Slums, Slumdogs, and Resistance

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I. Introduction ............................................................................................685
II. The Setting of Resistance: Dharavi—Maximum Slum in Maximum City .................................................................................................687
III. Structural Context of Resistance: Capitalism, Cities, and Slums ....689
IV. Backdrop of Resistance in Dharavi: Indian Public Policy and Slums ..............................................................................................695
V. Theorizing Resistance...........................................................................699
VI. Performing Resistance.........................................................................703
VII. Conclusion .........................................................................................709

Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.1
In human history there is always something beyond the reach of dominating systems, no matter how deeply they saturate society, and this is obviously what makes change possible.2

I. INTRODUCTION

Marooned on the outskirts of the law, almost one billion people live in slums, mostly in the global South.3 Many view slums as warehouses of “surplus humanity,”4 and slum dwellers as a “surplus population.”5

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Recently, the Academy Award winning film *Slumdog Millionaire* has dramatically underscored the urgency of the problem of slums. Set in Dharavi, the infamous slum of Mumbai, *Slumdog Millionaire* is an acerbic snapshot of law and illegality tangled in a brutal drama of power and resistance in the lives of slum dwellers. Dharavi emerges as a liminal space where law, extra-legality, and illegality commingle to produce spaces and subjects at the margins of legal orders and formal economies. Indeed, from these margins, we witness “the other side of universality—moral and legal no man’s land, where universality finds its spatial limit.”

How do those situated on the other side of universality negotiate their conditions of existence? What strategies of survival and practices of resistance do those confined to the margins of economic, legal, and social orders deploy? How can the lives of slum dwellers inform theorizing resistance? With a focus on Dharavi, this article explores these questions in tune with LatCrit teachings about the political nature of theorizing, the intersections of local and global, and privileging the voices of the subordinated. Guided by Foucault’s insight about the relationship between power and resistance, this article first explores the structural determinants of the production of slum dwellers and slums, and the policy frames that furnish the context of resistance for residents of Dharavi. Prompted by Said’s confidence in the possibility of change, this article

6. *Slumdog Millionaire* (Fox Searchlight 2009). The term “slumdog,” borrowed from this film, can be seen as an offensive characterization of those who live in slums. I use it, as I believe the film does, by combining the words “slum” and “underdog” to signal the marginalized state of those constrained to make slums their abode.

7. *Id.*

8. “The attributes of liminality or liminal personae (‘threshold people’) are necessarily ambiguous, since this condition and these persons elude or slip through the network of classification that normally locate states and positions in cultural space. Liminal entities are neither here nor there, they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial.” *Victor W. Turner, The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-Structure* 95 (1969).


13. *See infra* Parts II-III.
proceeds to engage with attempts to theorize resistance that unfolds outside recognized modes of political engagement, and recounts practices of resistance demonstrated by the slum dwellers of Dharavi.\textsuperscript{14}

**II. THE SETTING OF RESISTANCE: DHARAVI—MAXIMUM SLUM IN MAXIMUM CITY\textsuperscript{15}**

In Mumbai, every second person lives in a slum, making it the global capital of slum-dwelling.\textsuperscript{16} Twelve million people live in slums and tenements, and one million on pavements and sidewalks.\textsuperscript{17} In Dharavi, a 0.67 square mile maze of dark alleys and corrugated shacks that house one million souls,\textsuperscript{18} “housing is a verb.”\textsuperscript{19} This is a place where slum dwellers juggle housing costs, security, quality of shelter, distance from work, and personal safety. In the slums of Mumbai, death rates are fifty percent higher than in adjoining rural areas. Contaminated water and inadequate sanitation cause infections and parasitic diseases that account for forty percent of the death rate.\textsuperscript{20} Breathing Dharavi’s air is as hazardous as smoking two and a half packs of cigarettes a day.\textsuperscript{21} The municipal corporation runs the few available public toilets and charges for each use.\textsuperscript{22} Slum dwellers who have been in the city since before 1995 pay a monthly fee to the city for a “photo-pass,” an identity card with the photograph of the head of the household on it.\textsuperscript{23} The small print on the back of the card

\textsuperscript{14} See infra Parts IV-V.

\textsuperscript{15} See Suketu Mehta, Maximum City: Bombay Lost and Found (2004).


\textsuperscript{17} Id.; Minar Pimple & Lysa John, Security of Tenure: Mumbai Experience, in HOLDING THEIR GROUND: SECURE LAND TENURE FOR THE URBAN POOR IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 75, 78 tbl.4.1 (Alain Durant-Lasserre & Lauren Royston eds., 2002).

\textsuperscript{18} Kalpana Sharma, Rediscovering Dharavi: Stories from Asia’s Largest Slum 18 (2000).


\textsuperscript{21} Mehta, supra note 15, at 29.


\textsuperscript{23} Sharit K. Bhowmik, The Politics of Urban Space in Mumbai: ‘Citizen’ Versus the Urban Poor, in CONTESTED TRANSFORMATIONS: CHANGING ECONOMIES AND IDENTITIES IN CONTEMPORARY INDIA 147, 148 (Mary E. John et. al. eds., 2006).
states that the holder is an encroacher who has to pay a monthly “fine.”

Dharavi is also a hub of small industries that turn over an estimated $50-100 million annually. Against all odds, Dharavi has developed into a “kind of self-sufficient, self-sustaining ‘village,’ one with a ‘vibrant community and economy,’” which “has achieved a unique informal ‘self-help’ urban development over the years, without any external aid.” Its more than 5,000 industrial units produce textiles, pottery, and leather and provide recycling, printing, steel fabrication, and other services. Polluting, toxic, and often illegal industries find Dharavi, where “Darwin beat[s] Keynes,” attractive. Sweatshops profitably mine cheap labor under the radar of regulatory oversight. The slums contend with the “garbage dump syndrome,” a concentration of toxic industrial activity like tanning, dyeing, battery recycling, casting, metal plating, and chemical manufacturing. Slums also face the omnipresent threat of fire, whether accidental or the result of “hot demolition,” —arson used by landowners to clear out squatters.

