court

to state a claim” allegation in the Official Form, and concluding “[t]he brief and simple nature of this language indicates that no more detail is required of a defendant in an answer”); Lane v. Page, 272 F.R.D. 581, 594 (D.N.M. 2011) (noting that “[t]he forms appended to the rules bolster the Court’s analysis that rule 8(b) does not require defendants to provide factual allegations supporting defenses” because “Form 30 provides no factual allegations in support of the defense, and form 30 is sufficient under the rules”); see also William M. Janssen, The Odd State of Twombly Plausibility in Pleading Affirmative Defenses, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1573, 1635 (2013).

Hanilton v. Palm, 621 F.3d 816, 818 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating that Rule 84 states that the Forms in the Appendix to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “suffice under these rules” and that Form 13 makes clear that an allegation in any negligence claim that the defendant acted as plaintiff’s “employer” satisfies Rule 8(a)(2)’s notice requirement for pleading employer status).

In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012); see also Colida v. Nokia, Inc., 347 F. App’x 568, 570 & n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (concluding that the plaintiff’s infringement claims were “facially implausible,” but noting that he had not argued that the complaint was sufficient under Form 18 and Rule 84 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). It appears that the issues with Form 18 may be solved through Congress, however. The House has passed the Innovation Act, which will supplant that form if the law goes into effect. See Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 6(c) (2013).

See Garcia-Catalán, 734 F.3d at 104 (with regard to Form 11); K-Tech Telecomms., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277, 1283–84 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (with regard to Form 18); Hamilton, 621 F.3d at 818 (with regard to Form 13).

See supra notes 70–71.


The original Rules Enabling Act provided as follows:

[The Supreme Court of the United States shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules, for the district courts of the United States and for the courts of the District of Columbia, the forms
relied on a single advisory committee to draft and promulgate the Civil Rules. That committee consisted of mostly practitioners and academics, and it worked on the rules outside of public view. However, this did not mean that the committee did its work without any assistance. To the contrary, it consulted with various government agencies and members of the bar by sending out drafts of the rules for comment.

The rulemaking process worked this way—committees working in informal consultation with the bench and bar—until the mid-1950s. However, in 1956, the Court discharged the advisory committee. In 1958, after demands from the bar groups and the Judicial Conference of the United States, Congress passed a statute that expressly required the Judicial Conference to continuously study the rules. At that point, the Judicial Conference created a Standing Committee and subsidiary advisory committees to study the Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure. The rulemaking process continued to develop informally in the decades that followed; how the committees did their work was not codified. However, the rest of the process worked basically the same as it had before. The committees sent proposals to the Judicial Conference, which, after consideration, forwarded proposals to the Supreme Court. At that point, Congress could do nothing and the rules would become law, or it could intervene to amend or defeat the rule change.

During the 1980s, the rulemaking process became a focus of criticism. While it still informally consulted with the bench and bar, the meetings were not officially open to the public and the process was viewed as opaque. Congress once again intervened and adopted the Judicial Improvements and Access of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure in civil actions at law. Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant. They shall take effect six months after their promulgation, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no further force or effect.

Sec. 2. The court may at any time unite the general rules prescribed by it for cases in equity with those in actions at law so as to secure one form of civil action and procedure for both. Provided, however, That in such union of rules the right of trial by jury as at common law and declared by the seventh amendment to the Constitution shall be preserved to the parties inviolate. Such united rules shall not take effect until they shall have been reported to Congress by the Attorney General at the beginning of a regular session thereof and until after the close of such session.

Id. § 6. Id. § 7. Id. The initial advisory committees were in charge of civil, criminal, admiralty, bankruptcy, and appellate rules. Id. Today, there are still five committees, but admiralty has been largely subsumed by the Civil Rules Committee, and there is a committee that now reviews the rules of Evidence.

to Justice Act, which, in part, replaced the original Section 2072 with current Sections 2072–74. The amendments required the meetings to be open to the public and further required that records of the meetings be made publicly available. It also required that the recommendations include an “explanatory note,” a “written report explaining the . . . action,” and a consideration of “minority or other separate views.”

