Begging for Change: Begging Restrictions Throughout Washington

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BEGGING FOR CHANGE

Begging Restrictions Throughout Washington

SEATTLEU
SCHOOL OF LAW
HOMELESS RIGHTS ADVOCACY PROJECT
Begging for Change

Begging Restrictions Throughout Washington

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary.......................................................................................................................... 1

Introduction...................................................................................................................................... 1

Part I: Overview of the Law........................................................................................................... 5
  A. Stigmatizing and Criminalizing Visible Poverty ................................................................. 6
  B. Begging for Free Speech ......................................................................................................... 11
  C. Begging for Due Process ......................................................................................................... 17

Part II: Few Safe Havens ............................................................................................................. 21
  A. The Criminalization of Begging in Washington ................................................................. 22
  B. Enforcement of Begging Restrictions in Washington ......................................................... 29

Part III: Be Silent: Washington’s Restrictions on Begging ....................................................... 43
  A. Restrictions on Who Can Beg: Permitting Requirements .................................................... 44
  B. Restrictions on When Individuals Can Beg: Time Restrictions ........................................ 49
  C. Restrictions on Where Individuals Can Beg: Place and Distance Restrictions ............... 52
  D. Restrictions on How Individuals Can Beg: Manner Restrictions ..................................... 58

Part IV: Recommendations and Conclusion ............................................................................... 67
  A. Peaceful Begging Should Not Be Criminalized ................................................................. 67
  B. Repeal Laws that Apply to Peaceful Begging ..................................................................... 70
  C. Repeal Aggressive Begging Laws ...................................................................................... 71
  D. Recognize Peaceful Begging as a Protected Plea for Help ............................................. 73

Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 74

Appendix ........................................................................................................................................ 88

Part I: This Community Cares Flier ............................................................................................... 88

Part II: Graphical Comparison of the Rise in Begging Ordinances and the Rise in Criminalization .......................................................................................................................... 89

Part III: Methodology .................................................................................................................. 90

Part IV: Example Public Records Request Letter ....................................................................... 93
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The act of panhandling, commonly known as begging, is a constitutionally protected form of speech. But Washington’s cities are increasingly enacting ordinances that criminalize begging. The consequences of criminalizing begging are severe and include violations of First Amendment and due process rights. Indeed, these ordinances often outlaw peaceful and nonintrusive behavior protected by the First Amendment. Some advocates assert that since 2015, “100% of federal court cases have ruled bans/restrictions [on begging] are unconstitutional.”

Further, these laws do not contribute to a solution for homelessness; instead, they function to remove visible poverty and homelessness from sight. Due to the nature and penalties of these anti-begging ordinances, the debtor’s prison grows, and the cycle of homelessness continues.

Washington’s Begging Restrictions

The Homeless Rights Advocacy Project (HRAP) researched the laws of sixty-four cities across Washington State and found 121 ordinances that prohibit or restrict begging. An overwhelming number of these ordinances punish begging as a misdemeanor, inflicting on already vulnerable people ongoing and escalating collateral consequences.

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4 See, e.g., Challenges to Bans of Restrictions on Panhandling, SACRAMENTO REG’L COAL. TO END HOMELESSNESS (Oct. 2017). The fact sheet from Sacramento Regional Coalition to End Homelessness cites to data collected by the National Law Center on Homelessness & Poverty found in Housing Not Handcuffs: A Litigation Manual.
Key findings include:

- The vast majority of Washington cities punish begging: 86% of surveyed cities have at least one law criminalizing begging in their municipal codes.
- 83% of these laws result in a misdemeanor if violated. Criminal convictions exacerbate homelessness.\(^8\)
- Begging restrictions are proliferating: approximately 2/3 of all begging ordinances were enacted after 2001.
- Washington’s second most popular laws are “aggressive” begging restrictions.
- In the 1990s, courts began invalidating prohibitions on peaceful begging as unconstitutional restrictions on free speech. Many cities tried to circumvent this outcome by incorporating non-aggressive conduct into their so-called "aggressive begging" laws.
- Only 2% of aggressive begging ordinances turn on the specific, objectively aggressive conduct of the person begging.
- For the vast majority—98% of aggressive begging laws—a violation can occur based solely on a bystander’s subjective perception.
- If a bystander feels fearful or even feels compelled to give, such feelings may be enough to make begging criminal regardless of whether the person begging has done anything objectively aggressive.
- 42% of all aggressive begging ordinances rely exclusively on a bystander’s subjective perception.
- This reliance on whether a witness "subjectively" feels fear is highly problematic in light of well-established science proving people tend to feel fear simply when viewing a homeless person regardless of that person’s conduct.\(^9\)

Enforcement of Washington’s Begging Restrictions

HRAP requested public records from eleven Washington cities\(^10\) to gain insight on citations for anti-begging laws within the last five years. Only two cities—Marysville and Lakewood—provided data suggesting they formally cited individuals for violating specific begging laws within that timeframe.\(^11\) But the apparent lack of citation data from the remaining nine cities does not mean that these cities are not enforcing their anti-begging ordinances. To the contrary, Washington cities are likely using informal (and invisible or not

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\(^8\) See HRAP, supra note 6; Sara K. Rankin, *The Influence of Exile*, 76 Md. L. Rev. 4, 33 (2016) [hereinafter Rankin 2016].

\(^9\) Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, *Social Groups that Elicit Disgust are Differently Processed in mPFC*, 2 Soc. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 45, 45–51 (2007); Rankin 2016, supra note 8.

\(^10\) Those cities are: Arlington, Bonney Lake, Centralia, Des Moines, Lakewood, Lake Stevens, Issaquah, Marysville, Mount Vernon, Tacoma, and Puyallup. Requests for records were submitted pursuant to Washington’s Public Records Act, RCW §42.56 et seq., on January 29, 2018 and January 30, 2018.

\(^11\) See infra Part II, Section B(1).
“move-along” orders to extinguish the begging and push the visibly poor from public spaces.  

Key findings of the enforcement data include:

- Move-along orders may appear harmless, but they can still violate First Amendment and due process rights.
- The fact that move-along orders do not generate a ticket or other trackable evidence does not mean the laws are not being enforced. To the contrary, these orders are pervasive enforcement tools that are not reported or tracked.
- Move-along orders commonly chill free speech and are vulnerable to discriminatory use; however, those affected have no opportunity to challenge such orders and advocates cannot track them.
- Lakewood severely punished these violations: 100% of individuals found guilty received a 90-day jail sentence; 60% of individuals found guilty for begging in restricted areas also received a fine ranging from $300–$500.
- Lakewood’s apparent lack of formal enforcement after 2016 suggests that the Washington Supreme Court decision in City of Lakewood v. Willis, which held provisions of Lakewood’s Restricted Areas ordinance unconstitutional, may have triggered a dramatic shift in Lakewood’s enforcement policies.

Key Case Studies

This brief also reviews several case studies of specific Washington ordinances. The case studies reveal that many of these laws may not withstand judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment.  

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13 See infra Part II, Section (B)(2).
15 Id.
16 Infra Part II, Section (B)(2).
18 City of Lakewood v. Willis, 375 P.3d 1056, 1064 (Wash. 2016).
19 Infra Part III.
20 Id.
Key findings of the case studies include:

- Lakewood has two ordinances\(^{21}\) that are unlikely to withstand judicial scrutiny because they are overbroad content-based restrictions on speech. Both ordinances restrict substantial speech in traditional public fora—a space afforded the greatest First Amendment protections.\(^{22}\)
- Similarly, Des Moines has an ordinance prohibiting begging in public parks without first obtaining a permit.\(^{23}\) The ordinance is overbroad.\(^{24}\)
- Issaquah prohibits begging on public property from sunset to sunrise.\(^{25}\) This law is an overbroad restriction that prohibits substantial speech within a traditional public forum.\(^{26}\) It is also vulnerable to a vagueness challenge based on the ambiguity of the meaning of “sunset” and “sunrise.”\(^{27}\)
- Tacoma has two overlapping ordinances, one prohibiting coercive solicitation\(^{28}\) and another prohibiting pedestrian interference.\(^{29}\) These laws effectively prohibit the same behavior, except that coercive solicitation occurs only when an individual blocks pedestrian traffic \textit{while making a solicitation}.\(^{30}\) The penalty for coercive solicitation is a gross misdemeanor, resulting in a higher fine and a higher possible jail sentence than pedestrian interference.\(^{31}\)
- In other words, Tacoma punishes the same conduct more seriously if the offender is begging, even peacefully. Peaceful begging is protected free speech; it should not be punished as an aggravating factor.

Many Washington cities are unlikely to withstand a constitutional challenge to their anti-begging laws.\(^{32}\) Recent jurisprudence provides strong guidance for cities to consider in re-evaluating their anti-begging laws. This brief recommends cities:\(^{33}\)

- Repeal ordinances that restrict peaceful begging;
- Repeal aggressive begging ordinances and instead rely on existing ordinances to address truly aggressive behavior;
- Campaign for and invest in non-punitive solutions to address poverty; and
- Recognize begging as a plea for help protected by the United States Constitution.

\(^{22}\) Infra Part III, Section (B)(2).
\(^{23}\) Des Moines MC § 19.08.030(7) (1988).
\(^{24}\) Infra Part III, Section (A)(2).
\(^{26}\) Infra Part III, Section (B).
\(^{27}\) Id.
\(^{32}\) Id.
\(^{33}\) Infra Part IV.
Many cities that restrict begging are infringing on the constitutional rights of their most vulnerable residents and are contributing to the cycle of poverty and homelessness. But cities play a crucial role in protecting the constitutional rights of all of their residents, and they can be essential advocates in addressing the issues surrounding homelessness.
INTRODUCTION

The greatest misunderstanding about so-called ‘panhandling’ is about what it actually is. It is one citizen asking another citizen for help. It’s that basic.34

The freedom of speech is one of the most cherished constitutional rights throughout American history, but this right is routinely denied to visibly poor people with dire consequences.35 Nationally, cities are increasingly criminalizing life-sustaining behavior, infringing on the constitutional rights of individuals experiencing homelessness.36 Similarly, municipalities are increasingly drafting laws that criminalize begging, purporting to justify such laws as necessary public health and safety measures.37

Research has also shown that local municipalities are widely embracing anti-begging laws across the country.38 For example, as of 2017, laws prohibiting begging citywide have increased by 43% since 2006, and laws that prohibit begging in particular public spaces have increased by 7%.39 The increasing popularity of these restrictions is troubling because they suffocate the First Amendment rights of vulnerable populations and strip away the constitutional right to due process. These begging restrictions further prohibit constitutionally protected behavior and have serious consequences that continue the cycle of homelessness.