Recently, the Mumbai city government approved a plan, styled “Vision Mumbai,” to create a “world-class city” by 2013. Dharavi, where the value of the land occupied by the slum is estimated to be approximately $2 billion, is a particular target of this plan. Demolitions by bulldozers, with little notice to the residents, are the modus operandi. One Dharavi

24. Id.


27. Id.


31. Id.


resident asks:
Why wreck the homes and lives of people who have built the city and lived in it for decades? . . . Because from your luxury high-rise apartment you don’t want the humiliation of India’s poor in your line of vision as you make your money and succeed. Forcing them out is the only option. You simply can’t wish them away.36

Dharavi residents are not the only ones questioning Mumbai’s new vision of the city. An internationally known architect, for example, claims, “There’s very little vision with this plan. They’re more like hallucinations.”37 Residents also question the long-term vision of the plan and the city’s motivation behind the development. One slum-dweller asks, “Development for whom? The government’s idea of development doesn’t include us. I’ve seen the plans. Wonderful. No room at all for ugly poor people.”38 In the meantime, the global escalation in the price of real estate has also reached Dharavi, making even the slum beyond the reach of the destitute.39 A Dharavi real estate broker explains:
Ten years ago, poor people were my only clients and huts my only properties. My only line was: “Poor people can afford it.” Now I sell to businessmen, investors and speculators. I tell them, “This place is a commercial center. It’s slap in the middle of the city. Its development is approved. It’s a sure thing! It’s golden! Get it now!”40

This picture of Dharavi shows a space not invested with formal legality. Rather, it is a liminal zone of regulatory vacuum, where predatory entrepreneurs, corrupt politicians, and state functionaries operate unfettered by law or public scrutiny.

III. STRUCTURAL CONTEXT OF RESISTANCE: CAPITALISM, CITIES, AND SLUMS

Some have characterized slum dwellers as the “outcast proletariat”41 or the “disincorporated,” and “unincorporatable” of capitalism.42 They stand “condemned to the world of the excluded, the redundant, the dispensable, having nothing to lose, not even the chains of wage-slavery. [They are the]
the shadowy figures of the rejected, the marginal, the leftovers of capital’s arising, the wreckage and debris." Three interlinked historical features of capitalism furnish the contours of the process that produces these slums and their inhabitants: accumulation by dispossession, the reserve army of labor, and the informal economy.

Accumulation by dispossession signifies that markets always rely on non-market legal and extra-legal forces to function. Historically, coercion triggered the genesis of capitalism: the generation of “free” labor from those who have no other means of livelihood except their labor to be sold in a nascent “free” labor market. The process turned on “ex-novo separation between producers and means of production.” This was a realm outside the market governed by “pure” economic laws—a zone of extra-economic coercive power of the state and the law. The Enclosure Acts and Game Laws in England are examples of the coercive use of the law to dispossess rural farmers, hunters, and other subsistence producers, forcing them to seek a livelihood in the “free” wage market. Primitive accumulation, however, is “a basic ontological condition for capitalist production, rather than just a historical condition.” The various forms of social capital that are required by capitalism but not paid for by private capital exemplify the enduring nature of accumulation by dispossession. Examples include publically funded infrastructure, gendered and often racialized household and reproductive labor, instrumental use of race,
class, and nationality in immigration and land-ownership laws that consolidated agro-capital in California, and new appropriation of the commons for private accumulation whereby “the global commons are being enclosed.”

Accumulation by dispossession produces a reserve army of labor. While the “creative destruction,” of capitalism destroys traditional entitlements and subsistence economies and estranges direct producers from their means of labor, all those dislocated are not absorbed in the new production process. This unabsorbed labor is the so-called “surplus humanity”—populations separated from their non-capitalist means of subsistence but not integrated into the productive circuits of wage labor on a stable basis.

What do those not absorbed in formal markets do while suspended in the “imaginary waiting room” of history? They tend to their basic needs as best as they can by exchanging needs and capacities in networks of barter, petty trade, and casual employment under the radar of the law. The result is the emergence of a “need economy”—a zone outside the formal legal frames of contract and regulation signifying “informalization within the accumulation economy.” This zone is the so-called informal economy. While ostensibly “discovered in Africa in the early 1970s,” the informal economy has been a perennial and enduring companion of the formal capitalist economy. Its emergence was contemporaneous with that of capitalism, and it endures just as capitalism persists.

From Reproduction to Production, 1 ECON. & SOC. 93, 100 (1972).


52. See HARVEY, THE NEW IMPERIALISM, supra note 44, at 146-48; Hartsock, supra note 50, at 176.


58. Id. at 237.

Since the late 1970s, a neoliberal counter-revolution has unfolded on a global scale. This accelerated accumulation by dispossession, enlarged the surplus army of labor, and expanded the informal sectors of economies. Rural and urban areas are sutured in new networks to accelerate the siphoning of value. Deeper penetration of market forces accelerates migration of uprooted rural farmers to urban areas. Rapid urban growth combined with diminished state capacity is the recipe for mushrooming slums in the global South. With the state rolled back, privatization becomes “the cutting edge of accumulation by dispossession.” As flexible production shrinks regulated formal economies, informal shadow economies become the only source of livelihood for the urban poor. Today, the informal sector engages two-fifths of the economically active population of the global South. Across the global South, neoliberal policies have been “an inevitable recipe for the mass production of slums,” that “have become dumping grounds for a surplus population working in unskilled, unprotected, and low-wage

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64. For a detailed study of rapid urbanization over the last 30 years, see Frederick Van der Ploeg & Steven Poelhekke, Globalization and the Rise of Mega-Cities in the Developing World, 1 CAMBRIDGE J. REGIONS ECON. & SOC’Y 477, 490-94 (2008).