The statute is silent as to how publication and consideration of the rules actually works. Instead, the Judicial Conference, according to § 2073, has adopted procedures. Under those procedures, the advisory committees meet to consider the rules and prepare draft changes. Once those changes are prepared and after the Standing Committee has approved them, the rule changes are published for public comment. This publication includes a report “explaining the advisory committee’s action and its evaluation of competing considerations.”

The public comment period lasts for six months, and in most cases, the committee is required to hold public hearings to discuss the proposals. Once the comment period has ended, the advisory committee can then reconsider the rule change in light of the comments and testimony it received. It then prepares a report highlighting the comments and consideration of opposing views and then forwards the rule onto the Standing Committee. If the Standing Committee approves the rule change, it is then forwarded to the Judicial Conference, the Court, and Congress just as the original system had provided.

While these requirements are codified in both the statute and in the Judicial Conference policies, failure to follow these steps is not fatal to rule changes. Failure to comply with § 2073 or with the steps outlined by the Judicial Conference will not invalidate a rule that is otherwise correctly prescribed under § 2072. Yet, these steps have been historically followed and respected by the committees over the years. This makes sense. The changes made to the process in the late 1980s were done because of skepticism about the transparency of the

\[\text{ABROGATION MAGIC}\]

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56 Id.
58 Id. § 440.20.30.
59 Id. § 440.20.40.
60 Id. § 440.20.30.
61 Id. § 440.20.40.
62 Id. § 440.20.50.
63 Id. If the advisory committee makes a substantial change to the rule, it should, but does not have to, republish the rule for public comment again. Id.
66 See id.; Guide to Judiciary Policy, supra note 97 § 440.10.
Thus, committee members, the Judicial Conference, and the Court have closely adhered to these processes. Failure to do so would lead to questions about the integrity of the process and relatedly to skepticism about the rules' legitimacy.

B. Abrogation Violates the Rules Enabling Act Process

Abrogation of Rule 84 and the Official Forms is a violation of the Rules Enabling Act Process. That process requires that any change to the Rules be published for public consideration. Because a change to a form necessarily changes the rule to which it corresponds, the two must be considered together. Yet, the proposed abrogation of Rule 84 and the forms is being done without reference to any of the rules to which the forms correspond. This failure to consider the rules and forms together is improper under the Act.

The Rules are concepts that are encapsulated by words, and those words guide the interpretation of their meaning. A form is part of that interpretive exercise because it is part of the rule itself. Thus, for example, in determining what Rule 14 third-party practice means, the reader must necessarily read Form 16 and its form complaint. When a form is abrogated, it eliminates part of that interpretive language and changes the meaning of the rule to which that form is linked. That abrogation is a change that must go through the Rules Enabling Act Process. This means that if a form is going to be changed, both the form and corresponding rule must be considered by the Committee and published for comment. Because the proposed abrogation of Rule 84 and its attendant forms attempts to amend the forms without any proposed amendments to the rules to which the forms correspond, it violates the process that has been so thoughtfully developed under the Act.

The history of Rule 84 and the forms support this argument. First, the 1946 amendment to Rule 84 clarified that the forms and the rules to which they correspond are one and the same. That amendment explained that the forms “suffice under these rules” and are illustrative. In other words, the amendment changed Rule 84’s language from passive indication to active illustration. As Charles Clark stated, the forms were intended to give meaning to the rules. They are not simply forms in the nature of exemplars; they are part of the rules themselves. Therefore, if the Committee wishes to change the forms, it must do so pursuant to a rule change precipitated by the Committee itself or Congress.