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35 See generally NAT'L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 9 (discussing "why laws criminally or civilly punishing homeless persons' life-sustaining activity are ineffective . . . and how they often violate homeless persons' constitutional and human rights").
36 Id. at 11.
37 Justin Olson & Scott MacDonald, Seattle University Homeless Rights Advocacy Project, WASHINGTON'S WAR ON THE VISIBLY POOR: A SURVEY OF CRIMINALIZING ORDINANCES & THEIR ENFORCEMENT 5 (Sara Rankin ed. 2015) (emphasizing that municipalities are increasingly enacting ordinances that criminalize homelessness for the purported purpose of maintaining "health, safety, or general public order").
38 NAT'L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2.
39 Id.
Yet, there is no harm directly associated with begging alone. Courts have recognized begging as a form of speech protected by the First Amendment, involving many speech interests including “the communication of information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes.” But policymakers often perceive even peaceful begging as a problem because it is a visual reminder of homelessness or human desperation that makes people uncomfortable. Whether done consciously or unconsciously, the criminalization of visible poverty is well documented.

Between 2017 and 2018, HRAP examined the municipal codes of sixty-four cities within Washington State to understand the scope and consequences of begging restrictions, the most extensive survey of its kind in the nation. This brief finds that, despite begging being a constitutionally protected form of speech, Washington cities have employed many techniques to curb even peaceful requests for help while attempting to avoid First Amendment scrutiny. The study revealed 121 ordinances that can be organized into four distinct categories of restrictions: geographical, distance, time, and manner restrictions.

### Four Types of Begging Restrictions

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<th>Types of Restrictions</th>
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<tr>
<td>Geographical</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distance</td>
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<td>Time</td>
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<td>Manner</td>
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Particularly, cities have learned to manipulate geography by creating buffer zones around specific public spaces where begging is illegal or by implementing specific distance restrictions from areas like crosswalks, intersections, and entrances to buildings. Cities also

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41 Neidig, supra note 1.
43 Talner, supra note 40.
44 HRAP, supra note 6.
45 The term "begging restrictions" is interchangeable throughout this brief with the term "anti-begging laws" or "anti-begging ordinances."
46 Rankin 2016, supra note 8 (writing that "city and state governments 'have learned to manipulate geography in a manner that now seriously threatens basic First Amendment principles'" (quoting Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 581, 584, 585 (2006))); id. at 33 n.168 ("Political dissent has become spatial tactics’ principal casualty.” (quoting Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 Tex. L. Rev. at 589–90)).
implement time restrictions on begging wherein speech is prohibited between specific hours of the day. \(^{47}\) Finally, cities implement manner restrictions in the form of aggressive begging ordinances, which purport to prohibit threatening and aggressive behavior but often prohibit peaceful harmless speech. \(^{48}\) To avoid heightened scrutiny, municipalities have broadly drafted these laws in an attempt to mitigate First Amendment jurisprudence, while still imposing burdensome limitations on protected speech. \(^{49}\)

> It strains credibility to suggest that these laws target anyone apart from the visible poor or people experiencing homelessness. Just as importantly, these laws are unnecessary because they frequently overlap with existing laws applicable to the population at large. \(^{50}\) For example, objectively aggressive behavior is already prohibited by criminal laws such as harassment and assault. \(^{51}\) Yet aggressive begging ordinances are the second most common form of begging restrictions throughout Washington. \(^{52}\) Moreover, the majority of aggressive begging laws hinge on subjective perceptions of the person being solicited for help—for example, a person might be guilty of aggressive begging if someone listening to them feels intimidated, regardless of the means and manner of the solicitation. \(^{53}\)

Perception-based begging restrictions are particularly problematic because studies show that many people are deeply afraid of visibly poor people. \(^{55}\) Neurological tests show exposure to a person bearing some hallmark of homelessness can “[elicit] the worst kind of prejudice – disgust and contempt” in those who witness it. \(^{56}\) These studies highlight the critical flaw in anti-begging laws rooted in the reaction of bystanders. Few people are put in a state of fear when approached by a volunteer with a clipboard seeking donations for a social initiative; yet, a similar interaction committed by a visibly poor person can cause dramatically negative reactions. While these laws are frequently adopted “in a

\(^{47}\) E.g., Issaquah MC § 9.45.040 (2008); see, e.g., Jessica So, Scott MacDonald, Justin Olson & Ryan Mansell, Seattle University Homeless Rights Advocacy Project, LIVING AT THE INTERSECTION: LAWS & VEHICLE RESIDENCY 5 (Sara Rankin ed. 2016) (asserting that laws restricting the parking of cars between 2:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. are used to push vehicle residents out of neighborhoods).

\(^{48}\) Infra Part III, Section D.

\(^{49}\) Rankin 2016, supra note 8, at 34 (citing Joseph Mead, The First Amendment Protection of Charitable Speech, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 57, 59 (2015)).

\(^{50}\) See infra Part I, Section C.

\(^{51}\) Id.

\(^{52}\) Id.

\(^{53}\) Id.

\(^{54}\) Silverstein, supra note 3; see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002).


\(^{56}\) Id.; see also Harris & Fiske, supra note 9 (noting that study participants react with “disgust” to images of homeless people).
purported effort to outlaw intimidating, threatening, and aggressive conduct," more often than not they threaten peaceful behavior for the sake of deeply rooted systemic discomfort directed at visible poverty.\textsuperscript{57} Additionally, between vague aggressive begging restrictions and broad time and place restrictions, citizens often have no realistic way of knowing how to conform their behavior to the confines of the law. The end result is that protected speech—the right to simply ask for help—is savagely curtailed under the law.\textsuperscript{58}

This brief is organized into three parts. Part I overviews First Amendment and due process law often disregarded by these begging restrictions; Part II discusses the criminalization of begging in Washington, covering new data regarding anti-begging laws across the state; and Part III analyzes select begging restrictions in Washington to consider whether these laws would withstand judicial scrutiny. This brief concludes with recommendations for more compassionate, lawful, and effective approaches to begging.

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\textsuperscript{57} Silverstein, \textit{supra} note 3; see also \textit{Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition}, 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002).

\textsuperscript{58} Rankin 2016, \textit{supra} note 8, at 33–35.
PART I: OVERVIEW OF THE LAW

A basic tenet of First Amendment law is that the government cannot restrict speech because it disagrees with who the speaker is or what the speaker is saying. However, the law permits "content-neutral" time, place, and manner restrictions. It is within this narrow content-neutral exception that cities attempt to draft their anti-begging ordinances.

Although anti-begging ordinances disproportionately violate the constitutional rights of people experiencing homelessness, the public rarely views these laws as discriminatory. This blind spot exists, in part, because of the deeply-rooted human instinct to avoid evidence of poverty and human desperation. Studies show that people react to visible evidence of poverty with uneasiness, disgust, and fear. Due to the public’s aversion to visible poverty, local governments work to purge visible poverty from public spaces—regardless of whether

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59 Infra Part I, Section B.
discriminatory and unconstitutional effects are intended. When these restrictions prevent individuals from asking for help or obstruct their access to due process of the law they can trigger heightened judicial scrutiny. These popular anti-begging ordinances target visibly poor individuals, and courts are increasingly striking down anti-begging ordinances as unconstitutional under the First Amendment.

A. Stigmatizing and Criminalizing Visible Poverty

If history teaches us anything, it is that distinguishing between the worthy and unworthy poor never withstands the test of time.

Laws that restrict peaceful begging are among many forms of criminalization influenced by unconscious biases against visible poverty. Criminalization laws are often fueled by stereotypes that poor people are to blame for their circumstances. Although an estimated 20% of people experiencing homelessness actually work, anti-begging laws encourage the stereotype that people experiencing homelessness are lazy and inferior to housed individuals. Anti-begging ordinances are further fueled by the notion that giving money to people experiencing homelessness “enables addicts and prevents them from

66 E.g., Speet v. Schute, 726 F. 3d 867, 878 (6th Cir. 2013); Clatterbuck v. City of Charlottesville, 708 F. 3d 549, 551 (4th Cir. 2013); Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F. 3d 899, 904 (7th Cir. 2000); Loper v. New York City Police Dep’t., 999 F. 2d 699, 704 (2d Cir. 1993); Wiltz 2015, supra note 34; see also Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37, at 17 (citing United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990)) (stating that “[s]olicitation is a recognized form of speech protected by the First Amendment”).


68 PHILIPPE BOURGOIS & JEFF SCHONBERG, RIGHTEOUS DOPEFRIEND 316 (2009).

69 Rankin 2016, supra note 8, at 36 (“The increasing prevalence of anti-begging laws is a helpful example of how unconscious biases against poor people and deep-rooted associations between visible poverty and danger can become manifest in the law.”); see also HRAP, supra note 6.

70 Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37, at 1.