67. Mike Davis, Planet of Slums, supra note 4, at 17.
informal service industries and trade.”

If accumulation by dispossession creates slum dwellers, what is the genealogy of slums? The “creative destruction” of capitalism forced rapid relocations of habitation as rural populations moved to emerging centers of extraction, manufacturing, and commerce. As urban centers grew in a laissez faire regimes, so too did slums as the abode of the surplus army of labor. Dublin, Manchester, London, and Naples were early examples of such urban centers. The first prototype of planned urban development under capitalism occurred as a result of the rebuilding of Paris in the nineteenth century, whereby Paris emerged as a center of commerce and bourgeois life, and its emerging slums were removed from the heart of the city to its outer rim. While this “turned the capital city into the city of capital,” it also demonstrated that “the root cause of urban slumming seems to lie not in urban poverty but in urban wealth.” The second prototype emerged in the United States after the Second World War; first in New York City, and then in most other metropolitan areas. While predominantly white middle-classes, ensconced in debt-financed suburbia, turned to the pursuit of individual accumulation, protection of property, and so-called family values, the darker under-classes and the marginalized had to contend with removals, blighted inner-city ghettos, and inhuman public housing projects. The reconfiguration of Paris and New York City furnished two alternative models of urban development for the modern city across the global North—the “donut-shaped” American cities, with mostly poor people of color and immigrants concentrated in derelict inner-city zones, and European “saucer” cities, with immigrant and unemployed populations occupying high-rise housing on urban outskirts. In the global South, urban growth is a hybrid of both models, turning urban real estate into a high-profit sector “where political corruption, capitalist development

68. Id. at 175.
69. See generally Davis, Planet of Slums, supra note 67 (detailing the development of these slums).
70. See David Harvey, Paris, Capital of Modernity (2003) [hereinafter Harvey, Paris].
72. Verma, supra note 30, at xix.
73. See Robert Moses and the Modern City: The Transformation of New York (Hillary Ballon & Kenneth T. Jackson eds., 2007).
75. See generally Harvey, Paris, supra note 70, at 236-52 (discussing the displacement of the working class from the city center of Paris); Robert Moses and the Modern City, supra note 73, at 94-121 (providing an overview of downtown urban renewal projects and slum removal in New York City).
and international finance intersect.\textsuperscript{76} The dominant result is the concentration of real-estate ownership and slum growth.\textsuperscript{77}

The neoliberal political economy has triggered a convergence between domains of economy and culture, and a confluence of reconfiguration of urban space and commodification of symbolic forms.\textsuperscript{78} The city increasingly becomes exclusively a zone of the service and consumption economy, and urban space itself turns into a cultural commodity to be consumed along market principles.\textsuperscript{79} Skills suitable for the service sector and/or the capacity to consume what this space has to offer become the only grounds for eligibility to be in the city. The ineligible who stay back are eventually confined to the informal economy and deprived of secure shelter. The commodification of urban space, with culture and aesthetics at a premium, engenders a range of legal and architectural regimes to discipline the ineligible and dispossessed. These include “secure architecture,” “zero tolerance” policing, and “preventive crime control,” in the neoliberal “post-justice” city.\textsuperscript{80}

In the midst of all this, some urban groups do manage to contrive cultural, economic, and political “spaces of escape,” or “counter spaces.”\textsuperscript{81} Farmers’ markets, “alternative lifestyle” enclaves, and the “underground” economy are examples of this phenomenon which engender “new identities and practices that disturb established histories.”\textsuperscript{82} The resistive mode of these counter spaces can and does take overt political forms, as demonstrated by the anti-WTO protests in Seattle in 1999, and replicated in


\textsuperscript{77} See id. at 153-57 (detailing the growth of large construction firms, the sale of land to large developers and banks, and the displacement of the lower class in Istanbul during the 1980s).

\textsuperscript{78} See Allen J. Scott, Capitalism, Cities, and the Production of Symbolic Forms, 26 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRITISH GEOGRAPHERS 11, 11-12 (2002).

\textsuperscript{79} See Timothy A. Gibson, Selling City Living: Urban Branding Campaigns, Class Power and the Civic Good, 8 INT’L J. CULTURAL STUD. 259 (2005).


\textsuperscript{81} Gordon MacLeod et al., Negotiating the Contemporary City: Introduction, 40 URB. STUD. 1655 (2003).

many major cities around the world. This phenomenon has particular
import for the resistance movements of slum dwellers.

IV. BACKDROP OF RESISTANCE IN DHARAVI: INDIAN PUBLIC POLICY AND
SLUMS

The genealogy of the spatial production of urban slums in the global
South is rooted in the colonial configuration of cities in forms suitable for
the assertion of control and the incorporation of the colony into the
economies of empire. In India, British colonists reconfigured urban areas
to serve such ends. A defining feature of colonial India was the spatial
divide between the centers of gravity of colonial presence and the native
quarters. Natives not recruited into colonial security, administrative, and
commercial regimes, remained at or beyond the spatial and social margins.
A policy of neglecting even minimal housing needs of native
neighborhoods escalated into a de facto housing policy of reliance on local
elites who built overcrowded, unsanitary, but highly profitable tenements.
Mumbai, historically a coastal fishing village, emerged as an urban center
under colonial rule, a development rooted in the colonial control of opium
production and trade. The new city was carefully segregated, to separate
colonial masters and the incorporated from the dispossessed natives.