Second, looking to how the forms have been changed historically further supports this point. When the forms have been changed, in almost every case, a

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107 See Moore, supra note 93, at 1064.
108 See supra Part II.A.
109 See supra Part I.A.
110 FED. R. CIV. P. 84; see also supra text accompanying notes 6–10.
111 See supra text accompanying notes 6–7.
112 See Clark, supra note 10.
corresponding rule change was made. Changes to the forms that were not partnered with a rule change were done because federal statutory law changed and, thus, necessitated a modification of a rule, a form, or both. It appears that the only changes to the forms that have occurred in the absence of a corresponding rule or statutory change have been mostly administrative. In other words, amending or abrogating a form without a corresponding change to a federal rule or statute is unprecedented.

Finally, the current debate in the context of pleading further demonstrates why the forms cannot be changed without a proposed amendment to the rules. Because of Rule 84, Rule 8 and Form 11 are one and the same. Yet, Rule 8 has not been expressly considered by the Committee, nor has it been published for public comment with Form 11. This example aptly demonstrates why the proposed abrogation of Rule 84 and the forms violates the Rules Enabling Act Process.

Form 11 is well-known to scholars, judges, and practitioners. It sets forth a simple pleading for a negligence claim involving a car accident. In Twombly, the Supreme Court used Form 11 to explain why the Twombly plaintiffs had not met the pleading requirements of Rule 8. The Court explained that the lack of notice provided by the Twombly plaintiffs “contrast[ed] sharply with the model form for pleading negligence, Form [11].” The Twombly dissent used Form 11 to argue that the Court had gone beyond its institutional role by changing the Civil Rules outside of the Enabling Act Process.

Thus, Form 11 has been a contentious part of the recent pleading debate. The Civil Rule Committee’s commentary on Rule 84’s abrogation indicates that the Committee understood that the relationship between Rule 8 and Form 11 is fraught. The transmittal letter from Judge Campbell of the Civil Rules Committee to Judge Sutton of the Standing Committee noted that Form 11 “live[s] in tension with recently developing approaches to general pleading standards.” In 2009, when the discussion of abrogating the forms began, the Committee decided to delay possible abrogation because “[i]mmediate abrogation of the pleading Forms might seem to send a message about the Twombly and Iqbal pleading opinions, no matter how strenuously the Committee might

113 See supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text.
114 See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
115 See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
116 Form 11 reads in relevant part: “On date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff.” FED. R. CIV. P. FORM 11.
117 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10 (2007). Form 11 was Form 9 when Twombly was decided. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text for discussion of the restyling project.
118 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 575–77 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
emphasize that the project is to abrogate all the Forms without taking or implying any position on the sufficiency of any Form.” Yet, in that same meeting, the Committee debated what Twombly and Iqbal required. Was ‘“negligently’ a legal conclusion, a threadbare recital of an element of the claim that fails the Iqbal pleading test?” The Committee agreed that “[a]ttempting to frame pleading forms while pleading standards remained in flux could be difficult.” In other words, the Committee understood that Twombly and Iqbal might have changed Rule 8 to some degree and that Form 11 was a part of that change.

In the Civil Rules Committee’s April 2011 meeting, the discussion indicates the same. The minutes state, “The intense focus on pleading brought on by the Twombly and Iqbal decisions has put the illustrative ‘Rule 84’ Forms back on the agenda.” At the same time, the members decided that enough time had passed since Twombly and Iqbal such that “[r]evisioning the whole framework need not be seen as implicit commentary on the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, but instead can be recognized for what it is—a program to shift the initiating responsibility for forms away from the full Enabling Act process.” Yet, it is difficult to reconcile that Twombly and Iqbal could both put the Forms back on the Committee’s agenda and also have nothing to do with the decision to abrogate them.

The Committee’s struggle with Form 11 proves the point. Amending Form 11 to reflect Twombly and Iqbal would be a herculean task because it is not clear how to square the form with those cases. The Court acknowledged the sufficiency of Form 11 in Twombly and it refused to supplant the form in Iqbal. Reasonable people continue to disagree about how Twombly and Iqbal changed pleading, if at all. Regardless of that debate, however, Form 11 is a key piece of that puzzle. With Rule 8, it provides the baseline for pleading doctrine. If Form 11 is eliminated, Rule 8 will have necessarily been changed.