72 Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37, at 1.
getting help” or from getting a job.\textsuperscript{73} The justice system often supports this view by upholding laws that “push visibly poor people out of public space merely because visible evidence of human desperation tends to undermine feelings of safety.”\textsuperscript{74} Despite these notions, many people experiencing poverty are forced to beg because they have no reasonable alternative. A study of panhandling in Toronto, Canada, found that 48% of panhandlers did not enjoy panhandling because it was “degrading,” and 70% “would prefer a minimum-wage job,” but thought they could not handle one “because of mental illness, physical disability, or lack of skills.”\textsuperscript{75}

Included in the discussion of whether begging should be protected is how the stereotypes surrounding homelessness impact both the law and the level of tolerance and empathy from the community. This discussion is related to the stereotypes and unconscious biases discussed above, but it is often focused on individuals who give to panhandlers do not know how their money will be spent. One study in San Francisco found data that suggests that the funds donated to panhandlers are most often used for “good” purposes.\textsuperscript{77} For example, the study found that

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Data on panhandlers.}
\end{figure}

\begin{itemize}
\item 60% have a disability
\item 82% are experiencing homelessness
\item 94% use money for food
\item 44% use money for drugs & alcohol
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{73} Wiltz 2015, supra note 34. \textit{But see NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2 at 32} (estimating that “44% of all homeless people are employed on a temporary or full-time basis”); U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, HUNGER & HOMELESSNESS SURV., supra note 71. \textit{See Aaron Burkhalter, Signs of the Times, REAL CHANGE} (Dec. 19, 2013), http://realchangenews.org/2013/12/19/signs-times (explaining how cities, like Aberdeen, discourage people from giving donations to panhandlers by erecting signs that display “Keep the change. Don’t support panhandling. The majority of your change goes to Drugs & Alcohol. Help more by giving to charity.”). \textit{But see JOEL BLAU, THE VISIBLE POOR: HOMELESSNESS IN THE UNITED STATES (1993)} (quashing persistent “myths” that homeless people are “somehow responsible for their own poverty” by explaining that “[once] we acknowledge . . . drugs, alcoholism, or mental illness . . . are not sufficient explanations of homelessness, we can begin to explore the real causes”); Marie-Eve Sylvestre & Celine Bellot, \textit{Challenging Discriminatory and Punitive Responses to Homelessness in Canada}, in ADVANCING SOCIAL RIGHTS IN CANADA 1, 7 (Martha Jackman & Bruce Porter eds., Irwin Law 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2484975 (explaining how “prejudice and stereotypes obscure the social, economic, and political causes of homelessness and thwart efforts to address these underlying factors by blaming those who are its victims, imputing personal characteristics of moral inferiority, laziness, dishonesty, and criminality which, in turn, provide an ‘explanation’ for the problem of homelessness”).

\textsuperscript{74} Rankin 2016, supra note 8, at 25 (citing Beckett & Herbert, supra note 65, at 21 (quotation omitted)).

\textsuperscript{75} Rohit Bose & Stephen W. Hwang, \textit{Income and Spending Patterns Among Panhandlers}, 167(5) CMAJ 477-479 (2002), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC121964/. Interestingly, 43% of participants relayed that they did enjoy panhandling because of the opportunity to “meet people,” while 9% were undecided. \textit{Id}.


\textsuperscript{77} \textit{Id}.
94% of the money donated to panhandlers was used for food, and in contrast, only 44% of individuals used some of the money donated for drugs and/or alcohol.\footnote{Id.}

Such stereotypes are often advanced by business owners who complain about visible poverty in the local business districts and lobby for criminalization of homelessness.\footnote{\textsc{Nat’l Law Ctr.} 2017, supra note 2, at 31, 32; Joe Palazzolo & Alejandro Lazo, \textit{Denver’s Bus’s Take Active Role in Homeless Policies}, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 16, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/denvers-businesses-take-active-role-in-homeless-policies-1476639643 (explaining Denver’s business community successfully advocated for “homeless parking meter installations” which “encouraged people to feed parking meters that collected money for charity, rather than give to the homeless directly”).} Businesses frequently argue that the presence of visibly poor people scares away customers, especially when begging occurs.\footnote{See \textsc{Theresa Wiltz}, \textit{Do New Laws Help or Hurt the Homeless? Pew Charitable Trusts} (Nov. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Wiltz 2014], http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2014/11/17/do-new-laws-help-or-hurt-the-homelessness.} For many business owners “[t]he hope is simply that if homeless people can be made to disappear, nothing will stand in the way of realizing the dream of prosperity, social harmony, and perpetual economic growth.”\footnote{\textsc{Don Mitchell}, \textit{The Annihilation of Space by Law: The Roots and Implications of Anti-Homeless Laws in the United States}, RADICAL J. GEOGRAPHY 303, 307 (1997), http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8330.00048/epdf.} However, both business owners and members of the public fail to realize that absent employment or family support, begging may be a person’s “best option for obtaining the money that they need to purchase food, public transportation fare, medication, or other necessities.”\footnote{\textsc{Nat’l Law Ctr.} 2017, supra note 2, at 25.}

These stereotypes become especially harmful when cities publicly advance and reinforce them. For example, Arlington and Marysville recently joined to create a flier that identifies panhandling as a problem and urges individuals to keep their “wallet closed” when approached by panhandlers because “you can’t know how it will be spent.”\footnote{City of Arlington & City of Marysville, \textit{This Community Cares}, http://www.arlingtonwa.gov/DocumentCenter/View/918 (retrieved Oct. 17, 2017).} The flier identifies panhandling as a problem that “adversely impacts our cities’ and neighborhoods’ images, local businesses, and perception of public safety.”\footnote{Id.}
A common theme propelled by proponents of anti-begging ordinances is that they overestimate how feasible it is for individuals experiencing homelessness to find and maintain employment. Immutable characteristics and uncontrollable circumstances, including mental illness, addiction, single parenthood, lack of hygiene facilities, lack of sleep, and evidence of a criminal record for engaging in life-sustaining activities can make it difficult, if not impossible, to obtain an adequate job. Potential employers often hesitate when they see that an applicant has no permanent mailing address or reliable ability to maintain his or her hygiene.

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85 Id. The flier has been cropped for purposes of implementation into this brief. The entire flier is found in the appendix of this brief. Infra Appendix, Part I.


88 See Kincaid v. City of Fresno, No. 106CV-1445, 2006 WL 3542732, at *40 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2006). Irreparable harm results from these city-sanctioned practices, including “harm to homeless people’s security and dignity.” Id. For example, people experiencing homelessness “lose medicine and health supplies; tents and bedding that shelter them from the elements; clothing and hygiene supplies; identification documents and other personal papers; the tools by which they try to make a meager income; and items of immeasurable sentimental value.” Id. Without important identification documents, medication, clothing, and hygiene supplies, people experiencing homelessness are further hindered from finding and maintaining adequate employment.
Putting aside individual responses to begging, cities should resist criminalization. Criminalizing begging can exacerbate homelessness and make it more difficult for people to escape. Once saddled with a criminal record, people experiencing homelessness are further hindered from accessing employment, housing, and public benefits.⁸⁹ Instead of exacerbating this cycle, municipalities should address the underlying problems of people experiencing homelessness, such as inadequate mental health and housing benefits.⁹⁰ The cyclical nature of criminalizing homelessness is costly for taxpayers because people experiencing homelessness are consistently cycled through the criminal justice system when non-punitive alternatives, such as affordable housing, are pragmatically and economically more effective solutions.⁹¹

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⁹⁰ NAT'L LAW CTR. 2014, supra note 63, at 45.
⁹¹ Id. at 34 (stating that “costs resulting from criminalization measures are present at multiple stages of the criminal justice process,” and people experiencing homelessness are often unable to pay, which results in increased jail time, suspension of their driver’s license, and poor credit); Josh Howard & David Tran, Seattle University Homeless Rights Advocacy Project, AT WHAT COST: THE MINIMUM COST OF CRIMINALIZING HOMELESSNESS IN SEATTLE & SPOKANE (Sara K. Rankin ed. 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2602530. See generally Ariel Schreiber & Becca Butler-Dines, Too High a Price What Criminalizing Homelessness Costs Colorado: Denver City Spotlight, http://www.law.du.edu/documents/homeless-advocacy-policy-project/2-16-16-Final-Report.pdf (accessed on Feb. 3, 2018).
Regardless of studies that challenge stereotypes surrounding homelessness, the debate over whether to give to panhandlers is a futile conversation. All individuals value essential freedoms of autonomy and independence. “People have the right to be free agents . . . and limitations on their choice must be justified in terms of protecting their rights or the rights of others.” The “dilemma” of whether to give money to someone asking for help because that person might use the money as they choose should give us pause. The real dilemma should not center on passing judgment or how to limit the freedom and choices of others; instead, it should focus on how each of us will respond to another human being’s request for help.

And regardless of how anyone feels about homelessness “public intolerance or animosity cannot be the basis for abridgment of . . . constitutional freedoms.” Cities may not enact laws that contain “an obvious invitation to discriminatory enforcement against those whose association together is ‘annoying’ because their ideas, their lifestyle, or their physical appearance is resented by the majority of their fellow citizens.”

B. Begging for Free Speech

If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.

Laws that prohibit or limit an individual’s First Amendment right to ask for help are subject to significant constitutional challenges. It is central to the First Amendment that in

95 Id. at 616; see also Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (demanding a greater degree of specificity when “a statute’s literal scope . . . is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment”).
public fora, people “might be ‘confronted with an uncomfortable message’ that they cannot avoid.” Indeed, the First Amendment seeks to protect speech that others find disagreeable, uncomfortable, or even offensive. And yet, because others find even peaceful requests for help to be distasteful or uncomfortable, cities all over the country effectively block visibly poor people from exercising their First Amendment rights.

Anti-begging laws create hurdles that people experiencing homelessness are unlikely to overcome. Time and place restrictions on begging create invisible, irregular, and expanding patchworks of permissible and impermissible zones where begging may not occur—such as laws restricting begging after dark or begging near crosswalks and intersections.

The U.S. Supreme Court recently made it tougher for cities to restrict begging. The First Amendment prohibits the restriction of speech based on “its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.” In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the Supreme Court clarified that courts must determine whether a law is content-based “on its face” or content-neutral before determining whether the purported “purpose and justifications for the law are content-based.” This test means that courts must evaluate the plain language of a law to determine whether it targets a particular message or purpose before considering any purported justifications for the law. As a result, a court can determine that a law is unconstitutional based on the language of the law alone. If the law regulates speech based on the speaker’s message or the purpose for which the speaker is communicating, the law is content based; content-neutral justifications or rationales will not change this fact.

Reed is also significant because it clarified which speech restrictions are content-based. Since Reed, content-based restrictions include not only laws that regulate a speaker’s specific message, but also laws that regulate speech based on its “function or purpose.” Put another way, a law is content-based if an officer must evaluate what the speaker is communicating to determine whether her speech is restricted. In contrast, a law is content-neutral if it regulates an individual’s ability to speak in public without referencing the specific message the individual is communicating.