After decolonization in the global South, postcolonial elites inherited and
often reinforced the physical footprints and exclusionary geographies of
segregated cities. They rushed to embrace trickle-down development
models, whereby “the poor were denied a place in civic life and urban
culture, and were seen as an impediment to progress and betterment of
society.” In India, the Congress Party’s “one-party democracy” claimed

83. See, e.g., DAVID FEATHERSTONE, RESISTANCE, SPACE AND POLITICAL
IDENTITIES: THE MAKING OF COUNTER-GLOBAL NETWORKS 134 (2008);
GLOBALIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF RESISTANCE (Barry K. Gills ed., 2000); NAOMI
KLEIN, NO LOGO (1999).
84. See generally GLOBALIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF RESISTANCE, supra
note 83, at 150-64.
85. See Ronald J. Horvath, In Search of a Theory of Urbanization: The Colonial
City, 5 EAST LAKE GEOGRAPHER 60 (1969); ANTHONY D. KING, URBANISM,
COLONIALISM, AND THE WORLD ECONOMY: CULTURE AND SPATIAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE WORLD URBAN SYSTEM (1990); JAN MORRIS & SIMON WINCHESTER, STONES OF
86. See MARIAM DOSSAL, IMPERIAL DESIGNS AND INDIAN REALITIES: THE
87. See id. at 16-30.
88. See AMAR FAROOQUI, OPIUM CITY: THE MAKING OF EARLY VICTORIAN
89. NANDINI GOOPTU, THE POLITICS OF THE URBAN POOR IN EARLY TWENTIETH-
90. STANLEY A. KOCHNANEK, THE CONGRESS PARTY IN INDIA: THE DYNAMICS
OF ONE-PARTY DEMOCRACY (1968).
the moral high ground of national interest, modernity, equity, and efficiency.\textsuperscript{91} Poverty alleviation was projected as the central concern of the state. However, the development model of modernization by diffusion failed to deliver.\textsuperscript{92} While megaprojects like hydroelectric dams and heavy industry thrived, the education, health, and housing needs of the poor and the marginalized were neglected.\textsuperscript{93} Often this development model directly swelled the ranks of the urban poor.\textsuperscript{94} By the late 1970s, any lingering faith in development through state-led growth projects was shattered by poor growth rates, only a marginal decline in poverty, and barely appreciable improvements in the quality of life. As this development project derailed, the state attempted to address poverty by direct intervention.\textsuperscript{95} However, declining growth rates, the escalating fiscal crisis of the state, and the fragmentation of political legitimacy ruled out the implementation of refurbished welfare policies.

India took a turn to neoliberalism in the early 1990s, ushering in an era of “liberalization-privatisation-globalization.”\textsuperscript{96} The market emerged as the new messiah, the welfare state went into a decisive retreat, and there was a shift away from formal sector waged work to casual labor in the informal sector.\textsuperscript{97} The number of paupers in the country increased dramatically.\textsuperscript{98} The impact on slum dwellers was particularly acute.\textsuperscript{99} The results were a reconfiguration the social contract between the state and the subject, a


\textsuperscript{93} See ROBERT-JAN BAKEN, PLOTTING, SQUATTING, PUBLIC PURPOSE AND POLITICS: LAND MARKET DEVELOPMENT, LOW INCOME HOUSING, AND PUBLIC INTERVENTION IN INDIA 361 (2003).

\textsuperscript{94} Arundhati Roy is quoted in AMITAVA KUMAR, BOMBAY, LONDON, NEW YORK 52 (2002).

\textsuperscript{95} SANYAL, supra note 43, at 170.

\textsuperscript{96} Mary E. John & Satish Deshpande, Theorising the Present: Problems and Possibilities, ECON. & POL. WKLY, Nov. 15, 2008 at 83, 84; see also Kamal Nayan Karba, Indian Planning and Liberalisation, 31 ECON. & POL. WKLY, Oct. 5, 1996, 2740; Kuldeep Mathur, Neo-liberal Agenda and Study of Institutions, REV. DEV. & CHANGE 167 (1996).

\textsuperscript{97} See generally GOOPTU, supra note 89.

\textsuperscript{98} JEREMY SEABROOK, IN THE CITIES OF THE SOUTH: SCENES FROM A DEVELOPING WORLD 49 (1996).

reconstitution of the grounds of eligibility for full citizenship, and a
redrawing of the expectations of collective responsibility. This recalibration
entailed turning electoral representative democracy into a “free market
democracy.” Elections have been turned into a “heavily-sponsored, TV-
friendly spectator sport . . . [whereby] an electorate has been turned into a
market, voters are seen as consumers, and democracy is being welded to
the free market. Ergo: those who cannot consume do not matter.” An
ideological reconstruction of poverty and inequality has unfolded that
furnishes the grounds for the disavowal of the rights of the poor.

The Indian judiciary played a critical role in this enterprise. For a brief
period, the courts tempered the violence of evictions and demolitions, ever-
present dangers for slum dwellers, by requiring adequate resettlement
schemes. The neoliberal turn triggered a rupture, which led to a
redefinition of poverty and the rights of the poor, and Indian courts have
cast aside any considerations of the humane treatment and adequate
resettlement of squatters and have adopted a discourse of the illegality of
slums and squatting.

In the 1980s and early 1990s, Indian courts equated evictions with the
denial of the right to life, mandated alternative housing, held that
“reasonable residence is an indispensible necessity” for human
development and the fulfillment of the “right to life,” and argued that the
Indian Constitution held within its ambit the right to shelter to make the
right to life more meaningful. The courts held that adequate shelter is “a
home where [one] has opportunities to grow physically, mentally,

100. ARUNDHATI ROY, FIELD NOTES ON DEMOCRACY: LISTENING TO GRASSHOPPERS 17 (2009). For a case study of political marketing in the 1989 parliamentary election in India, see DILIP M. SARWATE, POLITICAL MARKETING: THE INDIAN EXPERIENCE 110-201 (1990).