120 October 2009 Civil Rules Minutes, supra note 15, at 16. The minutes go on to state that “[t]here is plenty of time to proceed deliberately.” Id.
121 Id. at 14.
122 Id. (emphasis added).
123 Id.
124 April 2011 Civil Rules Minutes, supra note 23, at 31–32.
125 Id. at 32–33.
127 See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 Duke L.J. 1, 15–16 (2010) (arguing that Twombly and Iqbal are a departure from established federal pleading standards); Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 56 Pepp. L. Rev. 1063, 1069 (2009) (arguing that Twombly was rightly decided); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 431 (2008) (arguing that Twombly changed pleading practice); Adam N. Steinman, The Pleading Problem, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 1293, 1300 (2010) (contextualizing Twombly and Iqbal and arguing that while the decisions may not have been praiseworthy, they should not be taken to have upended existing federal pleading standards).
When *Twombly* and *Iqbal* were decided, the Civil Rules Committee took a wait-and-see approach with respect to Rule 8. True to its deliberative capacity, the Committee decided to allow the cases to work their way through the courts before intervening to change the pleading regime in any way. While members of Congress attempted and failed to amend Rule 8 following *Twombly* and *Iqbal*, the Committee decided to stay neutral and abstained from making any changes to Rule 8. With the proposed abrogation of the forms, however, the Committee is making a change to Rule 8, and that change must be published for consideration.

Stated differently, if the Committee wishes to change Form 11, even if by deleting it, it must publish Rule 8 and the abrogated Form 11 together and take those amendments through the entire Rules Enabling Act Process anew. Moreover, if the Committee wishes to abrogate all of the forms at once, it must do the same across the board. Each form must be changed in concert with its corresponding rule. As this section has demonstrated, historically, the rules and the official forms have been considered part and parcel of one another. The treatment of Rule 84 and the individual forms over time, as well as the example of Rule 8 and Form 11, demonstrate that it is not proper under the Rules Enabling Act Process to abrogate a form without changing its corresponding rule.

III. AN ALTERNATIVE PATH TO PROPOSED ABROGATION

The Rules Enabling Act Process is necessarily deliberative. In this case, the Committee should undertake further study to determine which, if any, forms require an amendment and whether any such amendment should be made in concert with its corresponding rule. While the Committee has studied the forms, its inquiry has been short. A Forms Subcommittee was officially launched in November of 2011. That Subcommittee met by phone and submitted a report to the Civil Rules Committee in March of 2012. In that five-month period, the Subcommittee determined that the forms for the Civil Rules caused the most consternation because they required amendment under the Rules Enabling Act Process and because there were so many forms as compared to other procedural rules. The Civil Rule Committee decided that the Subcommittee should look into the Civil Forms specifically. In November 2012, a year after the Forms Subcommittee was launched and six months after

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128 *October 2009 Civil Rules Minutes, supra* note 15, at 8. (“[A]ny hasty response [to *Twombly* and *Iqbal*] in the Enabling Act process or in Congress might miss the mark.”).


130 *November 2011 Civil Rules Minutes, supra* note 27, at 35.

131 *March 2012 Civil Rules Minutes, supra* note 28, at 39. The Bankruptcy and Criminal Rule forms do not go through the Enabling Act Process. The Appellate Rules, while using the Enabling Act Process to change, only have a few forms. *Id.*
the same Subcommittee was asked to look into the Civil Forms specifically, the Subcommittee returned with the current proposal.\footnote{132}{NOVEMBER 2012 CIVIL RULES MINUTES, supra note 29, at 19.}

The Subcommittee reported that, according to its study, lawyers do not really use the forms, nor do pro se parties.\footnote{133}{Id. at 20–21. As to whether pro se parties might use the forms, the committee concluded that “there seems to be little indication that pro se parties often find the forms, much less use them.” Id. at 20. A committee member further opined that courts that are working with pro se parties do not use the forms, but instead use other resources. Id. at 21.}