Courts should now presume that explicit anti-begging laws are content-based. The very nature of anti-begging laws prohibit an individual from conveying their message of needing help. Whatever the manner a person asks for help, the act of panhandling itself is a form of expressive communication, and content-based anti-begging laws endanger the “right to engage fellow
human beings with the hope of receiving aid and compassion.” These laws impermissibly filter speech based on the message communicated because they require authorities to “examine the content of the message that is conveyed to determine whether a violation has occurred.” Put differently, these laws do not prohibit all speech in certain places or at certain times; they prohibit certain contents of speech.

Classifications of laws as either content-neutral or content-based have already led to markedly different outcomes in begging cases. If a law is content-based it is subject to strict

97 “Public foras are places that have been “held out for general use by the public for speech-related purposes.” What is a Public Forum?, FIRST AMEND. CTR. (Nov. 1, 2017), http://www.firstamendmentschools.org/freedoms/faq.aspx?id=13012. Traditional public forums consist of sidewalks, street corners, and public parks. Id.


99 Rankin 2016, supra note 8.


101 See, e.g., Auburn MC § 9.08.010(B)(6)(b) (2002) (unlawful to beg “at an intersection controlled by lighted traffic signals, where that activity is between or involves a person or persons located in a sidewalk or along a public roadway and a person or persons in or on a vehicle traveling on a public roadway”) (emphasis added); Sunnyside MC § 9.86.050(B) (1978) (“unlawful to beg “within 10 feet of any marked pedestrian crosswalk, within 10 feet of any entrance or exit of any building then in use by the general public, or from the area of any sidewalk within 10 feet of its intersection with an alley or publicly used driveway”).


103 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226 (quoting Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)).

104 Id. at 2228 (noting that the appellate court skipped this “crucial first step”) (clarifying that “strict scrutiny applies either when a law is content-based on its face or when the purpose and justification for the law are content-based,” and mandating that courts “evaluate each question” before concluding the law is content-neutral).

105 See id. at 2227.

106 Id. (clarifying that content-based laws include those that regulate the actual content of the message as well as laws that are “more subtle, defining regulated speech by its function or purpose”).


108 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2223.

109 See City of Lakewood v. Willis, 186 P.3d 1056, 1063 (Wash. 2016) (finding a Lakewood begging ordinance to be content-based under Reed and joining “the overwhelming majority of courts that have addressed similar anti-begging laws after Reed”).

110 See id. The assertion that anti-begging laws are presumed to be content-based applies only to laws that specifically target begging, not laws that broadly target all types of speech.


112 Id. (citing Benefit v. City of Cambridge, 424 Mass. 918, 679 (1997)).

113 Id. (citing McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2521 (2014)).

scrutiny—the highest and most exacting level of judicial scrutiny a court can apply—“regardless of the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of ‘animus toward the idea contained’ in the regulated speech.”115 Strict scrutiny requires the government to prove that the law serves a compelling interest and is narrowly designed to achieve that interest.116

On the other hand, if a law is content-neutral, it is subject to intermediate scrutiny—meaning the law is more likely to survive judicial review. Normally, to withstand intermediate scrutiny, the State must prove that the law furthers an important government interest by means that are “substantially related” to that interest.117 However, the Washington State Constitution includes more stringent free speech protections that require content-neutral restrictions to serve a compelling government interest.118 Essentially, in Washington those content-neutral laws must be aimed at achieving a compelling government interest, which is the same standard applied to content-based laws under strict scrutiny.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strict Scrutiny</th>
<th>Intermediate Scrutiny119</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Applies to content-based laws.</td>
<td>Applies to content-neutral laws.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State must prove the law is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest.</td>
<td>State must prove the law is substantially related to a compelling government interest.120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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115 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015); see also Telephone interview with Sarah Wunsch, Deputy Legal Dir., Am. Civil Liberties Union of Mass. (Feb. 26, 2016) (emphasizing that the government’s motive is irrelevant to the content-neutrality analysis).
116 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2218 (2015).
119 LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, supra note 117.
120 The Washington Supreme Court has raised the standard for content-neutral laws based on the State constitution. Collier v. City of Tacoma, 854 P.2d 1046, 1051 (Wash. 1993) (holding “[w]e diverge from the Supreme Court on the state interest element of the time, place, and manner test, ‘as we believe restrictions on speech can be imposed consistent with [the State constitution] only upon a showing a compelling state interest.’” (quoting Bering v. SHARE, 721 P.2d 918, 931 (Wash. 1986))).
Cities can no longer simply invoke phrases such as “public safety” or “public health” as justifications for begging restrictions unless the cities can prove a clear link between the begging restriction and the specific way the restriction serves the purported interest. In other words, the city bears the burden of demonstrating that its justifications for regulating begging are not mere pretext for suppressing requests for help. To meet this burden, the city must show that the harms it seeks to mitigate are real and that “the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a material way.”

These justifications must be genuine and supported by a strong basis of “meaningful evidence-based data” rather than “shoddy data” that is “hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to litigation.” Thus, Reed is a promising tool to fight unreasonable begging restrictions.

Consider one example of laws that commonly control who can speak and where they can speak: laws that require permits for begging. Requiring a permit to engage in protected speech is “a dramatic departure from our national heritage and constitutional tradition.” Because these laws require the speaker to obtain a permit before speaking, courts may classify the laws as creating a prior restraint on speech. A prior restraint exists when speech is “conditioned on the prior approval of public officials.” Prior restraints are problematic because they carry the risk of government officials censoring speech based on a whim; thus, permit requirements often risk suppressing speech based on the content or the identity of the speaker. Any system of prior restraint carries “a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”

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121 See McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2534 (2014) (“A narrowly tailored law will have a “close fit between ends and means”); McLaughlin, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 190 (noting that protecting public safety and preventing coercion may constitute compelling governmental interests insofar as “the legislature has a strong basis in evidence to support that justification” (quoting Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996))).


123 Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 624.


125 Id. at 190 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).

126 See Rankin 2016, supra note 8, at 37–38.


128 E.g., Lakewood MC § 9A.05.030 (2010). See Part III for a detailed discussion of these permitting requirements.


131 State v. Dean, 866 N.E.2d 1134, 1143 (1st Cir. 2007).

132 Id.

Even content-neutral permitting laws must meet certain criteria to overcome this presumption. If a permitting law regulates when, where, or how individuals may speak in public, the law must: (1) not give overly broad discretion to government officials; (2) not regulate the content of one’s speech; and (3) leave alternative means of communication open to those whose speech is affected. Municipalities can regulate some speech activities through permits, but permitting laws must be narrowly tailored.

A narrowly tailored law does not “burden substantially more speech than is necessary” to achieve the compelling government interest motivating the law. The city bears this burden by showing it is using the least restrictive means to further its interest. Cities fail to meet this burden when reasonable alternatives exist to address the issue at hand. For example, in Blitch v. City of Slidell, the city passed a content-based ordinance that required panhandlers to register with the police and to wear identification before asking others for a monetary donation. The city argued that the law was necessary to enforce its current aggressive begging laws. The plaintiffs, three individuals that panhandled in Slidell, filed a suit alleging that the ordinance violated the First Amendment. The district court held that the ordinance was an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment because it was a prior restraint on protected speech not narrowly tailored to meet the city’s public safety interests. The court found there were less restrictive, alternative means the city could pursue in achieving its enforcement interest. Rather than unnecessarily burdening protected speech, the city could allocate police resources to enforce already existing

[[I]t is offensive—not only to the values protected by the First Amendment, but to the very notion of a free society—that in the context of everyday public discourse, a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to speak to her neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so."
ordinances against aggressive panhandling or install cameras at frequently used locations to identify aggressive panhandlers.\(^{146}\)

**C. Begging for Due Process**

*The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government.*\(^{147}\)

Besides free speech concerns, anti-begging laws may violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.\(^{148}\) The Constitution requires that no individual “be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law.”\(^{149}\) Essentially, due process prohibits cities from “arbitrarily or unfairly depriving individuals of their basic constitutional rights.”\(^{150}\) Due process issues arise when anti-begging laws allow for discriminatory enforcement, when overlapping laws have differing penalties, and when violations of aggressive begging laws are determined only by the subjective perception of the witness and not on some objectively aggressive conduct.

First, specificity of the law is important for protecting individuals experiencing homelessness because vague laws allow for discriminatory enforcement against marginalized and disfavored groups.\(^{151}\) When a law regulates expression protected by the First Amendment, courts require legislatures to set specific and clear guidelines for law enforcement officials to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.\(^{152}\) To survive

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\(^{146}\) [Id.](#)


\(^{148}\) [Roulette v. City of Seattle](#), 850 F. Supp. 1442, 1453–54 (W.D. Wash. 1994), aff'd, 78 F.3d 1425 (9th Cir. 1996), opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 97 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1996), as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc (Sept. 17, 1996), and aff’d, 97 F.3d 300 (9th Cir. 1996), as amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc (Sept. 17, 1996) (invalidating a section of aggressive begging ordinance which prescribed circumstances to be considered in determining a beggar’s intent as unconstitutionally overbroad and vague).

\(^{149}\) U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.


\(^{151}\) [Coates v. City of Cincinnati](#), 402 U.S. 611, 616 (1971); see also Javier Ortiz & Matthew Dick, Seattle University Homeless Rights Advocacy Project, *The Wrong Side of History: A Comparison of Modern & Historical Criminalization Laws 17* (Sara Rankin ed. 2015) (describing America’s disturbing heritage of using vague laws as an “effective tool for the removal of unwanted people from public space because of the broad discretion the officers were granted by the wording of the statute”).

\(^{152}\) [Smith v. Goguen](#), 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (requiring a greater degree of specificity when “a statute’s literal scope . . . is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment”).
judicial scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment, an ordinance must provide a person of ordinary intelligence notice of what conduct is prohibited, and the criminalized behavior must not be susceptible of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.\textsuperscript{153} Thus, an ordinance violates the Fourteenth Amendment if it fails to clearly define the prohibited conduct in a manner that would allow for relatively uniform, rather than arbitrary, enforcement.\textsuperscript{154}

Anti-begging ordinances are susceptible to due process concerns. The laws target a particular form of speech; they deal with solicitation and panhandling specifically, as opposed to all speech generally. Perhaps an aggressive begging ordinance that targets all form of speech is, in fact, a law against harassment.