Human rights were deemed to include the “right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family; it includes food, clothing, housing, medical care and necessary social services.”

As neoliberalism made inroads in India, the courts took a dramatic turn. They now became interested in “cleaning up the city,” characterized slums as “large areas of public land . . . usurped for private use free of cost,” and rejected a plan to provide the free land for resettlement as “a proposal which attracts more land grabbers. Rewarding an encroacher on public land with an alternative free site is like giving a reward to a pickpocket.” The judicially recognized fundamental right to adequate housing evaporated in thin air. Now the courts told squatters facing imminent removal, “[w]hen you are occupying illegal land, you have no legal right, what to talk of fundamental right, to stay there a minute longer.” Courts raised the specter of anarchy and breakdown of order was raised to deny any relief: “If encroachments on public land are to be allowed, there will be anarchy.”

Deploying a discourse of epidemics and pathology to characterize squatters and slum dwellers, the courts argued that “their” numbers were “growing and growing,” and hence urgent steps must be taken to “deal with the problem.” The ultimate prescription was rather simple: “If they cannot afford to live in [the city], let them not come to [the city].”

The end result is an increased “segregation of economic classes.” A discourse of “development pornography” has flourished that holds slum dwellers responsible for “pressure on civic amenities, crime, social imbalances, economic exploitation, unplanned growth, deterioration of city beautification, culture, environmental setback to city development in a planned manner.” The new judicial language regarding slum dwellers is
saturated with the rhetoric of illegality. The courts appear mindful that in a constitutional liberal republic “in order, ethically, to justify denying a national citizen his text-based rights, it becomes necessary to make the informal settler into an ‘improper’ citizen.” The courts have done just that by characterizing slum dwellers as dishonest, unscrupulous, polluters, and predatory encroachers. Rendered an “improper citizen,” the “encroacher” can now be denied the protections of rights of citizenship. The political economy of slum production stands erased, the slum and the slum-dweller emerge as a space and a body without history, and responsibilities of the state stand vitiated.

V. THEORIZING RESISTANCE

How do slum dwellers respond to their condition? What measures of resignation and resistance frame their existence? Relevant here is Gayatri Spivak’s evocative question: “Can the subaltern speak?” Spivak cautions that external attempts to represent the subaltern run the risk of logocentric assumptions of solidarity within heterogeneity, and of speaking for the subaltern rather than allowing them to speak for themselves. The point is that if the subaltern could speak—that is, speak in a mode and manner intelligible to us—then they would not be a subaltern. This signals that the marginalized may respond to their condition in ways that lie outside the channels and modes of political action contemplated by those who do not share their condition. Substantiations of this proposition emerge from inquiries about “the weapons of the weak,” “oppositional consciousness,” history from below, “subversive” history,
alternative constructions of nationhood, and the economy. Resistance of the oppressed may take multiple and even contradictory forms. Here Gyan Prakash’s famous question, fashioned in response to a critique that postcolonial theory and subaltern studies try to ride two horses at once—arxism and post-structuralism/deconstruction—is useful: “Can the subaltern ride?” The implication for any inquiry about the marginalized is that it should be receptive to their heterogeneity and even contradictory oppositional practices.

Building on Foucault’s insight about the relationship between power and resistance, Judith Butler argues that the conditional but creative possibilities of resistive performance are a “relation of being implicated in that which one opposes, this turning of power against itself to produce alternative modalities of power, to establish a kind of political contestation that is not ‘pure opposition’ . . . but a difficult labor of forging a future from resources inevitably impure.” It is the contingent and precarious terrain of possibilities that makes possible both the reaffirmation of patterns of domination and their undoing. As Mbembe reminds us, located at the variously entangled public spaces, “the postcolonial subject has to learn to bargain in this conceptual marketplace.” Lives of the marginalized underscore that “we live in a time of porous legality or legal porosity, multiple networks of legal orders forcing us to constant transitions and trespassing.” Extreme heterogeneity of struggles against accumulation by dispossession can appear without progressive characteristics, and may be difficult to bring together both thematically and geographically. The urban informal sector is “ideologically promiscuous” in its tactical alignments with populist political formations across the ideological

130. See Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture 219 (1994).
When analyzing liminal spaces like slums and the informal economy, it is critical that we jettison what Foucault terms “the tyranny of globalizing discourses” and deploy what Chatterjee calls a “fragmentary discourse.” One also should take into account what Karl Polanyi termed the “double movement” of capitalist development, or the growth of market orientation of society and the simultaneous growth of struggles against market society’s negative effects.

In order to examine the field of possibilities of resistance and transformative political action by slum dwellers, hegemonic ideologies of the time have to be accounted for. Over the last thirty years Keynesian welfare, the socialist alternative, and nationalist populism have increasingly given way to a late capitalist market ideology. Globalization, neoliberalism, consumerism, and individualism form components of this hegemonic frame. We find ourselves in a world characterized by increasingly pervasive norms of the so-called free market: competition, freedom from others, consumerism, and self-fulfillment. With individuals posited as self-contained, self-interested, competitive, and primarily driven by greed, these norms reorder the balance between the individual and the community. Collective identities, duties to others, and social solidarities are increasingly banished from public discourse. This has a profoundly negative impact on the potential and scope of social movements that aim at foundational transformations of collective life. In critical social theory the revolutionary potential of urban populations has been a particular focus. Most inquiries have trained on the working class and, more recently, on an amorphous “multitude.” Relevant to our inquiry is Frantz Fanon’s prognosis that in the global South transformative social movements arose from the uprooted peasantry marooned on the fringes of cities, rather than industrial proletariat as envisaged by Eurocentric critical social theory. He argued:

It is among these masses in the people of the shanty towns and in the lumpenproletariat that the insurrection will find its urban spearhead. The lumpenproletariat, this cohort of starving men, divorced from tribe and

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134. See Davis, Planet of Slums, supra note 4, at 29.
clan, constitutes one of the most spontaneously and radically revolutionary forces of a colonized people.\footnote{141} Analysts of slums note that while the “outcast proletariat” is not a “socialized collectivity of labor and lacks significant power to disrupt or seize the means of production . . . [i]t does possess . . . yet unmeasured powers of subverting urban order.”\footnote{142} In order to appreciate the political space within which slum dwellers’ resistance unfolds, Partha Chatterjee’s mapping of postcolonial formations is instructive. Chatterjee sees the postcolonial political field split between distinct domains of civil society and political society.\footnote{143} Civil society “peopled largely by the urban middle classes, is the sphere that seeks to be congruent with the normative models of bourgeois civil society and represents the domain of capitalist hegemony.”\footnote{144} The domain of political society includes the urban poor and rural population, who, while having the formal status of citizens and opportunity to exercise their franchise as an instrument of political bargaining, are not under the moral-political leadership of the capitalist class. Importantly, they do not relate to the organ of the state in the same way that the middle classes do, nor do governmental agencies treat them as proper citizens belonging to civil society. Those in political society make their claims on government, and in turn are governed, not within the framework of stable constitutionally defined rights and laws, but rather through temporary, contextual and unstable arrangements arrived at through direct political negotiations.\footnote{145} This is in tune with the transformative potential of the marginalized wherein “the profound threat of these marginal positions lies in their power

\footnote{141. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth 81 (Richard Philcox trans., Grove Press 2004) (1963).}

\footnote{142. Davis, The Urbanization of Empire, supra note 41, at 11-12.}

\footnote{143. In his interrogation of postcolonial modernity, he locates the emergence and operations of a “political society” in the conflict between modernity and democracy. He sees modernity being about rights and a sanitized public space emptied of social and class divides. “Civil society” is this realm of modernity and domain of rights. Democracy, Chatterjee suggests, emerges where the political meets the popular. This is the domain of “political society,” where the dominant are forced to acknowledge the presence of, and to negotiate with, the dominated. In electoral representative democracies, particularly in the global South, the “political society” becomes a terrain where the marginalized can and do secure concessions that are often outside the formal ambit of the law. Partha Chatterjee, Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World 40-41 (2004) [hereinafter Chatterjee, Politics of the Governed].}

\footnote{144. Partha Chatterjee, Democracy and Economic Transformation in India, ECON. & POL. WKLY April 19, 2008, 53, 57 [hereinafter Chatterjee, Democracy].}

\footnote{145. Id. at 57. Chatterjee acknowledges, however, that there remain marginal groups that “represent an outside beyond the boundaries of political society.” Id. at 61. In the case of India he counts the tribal indigenous communities as the prime representatives of such groups. Id.}
to question the ordering of everyday reality, through their capacity to ignore or transcend normal customary divisions. Chatterjee sees the deployment of new forms of political associations of the urban subalterns and organizations of labor within the informal economy as “quite sophisticated forms of strategic politics.” However, outcomes of resistance in any given space produced as an effect of operations of power are not predetermined or predictable.

VI. PERFORMING RESISTANCE

The marginalized in India are accused of not resisting enough. The complaint is that:

Successive governments in India have had reason enough to rely on the unending patience of the neglected and deprived millions in India who have not risen in fury about illiteracy, hunger, illness, or economic insecurity. The stubborn persistence of these deprivations has much to do with that lack of fury.

In conditions of extreme marginality, survival itself is resistance, particularly when one perpetually has to transgress lines of legality to live, work, and survive. Under conditions where “housing is a verb,” the daily struggle for shelter, food, water, and even a place to relieve oneself takes time, energy, innovation, and perseverance. Squatting itself is a prolonged test of will and endurance against repressive apparatuses of the state, because “[i]t is not unusual to hear of a squatter settlement that has been constructed overnight, torn down by the police the next day, constructed again the following night, destroyed again, and reconstructed until the authorities tire of fighting.” Besides defense of what little they may have, the survival struggles of slum dwellers are often also “surreptitiously offensive,” as they ceaselessly try to expand the survival space and the rights of the disenfranchised. Slum dwellers also create sizable informal economies and mutual-help networks to sustain


147. Partha Chatterjee, Classes, Capital and Indian Democracy, ECON. & POL. WKLY, Nov. 15, 2008, at 89, 92 [hereinafter Chatterjee, Classes].


themselves. Doing this under conditions of extra-legality, without any external help, and in the face of public hostility borders on the miraculous. An anti-demolition activist from Dharavi states:

You in the West so easily see the slum as a negative concept. Yes, it is beset by deep poverty and neglect, but Dharavi has also been mirroring India’s economic revival and it has done so largely by rejecting a local government that has long ignored it and by recycling its own resources.152

Slum dwellers of Dharavi use both sustained and episodic collective action to secure access to necessities. In one instance, for example, women of Dharavi deployed sustained and organized action to have the municipal corporation reduce the users’ fee for toilets for women and children.153 It is remarkable that collective action unfolds in a setting where the internal demography is volatile due to a steady influx of newcomers, often resulting in “slums within slums.”154 The resulting spatial configurations are often fractured with “the outsiders and insiders unable to build relationships and coherent communities.”155 Nevertheless, collective resistance against evacuation and slum-removal is an ever-present feature of Dharavi.