The Subcommittee and Committee’s determinations regarding the Forms may well be true, but the Enabling Act Process requires more study before making such a significant change. The federal rulemaking process has been criticized in the past for proposing amendments without a strong empirical basis for change.\footnote{134}{See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 841 (1993) (arguing that because of a lack of empirical research to support the adoption of Rule 11, the rulemaking process should be stopped until better study can be made of the process); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795 (1991) (arguing that proposed Rule 26(a) was drafted without any empirical study to support its adoption); Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of Empirical Research in Civil Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121 (2002) (discussing the Committee’s use of empirical research and its limitations).}

In the context of pleading, the Committee has worked hard to change this approach and has put the Federal Judicial Center to good use when making changes to the rules.\footnote{135}{Wilging, supra note 134, at 1147–53 (discussing, for example, the use of empirical work to support that adoption of a revised Rule 11). This is not to say the Committee’s current use of empirical work is without criticism. See id. at 1204 (calling for more experimental research in order to improve rulemaking); Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal Judicial Center’s Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2012) (challenging the findings of the Federal Judicial Center’s Twombly and Iqbal study).}

Rule 84 and abrogation of the Forms should be no different.

Along those same lines, the decision to abrogate Rule 84 and the Forms requires more time for public comment. Because of the breadth of the proposed discovery rule amendments, Rule 84 has gone largely unnoticed.\footnote{136}{See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER Iqbal, REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (Mar. 2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf; OCTOBER 2009 CIVIL RULES MINUTES, supra note 15, at 8 (noting the start of Andrea Kuperman’s project to “compile[e] and evaluat[e] lower-court decisions”).}

The Rule 84 discussion started in 2009, but it did not take on a serious tone until November 2012. Less than a year passed before publication of the proposed abrogation, and to a large degree, it appears that the bench and bar have not quite caught up to the change. If the Committee were to change the text of Rule 8 it-
self, for example, it would engender a barrage of public comment. That the abrogation of Rule 84 has not created that amount of feedback is evidence that the rule change has gone—incorrectly—unnoticed.

Addressing each form in concert with its rule will undoubtedly take significant time and effort. The Civil Rules Committee has discussed how revising the forms would be a meaningful project. However, the Committee has not shied away from large, daunting projects in the past. One need only look to the Style Project and the time computation project to see that the Committee can manage these large projects and not sacrifice its other important work. Indeed, the Committee is exceedingly capable of this task. Moreover, in the words of Charles Clark, such a project is demonstrative of the “need of a continuing rules committee to watch lest through habit and practice form comes to dominate substance.”

CONCLUSION

This essay argues that the proposed abrogation of Rule 84 and its attendant Forms violates the Rules Enabling Act Process. The failure to consider the rules in concert with the forms has led not only to a violation of this process, but to an impending rule change that has not benefited from the considered wisdom of the bench and bar. Whether the civil litigation system will ultimately suffer from abrogation of the Forms, if adopted, is not clear. What is clear is that the legitimacy of the Civil Rules will be marred by the Committee’s failure to abide by the Rules Enabling Act Process. Magic tricks succeed when they make us believe something that did not really happen. In this case, the abrogation sleight of hand did not work and, in essence, we are left with an empty hat and no rabbit.

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138 “Diversion of Committee resources to [the forms] task could exact a high price in discharging more important responsibilities.” March 2012 Civil Rules Minutes, supra note 28, at 41; see also October 2009 Civil Rules Minutes, supra note 15, at 15 (stating that abrogation would “relieve the Committee of the responsibility that flows from present Rule 84”).
139 September 2006 Standing Committee Report, supra note 51, at 21 (noting that even before publication and comment, the process for the restyling project took “two and half years and produced more than 750 documents”).
141 Clark, supra note 58.