Not surprisingly, courts have increasingly scrutinized anti-begging ordinances with great care in recent years, routinely striking those laws written with vague restrictions devoid of objective criteria.\textsuperscript{155} Without such judicial oversight, laws may allow for unfettered discretion and virtually unrestrained powers to arrest, which is offensive to constitutional freedoms.\textsuperscript{156}

Discriminatory enforcement of marginalized groups is also evident in how individuals experiencing homelessness and the act of begging are often portrayed in the media. For example, a woman who panhandled to raise money for school supplies received praise from her community,\textsuperscript{157} while a man who panhandled for his basic needs was regarded with contempt and was perceived by others as a wrongdoer.\textsuperscript{158} These two contrasting stories illustrate the problem with discriminatory enforcement. Who is more likely to be cited for their behavior? The teacher panhandling for school supplies or the individual panhandling for his most basic of needs?

\textsuperscript{153} Webster, 802 P.2d at 1338.

\textsuperscript{154} Id.

\textsuperscript{155} Rankin 2016, supra note 8, at 54 (explaining how "common reactions to visible poverty—discomfort, unease, disgust, and anxiety—fuel the urge to exile" people experiencing homelessness from public space).

\textsuperscript{156} City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 465–67 (1987) ("Although we appreciate the difficulties of drafting precise laws, we have repeatedly invalidated laws that provide the police with unfettered discretion to arrest individuals for words or conduct that annoy or offend them."); see also Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 129 (1992) (holding invalid laws delegating "overly broad discretion to the decision maker").


Second, aggressive begging laws are often one of many overlapping ordinances with differing penalties that cause both due process and equal protection concerns. Overlapping ordinances criminalize the same behavior under two or more separate ordinances. When those ordinances carry different penalties, discriminatory enforcement against particular classes of individuals is inevitable. For example, aggressive begging ordinances may “hold homeless individuals to a higher standard than existing assault or harassment laws, which often prohibit the same conduct but are facially neutral.” Cities cannot deem one criminal activity worse simply because it is conducted combined with constitutionally protected—albeit disfavored—speech. When aggressive begging ordinances and existing assault or harassment laws have different penalties, they may violate the right to due process; differing penalties for identical conduct may “authorize and even encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”

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159 Kindelan, supra note 157.
160 Dion Leifer, New Wichita Law: You Could go to Jail for Giving Money to a Roadside Panhandler, WHICHITA EAGLE (Dec. 12, 2018), http://www.kansas.com/news/politics-government/article189336969.html (writing that “panhandlers and drivers who give them money could face stiff fines or even jail time under an ordinance approved by the Wichita City Council”).
161 Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37, at 7 (stating that at least “66% of [Washington] cities draft criminalization ordinances in a way that either overlap with other ordinances or contain compound provisions that criminalize multiple, and often unrelated, behaviors”). See infra Part III, Section (D) for an example of overlapping ordinances in Washington.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 4, 17–28 (comparison of Seattle’s Pedestrian Interference ordinance and its Harassment ordinance reveals that aggressive begging “is nothing more than harassment in the context of a poor person asking for money”).
165 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999); Centro De La Comunidad Hispana De Locust Valley v. Town of Oyster Bay, 128 F. Supp. 3d 597, 618–19 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (finding no “comfort that the Town’s safety officers will use their discretion, or be ‘trained’ on how to determine whether a person is soliciting employment or attempting to stop a vehicle to solicit employment” because “[s]uch discretion may surely invite discriminatory enforcement”); Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37, at 7.
Third, due process concerns arise with aggressive begging laws specifically because of how those laws shift the focus of culpability.166 Often, such laws are written so culpability is based on the perception of the bystander rather than on the specific, objective conduct of the individual asking for help. As a result, an individual can violate aggressive begging laws without engaging in objectively aggressive behavior.167 For example, a person being asked to give money might feel “compelled or fearful” yet cannot point to any objective conduct that the speaker should have avoided. When culpability is based on the bystander’s perception, the focus shifts from the conduct of the beggar to the bystander’s feelings, which are filtered through the bystander’s own lens of prejudice and inherent bias.168 Thus, a person experiencing homelessness may have no way to inform his or her conduct to fit the law—simply asking for help may be a crime.

As a policy matter, these aggressive begging laws are not appropriate because they cater to implicit and unconscious biases regarding visible poverty. When little or no guidance is provided about the objective conduct prohibited, law enforcement is left to rely on subjective perceptions: “whether that perception is judged as a ‘reasonable person’ feeling fearful or compelled or some perceived manifestation of an ‘intent to intimidate.’”169 In such circumstances, individuals exercising their constitutional right to ask for help in public have no way of knowing “how to conform themselves to the law” because there is no objective basis to determine when peaceful requests for money might be perceived as threatening or intimidating.170

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166 See infra Part III, pp. 63–65 for a more in-depth discussion on how due process concerns arise when culpability is found in the subjective perception of the “victim.”
168 Telephone Interview with Aaron Burkhalter, Editor at Real Change (Oct. 6, 2017).
170 See Memorandum from Justin Olson to Professor Sara Rankin, Director of the Homeless Rights Advocacy Project at Seattle University School of Law, Washington’s Panhandling Ordinances: Graphical Representations 2 (2017) [hereinafter Olson Memorandum] (reporting that 42% of the surveyed aggressive begging laws trigger liability based on perception alone, 54%, contain both a conduct component as well as a perception component, 2% contain only conduct components, and 2% contain neither conduct nor perception based components). Notably, 98% of aggressive begging ordinances contain a perception-based component. Id.
171 Wunsch, supra note 115.
A common example reveals how impractical and morally repugnant laws with a subjective component can be. Under most of these laws, it is enough to trigger criminal liability if a bystander feels fearful or compelled to donate. Yet in cities throughout Washington, both volunteers and paid organizations will place representatives at street corners asking for donations to one cause or another. Environmental activists, political fundraisers, and champions of charitable causes may not make passersby feel fearful, but they make bystanders feel compelled to give. Were these laws faithfully applied, the examples above would be liable under the aggressive begging ordinances. Yet it is not the clean-cut, college-aged activists at risk under these laws; it is the visibly poor who ask for help, not out activism but out of necessity.

**Recap of Applicable Law**

- A legal presumption exists that anti-begging laws are content-based laws.\(^{173}\)
- Permitting laws targeting solicitation specifically are content-based because they “target specific speech based on its communicative intent.”\(^{174}\)
- Content-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny.\(^{175}\)
- Cities must show that the permitting law is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling interest.\(^{176}\)
- The law must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.\(^{177}\)
- A content-neutral law must leave open ample alternative channels of communication.\(^{178}\)
- The city must supply meaningful evidence-based data to establish its compelling interest.\(^{179}\)

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\(^{172}\) *City of Seattle v. Webster*, 802 P.2d 1333, 1338 (Wash. 1990).

\(^{173}\) See *City of Lakewood v. Willis*, 186 P.3d 1056, 1063–64 (2016).


\(^{176}\) Id. (citing *McCullen v. Coakley*, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2530 (2014)).

\(^{177}\) *Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educ’s Ass’n*, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).

\(^{178}\) Id.

\(^{179}\) *McLaughlin*, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 187.
PART II: FEW SAFE HAVENS

A. The Criminalization of Begging in Washington

Throughout Washington State, an overwhelming majority of cities have adopted ordinances that curtail and criminalize the exercise of free speech in the form of begging. A survey of sixty-four cities throughout Washington State found 121 anti-begging ordinances,\(^{180}\) indicating that cities continue to rely upon the criminal law as a response to disfavored speech from marginalized groups. This section summarizes key findings drawn from the data collected on those begging restrictions.

The majority of cities surveyed (86%) had at least one ordinance restricting begging in some form.\(^ {181}\) No clear pattern or common thread links the few cities that have no anti-begging ordinances. The criminalization of begging is neither limited to one region over another nor to large cities over small cities. There are few safe havens throughout Washington and no way to predict whether a particular city will allow individuals to ask for help in public. The graph below depicts the number of cities with anti-begging ordinances in their municipal codes.\(^ {182}\)

\(^{180}\) The complete survey data, current as of April 2018, is on file with the Homeless Rights Advocacy Project (HRAP) at Seattle University School of Law [hereinafter Ordinance Chart].

\(^{181}\) The survey revealed that 55 of the 64 cities surveyed had at least one anti-begging restriction within their municipal codes.

\(^{182}\) See Ordinance Chart, supra note 180.
These ordinances restrict begging through many mechanisms. The data shows that ordinances with zone or geographic restrictions are the most common method of criminalization. The following graph depicts anti-begging ordinances in Washington State sorted into four categories of common restrictions: geographic restrictions, distance restrictions, time restrictions, and aggressive panhandling restrictions.

Beyond simply victimizing protected conduct, anti-begging ordinances also impose severe penalties for engaging in constitutionally protected speech. Proponents of homeless criminalization laws commonly argue that the penalties are mere infractions carrying civil (monetary) penalties—not criminal. These proponents claim no one ever faces the prospect of

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183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Note that some cities have ordinances containing all four types of restrictions within one ordinance. For example, a city may have an ordinance that prohibits begging within public parks, and also on sidewalks between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. This ordinance would be included in both the zone/geographic restriction category and the time restriction category.
jail time for camping in public spaces, sitting on sidewalks, or—in the case of this present study—asking for help. But to the contrary, HRAP researchers discovered the opposite to be true: the majority of anti-begging ordinances provide for **misdemeanor** penalties.

The chart below demonstrates the dramatic discrepancy between civil penalties and criminal penalties for anti-begging ordinances:

**Penalties for Begging Restrictions**

- **Unknown**, 2%
- **Infraction**, 15%
- **Misdemeanor**, 83%

Penalties for begging are severe: 83% of the surveyed begging ordinances are misdemeanors, which means violators may incur a substantial fine and possible incarceration. Moreover, the above chart does not account for ordinances with penalties that transform infractions into misdemeanors. Of the remaining 15% listed as infractions, half allow for a civil infraction to evolve into a misdemeanor—typically due to repeated violations. Under these “progressive penalty” provisions, repeat violations of the same conduct, such as asking for help again after receiving a negative response, may transform some of those relatively few civil infractions into misdemeanors. Interestingly, some misdemeanor ordinances themselves also contained progressive penalty provisions, providing for enhanced fines and jail time because of multiple citations.