In a city otherwise marred by inter-religious strife, residents display remarkable inter-religious solidarity to resist evictions and demolitions in Dharavi. While “developers want to transform this massive slum into a glossy, shining symbol of New India,” the slum dwellers “people of all faiths—Hindu, Muslim, Christian—have come together to protest against the demolition of their homes.”156 This intra-slum solidarity arises from a sense of community understood in terms of shared kinship—the most common metaphor . . . is that of family.157 Slum dwellers, like other urban poor adopt “highly emotive resources of solidarity and militant action.”158 Slum dwellers use religious and cultural festivals, particularly those that involve rituals of role reversal, to cultivate solidarity and to imagine alternative social arrangements. Such rituals, seen as “safety valves” conceived to reinforce relations of power, become a site for sudden and unanticipated expressions of pent up subaltern anger with transformative

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152. McDougall, supra note 36.
153. SHARMA, supra note 18.
157. CHATTERJEE, POLITICS OF THE GOVERNED, supra note 143, at 103.
158. Chatterjee, Democracy, supra note 144, at 61.
Deployment of religion to cultivate solidarity by “the marginalized in the shantytowns of neocolonial modernity” can be a “more radical” resistance than “participation in formal politics or labor unions.”

Dharavi residents also use elections and political patronage circuits to sustain a precarious yet resilient existence through political mobilization. Votes in elections are used as bargaining chips. This is facilitated by the fact that “vote-banks” and networks of patron-client relationships play a critical role in the electoral politics in India. Here slum dwellers can be seen as “occupy[ing] a liminal zone framed by the tension between their formal illegality . . . and electoral importance.” Election cycles become a particular opportunity for slum dwellers to secure protection and concessions. While the voter turnout in wealthy sections of Mumbai is a mere twelve percent, from the “squatters in the slum colonies, for whom the issue of who comes into power means the difference between living within four walls or on the street, it’s eighty-eight percent. False. In India the poor vote.”

Slum dwellers also secure some measure of protection and benefits through a set of “paralegal arrangements” with the “political society.” This is critical, as their habitat and work in the informal sector rests upon violations of property laws, safety standards, pollution norms, and tax regimes. This makes the claims of the urban poor in political society “a matter of constant political negotiation and the results are never secure or permanent. Their entitlements, even when recognized, never quite become rights.” The claims for protection and benefits “cannot often be met by standard application of rules and frequently require the declaration of an

159. Ranajit Guha notes: The not too rare correspondence between sacred days and insurgency as witnessed, for instance, by the incursion of Wat Tyler’s men into London on the morning of Corpus Christi, June 13, 1381, the beginning of the great series of peasant revolts in Germany during Fastnacht 1525, the conversion of a carnival featuring Mere Fella and her Infanterie into a riot in masquerade against royal tax officials in Dijon in 1630, the coincidence of some of the jacqueries of 1789 in France with Sundays, feast days, etc, as mentioned by Lefebvre and the threat of massive uprising in Bombay during Moharram and Diwali in the year of the Mutiny [1857].

RANAJIT GUHA, ELEMENTARY ASPECTS OF PEASANT INSURGENCY IN COLONIAL INDIA 31 (1999).


161. John & Deshpande, supra note 96, at 83, 85.

162. MEHTA, supra note 15, at 68 (quoting a member of the Parliament from Mumbai).

163. Id. at 56.

164. Chatterjee, Democracy, supra note 144, at 58.
exception." \textsuperscript{165} The fragile basis of housing and livelihood in the grey zones of informality has to be protected through this on-going negotiation. Often collective action in the slums translates into grassroots organizations to protect extra-legal habitations and livelihoods from the police, other agencies of the state, and developers. \textsuperscript{166} Usually styled “associations,” they “spring from a collective violation of property laws and civic regulation.” \textsuperscript{167} A study of extra-legal street vendors and squatters finds that they “operated strategically in political society, successfully mobilizing support among citizens and political parties to establish and maintain their tenuous, and clearly illegal, occupation of the streets.” \textsuperscript{168}

Economic and political forces unleashed by neoliberalism have aggravated the nexus between crime, urban poverty and segregation, and have reconstituted rights of citizenship. \textsuperscript{169} Consequently, marginalized slum dwellers often survive by engaging in criminal behavior as those in power stymie legitimate means of survival. \textsuperscript{170} Often the use of violence has a “calculative, almost utilitarian logic, designed to draw attention to specific grievances with a view to seeking appropriate governmental benefits. A range of deliberate tactics are followed to elicit the right response from officials, political leaders and especially the media.” \textsuperscript{171} Violence along intersecting ethnic, religious, caste, and class lines has become an endemic feature of politics in Mumbai since the rise of neoliberalism and the Hindu Right. \textsuperscript{172}

The threat of a riot is ever present in Dharavi. Some scholars and

\textsuperscript{165} Id. at 61.


\textsuperscript{167} CHATTERJEE, POLITICS OF THE GOVERNED, supra note 143, at 59.

\textsuperscript{168} Id. at 61.

\textsuperscript{169} For a landmark study of this process, see TEREZA P. R. CALDEIRA, CITY OF WALLS: CRIME, SEGREGATION, AND CITIZENSHIP IN SAO PAULO (2000).

\textsuperscript{170} For an evocative report on the entanglement of crime with economic opportunity in Mumbai, including in Dharavi, see MEHTA, supra note 15, at 185-249.

\textsuperscript{171} Chatterjee, Democracy, supra note 144, at 60. Chatterjee says: the proliferation of the tactical use of violence, not so much to intimidate or punish (although there is that too, but that is familiar political violence of the old kind) but to display in the public space, in spectacular fashion, the anger and moral outrage of “the people.” Violence here serves the rhetorical function of converting populations into a people.