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186 See Olson & MacDonald, *supra* note 37.
188 See, *e.g.*, Centralia MC § 10.37.060(A)–(C) (2014) (increasing penalties for multiple offenses: “Class 1 civil infraction with the maximum assessment not to exceed . . . two hundred fifty dollars” for first offense; “misdemeanor . . . subject to a fine not to exceed one thousand dollars . . . and/or imprisonment not to exceed ninety days” for second offense; and “gross misdemeanor” punishable by a fine “not to exceed five thousand dollars . . . and/or imprisonment not to exceed three hundred and sixty-five days” for third offense (emphases added)).
189 See Olson Memorandum, *supra* note 170, at 5.
190 See, *e.g.*, Port Angeles MC § 12.04.130 (2016) (first offense punishable “by a fine of up to $500 and imprisonment for up to thirty days, or both,” second offense punishable “by a fine of up to $1,000 and imprisonment for up to ninety days, or both,” and third and subsequent offenses punishable “by a fine of up to $5,000 and imprisonment for up to one year, or both”); see also Arlington MC § 9.56.080(1)–(3) (2014).
As depicted above, misdemeanor ordinances drastically outnumber infraction ordinances for every category of restrictions HRAP researchers identified. Specifically, 77% of violations of geographic restrictions result in a misdemeanor, while only 20% result in an infraction; 90% of violations of distance restrictions result in a misdemeanor, while only 3% result in an infraction; 75% of violations of time restrictions result in a misdemeanor, while 25% result in an infraction; and 94% of violations of manner restrictions result in a misdemeanor, while only 6% result in an infraction. This data is striking when considering that the most common ordinances are geographic restrictions, which operate to criminalize peaceful begging. This effectively means that cities are not only criminalizing constitutionally protected behavior, but they are severely punishing the exercise of the First Amendment right to ask for help.

The data also reveals that begging laws have become increasingly popular throughout Washington over the last 40 to 50 years. This rise in popularity corresponds with an increase in homelessness in many cities. The increase also coincides with the general trend of criminalizing visible poverty through other means. The chart below depicts a timeline of new anti-begging laws being passed for five-year periods starting around 1960:

Begging restrictions were fairly minimal throughout the State until 1976–1980, at which time there was a sharp increase in the passage of new laws. This increase in anti-begging laws occurred at the same time as the nation suffered a decline in affordable housing and a

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191 See Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37. See infra Appendix, Part II, for a side by side comparison of the rise in begging restrictions based on data collected for this research and the general trend of criminalization policies that was reported in Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37.
192 Id.
193 See Ordinance Chart, supra note 180.
reduction in spending for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). This increase also coincides with the deinstitutionalization of mental health treatment that made it difficult for individuals with severe mental illness to find care and shelter. These trends suggest that as poverty becomes more visible in public space—due to factors including divestments in affordable housing and mental health treatment—society responds to visible poverty by criminalizing poverty rather than restoring investments in non-punitive options.


The drastic escalation during the 2006–2010 period coincides with the 2008 financial crisis. Approximately two-thirds of all begging ordinances were enacted after 2001.

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195 Daniel Yohanna, Deinstitutionalization Of People With Mental Illness: Causes And Consequences, Am. Med. Ass’n J. Ethics (Oct. 2013), http://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/2013/10/mhst1-1310.html; The deinstitutionalization of mental health treatment was a policy decision and movement to remove individuals with severe mental illness out of large state institutions and then those institutions were subsequently closed. This deinstitutionalization was made without ensuring that the individuals received the care and rehabilitation necessary in order to live successfully within the community. E. Fuller Torrey, Out of the Shadows: Confronting America’s Mental Illness Crisis Ch. 1-3 (1997).

196 See Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37; Rankin 2016, supra note 8.

197 Ordinance Chart, supra note 180. 66% of all ordinances were enacted in Washington since 2001. Id.
A likely reason for the increase in begging restrictions is the recent upsurge of aggressive begging laws. During the 1990s, courts began to strike down outright prohibitions on peaceful begging as unconstitutional restrictions on free speech.

In response, many cities tried to circumvent such constitutional restrictions by incorporating non-aggressive conduct into their aggressive begging laws: for example, begging with a partner, even if sitting down and saying nothing but only holding a sign, could constitute aggressive begging. The graph below depicts the rise in aggressive begging laws in Washington State:

![Graph showing the rise in aggressive begging laws in Washington State](image)

This graph shows a major increase in aggressive begging laws beginning in 2005, when four new laws were enacted in 2005 alone, leading to 2014, when six new laws were enacted. In fact, 52% of all existing aggressive begging laws surveyed were enacted after 2005. This

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198 Sena, supra note 89, at 293.
200 Wunsch, supra note 115.
201 Ordinance Chart, supra note 180.
202 Id.
trend suggests that cities are attempting to circumvent judicial scrutiny by enacting aggressive begging laws under the veil of targeting aggressive behavior rather than protected speech.

The graph below shows that the potential to criminalize even peaceful requests for donations is rampant throughout Washington: the vast majority of aggressive begging laws include a subjective, perception-based component as part or all of the basis for determining when begging is unlawful. Over half of all such ordinances contain both a conduct component and a perception component, providing even more ways to find guilt under the law. Notably, only 2% of all aggressive begging ordinances are defined only by the specific, objective conduct of the person asking for a donation.

As explained in Part I, Section B, the rise of aggressive begging restrictions raises substantial constitutional and policy concerns. Homeless criminalization ordinances are ineffective. They do not reduce homelessness or curtail offenders from engaging in necessary, life-sustaining behavior; they cost more than many non-punitive alternatives; they indirectly discriminate against distinct marginalized groups; and they harken back to past eras when the law was used to banish undesirable groups from public space. But the data

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203 See NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2 at 36.
204 See Howard & Tran, supra note 91 and accompanying text.
205 See Kaya Lurie & Breanne Schuster, Seattle University Homeless Rights Advocacy Project, DISCRIMINATION AT THE MARGINS: THE INTERSECTIONALITY OF HOMELESSNESS AND OTHER MARGINALIZED GROUPS 2–5 (Sara Rankin ed. 2015) (revealing how “racial minorities are disproportionately represented in the homeless population”).
206 See Ortiz & Dick, supra note 151 and accompanying text.
reveals that Washington municipalities have continued to implement punitive measures to remove evidence of visible poverty from their cities.

### B. Enforcement of Begging Restrictions in Washington

Obtaining data on the enforcement of begging restrictions in Washington’s cities proved difficult. Although HRAP requested public records from eleven Washington cities, only two cities—Marysville and Lakewood—had formally cited individuals for violating specific begging laws in the past five years. Nine of the eleven cities stated that no individuals were cited under any of the ordinances between January 1, 2013, and January 1, 2018.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Ordinance(s)</th>
<th>Citations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arlington</td>
<td>9.56.50 Coercive Solicitation</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonney Lake</td>
<td>9.11.050 Aggressive Solicitation</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralia</td>
<td>10.37.030 Coercive Solicitation</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Des Moines</td>
<td>19.08.030(7) Regulations &amp; Prohibited Activities: Public Parks</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake Stevens</td>
<td>9.08.030 Aggressive Begging</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issaquah</td>
<td>9.45.030 Coercive Solicitation</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9.45.040 Time of Solicitation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Vernon</td>
<td>9.21.060 Aggressive Begging</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tacoma</td>
<td>8.13A.040 Solicitation by Coercion</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puyallup</td>
<td>9A.08.040 Solicitation by Coercion</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At first glance, the lack of reported citations might seem like a reason for free speech advocates to celebrate. However, any enforcement data (or lack thereof) must be understood

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207 Those cities are: Arlington, Bonney Lake, Centralia, Des Moines, Lakewood, Lake Stevens, Issaquah, Marysville, Mount Vernon, Tacoma, and Puyallup. Requests for records were submitted pursuant to Washington’s Public Records Act, RCW §42.56 et seq., on January 29, 2018 and January 30, 2018.

208 The process of requesting public records from the city of Lakewood was especially challenging. Specifically, the city of Lakewood maintains paper files of its criminal records. Email from Erika Sullivan, Paralegal, City of Lakewood, to author (Feb. 21, 2018 14:40 PST) (on file with author). Because Lakewood’s records are paper files, the city stated that it would take over a year to search for the responsive records requested on the enforcement of Lakewood’s anti-begging ordinances. Email from Erika Sullivan, Paralegal, City of Lakewood, to author (Feb. 2, 2018 13:17 PST) (on file with author). HRAP reduced the scope of the request for data on two separate occasions before receiving a timely response. The difficulty in obtaining data regarding the enforcement of a city’s ordinances illustrates the importance of effective and efficient administrative procedures and policies.

209 Those cities include: Arlington, Bonney Lake, Centralia, Des Moines, Lake Stevens, Issaquah, Mount Vernon, Tacoma, and Puyallup.

210 Public records request data on file with author.
in the context of informal enforcement methods, such as “move-along” orders and referrals to “Designated Mental Health Professionals” for involuntary commitment. As explained below, such orders are increasingly popular means of displacing visibly poor people from public view: they achieve the same prized outcome of displacement without leaving evidence of enforcement.

1. The Problem of Move-Along Orders

Move along orders effectively extinguish and chill the dissemination of speech just as formal arrests and citations do.

Police officers routinely order people experiencing homelessness to move from public space as a method of enforcing laws that criminalize homelessness. Move-along orders are given when officers approach individuals telling them, in sum or substance, “You have to move,” and “You can’t be here.” When individuals refuse to comply with a move-along order, police officers threaten to issue an arrest. Such an arrest might be combined with a civil penalty, removal to a psychiatric hospital, or the destruction of the individual’s property. These move-along orders are just one of many pervasive penalties associated with the overarching criminalization of homelessness in Washington. They effectively extinguish and chill the dissemination of speech just as formal arrests and citations do. However, individuals cannot challenge the orders without risking arrest or issuance of civil citations. Due to the very nature of these move-along orders, they are vulnerable to discriminatory use by police enforcement because the issuance of move-along orders is not tracked by law enforcement within Washington.

Move-along orders are prevalent across the country. For example, in New York, officials have long been proponents of the “broken windows” theory, wherein the appearance of disorder (or, in the minds of some city officials, the appearance of poverty) invites criminal

211 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.
214 Id.
215 Id.
217 See email from Mark Solomon, Community Crime Prevention Specialist, Seattle Police Dep’t, to author (Apr. 20, 2018, 11:00 PST) (on file with author) (“It would be hard to get an accurate number of ‘move along’ [orders] because we don’t formally track these types of contacts.”).
behavior. But over a period of approximately twelve years, individuals were arrested only six times under New York’s anti-begging law. In *Loper v. New York*, it was conceded that while very few arrests were made under the anti-begging law, “officers used the statute as an authority to order individuals whom were begging to ‘move on.’” The Second Circuit held that panhandling was protected speech entitled to the highest First Amendment protection. Yet even today, the city of New York still uses the practice of move-along orders to force individuals experiencing homelessness to disappear from sight.

Although move-along orders are invisible because they are not recorded or reported in many jurisdictions, existing data suggests they are a prevalent means of moving people experiencing homelessness. In 2014, a survey of 351 individuals experiencing homelessness in San Francisco found that 70% of individuals had been forced to move from public space by law enforcement. Of those who were ordered to move, only 9% moved to location indoors while the remaining 91% reported that they remained in public spaces and simply moved to a new outdoor location. Most individuals forced to move simply went “down the street, around the corner, or to walk around and returned after the police left.” Further illustrating the prevalence of move-along orders, over 5000 individuals received move-along orders from police in Denver, Colorado in 2016.

Move-along orders are also a common practice throughout cities in Washington State. Due to the informal nature of move-along orders, this type of enforcement is not tracked by Washington law enforcement or by cities. Still, as explained below, this virtually invisible practice is common, pervasive, and potent.

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220 Leoussis, supra note 219.
223 *Id.* at 1–2.
224 *Id.* at 1.
225 Michael Bishop, Bridget DuPey, Nicole Jones, Ashely Kline, Joshua Mitson, & Darren O’Connor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law Homeless Advocacy Policy Project, *Too High a Price 2: Move On to Where*? (Nantinya Ruan & Elie Zwiebel eds. 2018). Denver is one of few jurisdictions where police may collect data on such orders.
226 See Solomon, supra note 217.
Move along orders are potent because the recipient has no recourse, no reasonable due process of law to protect their rights. The recipient has no opportunity to challenge the lawfulness of the underlying ordinance supporting the move-along instruction, nor is there any real choice for the individual to make when ordered to move by law enforcement. Individuals experiencing homelessness are simply told to leave the public space at once or face the full weight of the law. For example, in Seattle, police officers aim for “voluntary compliance” of the city’s sit-lie ordinance and will issue informal move-along orders as the primary means of enforcement.\(^\text{228}\) If an individual is sleeping in a doorway or lying on the street, officers will tell them they need to get up and go.\(^\text{229}\) This practice is common throughout all of Washington.\(^\text{230}\)

Further, the city of Centralia purposefully used only warnings to enforce an ordinance that restricted begging at most intersections within the town.\(^\text{232}\) That specific ordinance has since been amended.\(^\text{233}\) But the current version of the ordinance explicitly states that the penalty for a first violation of coercive solicitation is a verbal notification and warning.\(^\text{234}\) Centralia’s city attorney, Shannon Murphy-Olson, stated that the verbal warning change would “be beneficial because it will not immediately impose monetary fines on people who do not have a source of income.”\(^\text{235}\) While “a ‘move along’ order may sound benign, it is enormously disruptive and harmful for people who live on the street and do not have homes where they can seek respite from police attention.”\(^\text{236}\) Move-along orders circumvent the voluminous repercussions associated with criminal and civil penalties, yet they are no less offensive to civil liberty where an individual is politely but unequivocally banished from the public eye.

Individuals experiencing homeless who spend time in public spaces, such as those individuals who engage in begging or who rest along public sidewalks are easy targets for move-along orders.\(^\text{237}\) Because of the insidious, disruptive, and harassing nature of these

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\(^{228}\) Solomon, supra note 12.  
\(^{229}\) Id.  
\(^{230}\) E.g., id. (stating that for Seattle’s sit/lie ordinance an officer would enforce the ordinance by aiming for voluntary compliance, saying “you will need to go, or hey you need to get up, time to go.”); Pesanti, supra note 12.  
\(^{231}\) Central K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic, supra note 212.  
\(^{232}\) Pesanti, supra note 12.  
\(^{234}\) Centralia MC § 10.37.060 (2017).  
\(^{235}\) Pesanti, supra note 233.  
\(^{236}\) Picture the Homeless Complaint, supra note 213, at 2.  
\(^{237}\) Id. at 1.
orders, they are a "pervasive penalty" associated with the overarching criminalization of homelessness in Washington State and throughout the country.\textsuperscript{238} Pervasive penalties are a "punitive process of policing through move-along orders, citations, and threats of arrest that largely remain hidden from public view and official scrutiny because such enforcement falls short of official booking."\textsuperscript{239} As noted above, move-along orders do not trigger the regular recordkeeping process of enforcement required under the law.\textsuperscript{240} "Official citation and arrest numbers gloss over the thousands of instances in which officers detain, interrogate, search, and make demands of inhabitants without activating the formal criminal justice process."\textsuperscript{241} The public should be especially wary of those police enforcement actions, which evade oversight.

The personal experiences of individuals on the receiving end of move-along orders reveal the harmful nature of informal enforcement mechanisms. Individuals have described them as “a constant pestering that keeps you from ever feeling relaxed or belonging just about anywhere.”\textsuperscript{243} Move-along orders also implicitly encourage individuals to avoid the police, even when facing danger.\textsuperscript{244} For example, one individual avoided calling the police to report being assaulted, asking, “What’s the point? If I called them, they would have made us all move.”\textsuperscript{245} These move-along orders have been identified as having lasting collateral consequences. Specifically, they push people to unsafe spaces, lead to adverse health effects, and effectively move individuals away from necessary resources.\textsuperscript{246}

Move-along orders find their roots in what has been officially coined the “broken windows” theory of criminality, which has also been used to support anti-begging ordinances. The theory uses the phrase “broken windows” as a metaphor for disorderly conduct—an image of a street with buildings in disrepair, garbage strewn about, and general chaos and lawlessness everywhere.\textsuperscript{247} Disorderly conduct has been defined as “incivility, boorish, and threatening behavior that disturbs life, especially urban life.”\textsuperscript{248} The broken windows theory

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{238} Herring, Dilara & Alatorre, \textit{supra} note 216.
  \item \textsuperscript{239} \textit{Id.} at 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{240} \textit{See id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{241} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{242} Herring, Dilara & Alatorre, \textit{supra} note 216.
  \item \textsuperscript{243} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{244} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{245} \textit{Id.}
  \item \textsuperscript{246} Bishop, \textit{supra} note 226.
  \item \textsuperscript{247} DON MITCHELL, \textit{THE RIGHT TO THE CITY: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FIGHT FOR PUBLIC SPACE} 200 (Guilford Press Epub ed. 2012) [hereinafter \textit{THE RIGHT TO THE CITY}].
  \item \textsuperscript{248} \textit{Id.} at 299 (quoting GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, \textit{FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES} 14 (1996))
\end{itemize}
does not try to hide disdain for visible poverty. Rather, the theory itself clarifies that certain individuals are the benefactors of a lawful orderly society, while certain other individuals should be the subject of heavy policing and strict control.\footnote{Id. at 200.}

The citizen who fears... the importuning beggar is not merely expressing his distaste for unseemly behavior; he is also giving voice to a bit of folk wisdom that happens to be a correct generalization—namely, that serious crime flourishes in areas where disorderly behavior goes unchecked. \textit{The unchecked panhandler is, in effect, the first broken window}... If the neighborhood cannot keep a bothersome panhandler from annoying the passers-by, the thief may reason, it is even less likely to call the police to identify a potentially mugger or to interfere if a mugging takes place.\footnote{Id. (alteration in original) (quoting George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, \textit{Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety}, \textit{Atlantic} (Mar. 1982), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/).}

The broken windows theory asserts that the “more people there are who are harming no identifiable person but merely engaging in what the authors declare to be ‘disorderly behavior,’ the more just is the engagement in an unjust act, for ‘disorderly behavior’ in and of itself poses a ‘grave threat . . . to our society.’”\footnote{Id. at 201 (alteration in original) (quoting GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, \textit{FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES} 7 (1996))} The theory expressly encourages police to “push the homeless along” and out of public spaces.\footnote{Id.} Essentially, the theory is a “policy of ‘zero tolerance’ for behaviors and actions deemed disorderly or ‘worrisome’”—behaviors which, to a proponent of the theory, undeniably include conduct associated with homelessness.\footnote{Id.}

Move-along orders are the primary method officers use to enforce anti-begging ordinances.\footnote{Id.} However, in the context of begging, an individual’s First Amendment rights are infringed upon when a police officer tells them to move-along. In \textit{Colten v. Kentucky}, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision by the Kentucky Court of Appeals that found an individual guilty of disorderly conduct when a police officer asked the defendant to leave the scene, rejecting the defendant’s counter claim that his First Amendment rights were infringed upon.\footnote{Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 104 (1972).} Specifically, the Court affirmed the lower court’s finding that the defendant “was not undertaking to exercise any constitutionally protected freedom.’ Rather, he ‘appears to have had no purpose other than to cause inconvenience and annoyance. So the statute as applied
here did not chill or stifle the exercise of any constitutional right.”

Scholars have interpreted *Colten* to mean that “a person who congregates with others with no bona fide intention to exercise a constitutional right . . . can be asked to move along.”

But courts have routinely rejected enforcement policies that threaten to chill or otherwise infringe upon the exercise of constitutionally protected speech:

When a police officer tells an individual to “move along,” the request comes with an implicit threat that if the person does not leave the area, he or she will be given a citation or arrested. Although citations are used only for infractions for which punishment does not include the possibility of jail time, a person’s failure to pay or plead to a citation can result in a warrant for arrest. Thus, although being asked to move along may not seem to criminalize behavior, it is part and parcel of a system that threatens eventual arrest for prohibited conduct.