\textsuperscript{172} See THOMAS B. HANSEN, THE B.J.P. AND COMPULSIONS OF POLITICS IN INDIA (1998); THOMAS B. HANSEN, THE SAFFRON WAVE: HINDU NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN MODERN INDIA (1999); Hansen, Wages, supra note 129.
theorists see this threat as strategic use of illegality and violence. Violence may be deployed to keep demolition squads at bay, to protest unfavorable changes in state policy, or to protest against worsening conditions of life. Ever since the global neoliberal turn, there has been a noticeable increase in protests by slum dwellers and the urban poor against the escalating cost of food, housing, and other basic amenities. One study counted one hundred and forty-six food riots in thirty-nine countries from 1976 to 1992, and dubbed them “IMF Riots.” The response to slum dwellers’ protests has included expanded use of state violence through adoption of stricter criminal laws, enforcement of spatial segregation and isolation, and counterinsurgency measures.

Criminalizing slums and slum dwellers is increasingly becoming a part of counterinsurgency strategies. While the governing classes increasingly designate slum dwellers as criminals, an “architecture of fear” is creating gated communities and secure areas for the elites all over the global South, where they can live a “real imitation life” modeled after television images from the global North. Global security establishments are aware of the geopolitical implications of the rise of slums and slum dwellers’ resistance movements. The journal of the Army War College opines: “The future of warfare lies in the streets, sewers, high-rise buildings, and sprawl of houses that form the broken cities of the world.” A RAND Corporation report bemoans that the U.S. military is not designed for urban counterinsurgency, while mega-slums are becoming zones of primary threat to the security of the existing order.

179. Ralph Peters, Our Soldiers, Their Cities, 26 PARAMETERS 43 (Spring 1996).
Stripping the slum-dweller, now deemed an “improper” citizen, of protections of the laws has implication that go beyond the space and state of habitat of the urban poor. Now placed both in a space of exception and state of exception, the slum dweller is a perpetual target of state violence. Participation in or even proximity with the dark sides of the informal economy renders the slum-dweller an embodiment of crime and criminality. In the post-welfare and post-social-democracy global North a “language of deviance run[s] amok,” and “people and places become pathologically labeled as undeserving ‘others.’” As da Silva shows in her work on state violence in favelas of Rio de Janeiro, the subalterns positioned “in/difference” are rendered “affectable subjects” and the “subject[s] of necessitas (outer-determination) and not life (self-determination).” In the shadow of neoliberalism, the violence of the state braids with the violence of the market in the service of accumulation by dispossession yet again.

Another obstacle in the struggle of slum dwellers is the ubiquity of discourses and attendant apparatuses of “civil society.” This elusive construct, forged on the anvil of European history and reported in the annals of European social theory, is deployed in the global South to enable so-called NGOs to occupy the space being created by shrinking the state and silencing the marginalized. In postcolonial formations the iron fist of the state remains within the supposedly velvet glove of “civil society,” which is “not a domain of hegemony . . . but of domination. Its attempts to make economic liberalization the common sense of our times are accompanied by brutal state repression and the anomalous exercise of law.” When operating in slums, these NGOs, laying claims to expert knowledge, often monopolize the roles of traditional political machines.


181. See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (Daniel Heller-Roaxen trans., 1998); GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Keven Atell trans., 2005).


183. Macleod et al., supra note 81, at 1665.


186. See id.


and usurp the authentic voice of the slum-dwelling poor. This process “has entrenched the position of a small, homogeneous ‘iron triangle’ of transnational professionals based in key government ministries (especially finance), multinational and bilateral development agencies, and international NGOs.” The “civil society revolution has bureaucratized and de-radicalized urban social movements.” The NGOs “end up functioning like the whistle on a pressure cooker. They divert and sublime political rage, and make sure it does not build to a head.” By the account of a Mumbai housing activist, slum-oriented NGOs:

subvert, dis-inform and de-idealize people so as to keep them away from class struggle. They adopt and propagate the practice of begging favors on sympathies and humane grounds rather than making the oppressed conscious of their rights. As a matter of fact these agencies and organizations intervene to oppose the agitational path people take to win their demands. Their effort is constantly to divert people’s attention from the larger political evils of imperialism to merely local issues and so confuse people in differentiating enemies from friends.

The antidote for the discourse of civil society and machination of NGOs are grassroots organizations of the marginalized, and concerted action with other subordinated sections of the society, guided by broader transformative political projects. This is the path Dharavi has chosen.

VII. CONCLUSION

Urban slums are spaces that radically depart from the original meaning of “city,” a term derived from civ’tade, civitat-em, and civitas, “its primary sense was therefore ‘citizenship’; thence concretely ‘the body of citizens,’ the community.” Slums testify to the unsustainability of the capitalist world order, and national policies imprisoned in bankrupt development models. They challenge us to cut through the ideological fog that envelops the operations and effects of socioeconomic orders procreated by the rule of unbridled capital accumulation. They underscore the urgency of the task to reimagine concepts of citizenship, class, identity formation, and social

189. VERMA, supra note 30, at 150.
change in tune with the rhythms of lived experiences of the urban poor. They warrant a deeper understanding of the relationship between power and resistance and the mutually constitutive role of law and extra-legality. The daily struggles and resistive ingenuities of slum dwellers should inform LatCrit’s agenda of deploying critique as a strategic practice. By refusing to live a life of “living without alternatives,” the slumdogs of Dharavi remind us that a “world without alternatives needs self-criticism as a condition of survival and decency.”\footnote{Zygmunt Bauman, \textit{Living Without an Alternative}, 62 POL. Q. 35, 35, 44 (1991).} Are we up to the task?