Ultimately, the data—or lack of data—from Washington cities regarding enforcement of anti-begging ordinances leads to only one of two possible conclusions: either these ordinances are being enforced through informal means or they are wholly unnecessary. Because Washington’s cities have no mechanism for keeping track of move-along orders, there is no

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256 *Id.* at 109 (1972) (quoting *Colten v. Commonwealth of Kentucky*, 467 S.W.2d 374, 378 (Ky. 1971)) (“[W]e perceive no justification for setting aside the conclusion of the state court that when arrested appellant was not engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment”). Note, that until 1976, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky was the State’s highest court.


258 Herring, Dilara & Alatorre, supra note 216.
way to understand the full extent to which these orders are given and how residents’ lives are being affected.

But the generalized research on warnings and move-along orders establish that when they used to prevent someone from peacefully begging, they are unconstitutional and have a chilling effect on protected speech. Much like the futility of issuing civil penalties to those least able to pay them, issuing move-along orders to people experiencing homelessness merely compounds the suffering of our vulnerable neighbors.

2. Enforcement Data Retrieved from Lakewood and Marysville

Like all cities, move-along warnings likely buoy most enforcement efforts. But Marysville and Lakewood also formally cited individuals for violating specific begging laws in the past five years. The table below illustrates the number of citations given from January 1, 2013 to January 1, 2018. This citation data fails to capture the full extent of enforcement of anti-begging laws in Lakewood and Marysville since move-along warnings, due to their very nature, are pervasive penalties that escape the paper trail of official booking.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Ordinances</th>
<th>Total Citations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lakewood</td>
<td>8.76.510: Solicitation</td>
<td>51 citations issued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9A.05.050: Unlawful Solicitation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9A.04.020A: Restricted Areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9A.04.010: Aggressive Begging</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marysville</td>
<td>6.37.040: Coercive Solicitation</td>
<td>4 citations issued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.37.030: Aggressive Begging</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.37.047: Place of Solicitation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Over a five-year period, Marysville issued only four citations. Lakewood issued fifty-one citations. Marysville's citations include two citations for Aggressive Begging, one citation for Coercive Solicitation, and one citation for Place of Solicitation. Curiously, in April 2018, the Marysville City Council amended the city’s municipal code to eliminate “conflicting provisions.”259 Prior to April 2018, section 6.37.030 of Marysville’s Municipal Code was titled Pedestrian Interference, prohibiting intentionally obstructing pedestrian traffic or aggressively begging.260 Marysville amended that ordinance in 2018 under the new title Aggressive Begging. The amended ordinance prohibits aggressively begging only.261 The City Council removed the

260 Id.
261 Id.
obstructing pedestrian traffic provision because that conduct was already “covered by other provisions in the code.”

Still, Marysville’s Aggressive Begging ordinance now appears to directly overlap with its Coercive Solicitation Ordinance. The overlapping ordinances prohibit effectively the same behavior.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Marysville Overlapping Ordinances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>§ 6.37.030 Aggressive Begging</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“It is unlawful to aggressively beg.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“’Aggressively beg’ means to beg with the intent to intimidate or coerce another person...”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“’Beg’ means to ask for money or goods as a charity.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Marysville’s two ordinances contain very similar language. Marysville’s municipal code defines “coerce” and “coercive” as (1) approaching, speaking, or gesturing to a person in a way that would cause a reasonable person to believe they were being threatened with a crime; (2) approaching within one foot of a person for the purpose of making a solicitation without first obtaining the person’s consent; (3) persisting in soliciting after being given a negative response; (4) blocking the passage of a person; (5) engaging in conduct that “would reasonably be construed as intended to compel or force a person being solicited to accede to demands”; or making false or misleading representations while soliciting. Both Marysville’s aggressive begging ordinance and coercive solicitation ordinance include the word “coerce” or “coercive” in their language, effectively prohibiting the exact same behavior but with two overlapping ordinances.

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262 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.
Marysville’s overlapping ordinances present due process issues. Marysville cited one individual in 2016 for coercive solicitation and two individuals in 2017 for aggressive begging.\footnote{Data on file with author.} When these two ordinances prohibit the same behavior, how does an enforcing officer know which ordinance to cite one under? What was the determinative factor that the officer used in deciding which ordinance to apply? According to Marysville's data, of those three charges, only one individual was found guilty of aggressive begging. The coercive solicitation citation was dismissed, and the other aggressive begging citation was “amended.” The individual found guilty of aggressive begging was convicted of a misdemeanor, which will carry severe collateral consequences for him.\footnote{Marysville MC §§ 6.37.050 (2012) ("Aggressive begging is a misdemeanor. Coercive solicitation is a misdemeanor. Any person violating this chapter shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $1,000 or by imprisonment and jail for not more than 90 days or by both such fine and imprisonment."); see also infra Part III.}

Lakewood was the only other city that reported citations. Lakewood issued fifty-one citations for the five-year period from January 1, 2013, to January 1, 2017. This rate reflects a higher degree of enforcement when compared to the other cities surveyed. Of those citations issued, eleven citations were for Aggressive Begging under section 9A.04.010 of Lakewood’s Municipal Code, and forty were for begging in a Restricted Area under section 9A.04.020A. Zero citations were issued for sections 8.76.510 Solicitation and 9A.05.050 Unlawful Solicitation. Lakewood issued no citations in 2017.

Lakewood’s lack of formal enforcement after 2016 suggests the impact of the Washington Supreme Court decision in City of Lakewood v. Willis, which held provisions of Lakewood’s Restricted Areas ordinance unconstitutional.\footnote{City of Lakewood v. Willis, 375 P.3d 1056, 1064 (Wash. 2016).} Still, the decline in formal citations does not mean Lakewood is no longer enforcing these begging restrictions. As previously explained, police commonly use the invisible enforcement mechanism of move-along orders to achieve the same outcome.

The graph below depicts the total number of anti-begging citations Lakewood issued between 2013 and 2017 and the number of citations issued for each ordinance. The data shows a spike in the number of citations issued in 2014. Lakewood issued twenty-five citations in 2014 alone, accounting for nearly half of all citations issued throughout the four-year period.
This data may suggest that, as poverty became more visible in 2014, the city responded with greater enforcement of its begging restrictions. Pierce County, where Lakewood is located, had the highest number of unhoused individuals in 2014, totaling 1474 individuals.\textsuperscript{272} In 2013, the county had 1303 unhoused individuals,\textsuperscript{273} and in 2015, 1283 individuals were considered unhoused.\textsuperscript{274} So 2014 represented a spike in Pierce County's homeless population and in Lakewood's enforcement of its begging restrictions.

Prior to 2017, Lakewood's enforcement focused primarily on begging in "restricted areas." As illustrated below, citations for begging in restricted areas account for 78\% of the issued citations throughout the four-year period, while aggressive begging citations account for 22\% of the issued citations:

\textsuperscript{272} WASH. DEP'T OF COMM., 2014 POINT IN TIME COUNT (2014), http://www.commerce.wa.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/hau-pit-final-summary-2014.pdf. Note, this number includes families; however, each member of the family is counted as a single individual.
Notably, it was such a "restricted area" anti-begging ordinance that the Washington State Supreme Court held to be unconstitutional in 2016. Lakewood's data does not indicate which provisions of the ordinance applied to citations under during its four-year time period; yet it is quite possible that some people cited under this ordinance were engaged in the very same conduct that the Court held to be constitutionally protected in *Willis*.

Another key finding from Lakewood’s data is that most anti-begging citations were dismissed. Specifically, eighteen of the citations were dismissed without prejudice and sixteen were dismissed with prejudice. When a case is dismissed without prejudice, the city is barred from raising the issue again in another lawsuit.\(^{275}\) When a case is dismissed with prejudice, the city can bring another lawsuit against the individual based on the same incident.\(^{276}\) While the dismissal of these citations ultimately means those individuals will not incur criminal record for the alleged violation, the experience of being cited or arrested for engaging in constitutionally protected behavior is still traumatic and carries serious collateral consequences.

Fifteen of Lakewood's fifty-one citations resulted in a finding of guilt. Two of the citations were categorized as “Guilty Other Deferral Revoked,” which Lakewood explained “refers to revoked status or violation of a previous deferral or stipulated order of continuance.”\(^{277}\) For the two citations labeled “guilty other deferral revoked,” the individual was found guilty after violating a previous agreement to defer any sentencing or decision on

\(^{275}\) *Glossary of Terms, WASH. COURTS* (2018), https://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/resources/?fa=newsinfo_jury.termguide#D.

\(^{276}\) Id.

\(^{277}\) Email from Erika Sullivan, Paralegal, City of Lakewood, to author (Apr. 23, 2018 15:29 PST) (on file with author).
the merits of the case.\textsuperscript{278} It is unclear whether those previous agreements also involved the curtailment of any First Amendment rights. The graph below displays the variations in ultimate disposition of each citation:

While guilty sentences were relatively few, the penalties for those few defendants were disturbingly severe. Both Lakewood’s aggressive begging ordinance and its restricted area ordinance results in a misdemeanor if violated.\textsuperscript{279} The penalties ranged from ninety-day jail sentences, with portions of those sentences suspended, and fines ranging from $0 to $500. The table below depicts the penalties for the five individuals found guilty aggressive begging in Lakewood:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggressive Begging-Penalties</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>Jail Sentence</th>
<th>Fine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defendant 1</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>90 days suspended</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant 2</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>90 days suspended</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant 4</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>White</td>
<td>90 days, 89 suspended</td>
<td>$300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant 3</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>90 days, 88 suspended</td>
<td>$500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defendant 5</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Black</td>
<td>90 days, 87 suspended</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In contrast, the following table describes the penalties for the ten citations issued to individuals found guilty of begging in restricted areas in Lakewood:

\textsuperscript{278} See id.

\textsuperscript{279} Lakewood MC § 9A.04.030 (2010) (“Violation of this section shall be a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine up to $1000 or by a jail sentence of up to 90 days, or by both such fine and jail time.”).
Interestingly, in Lakewood, begging in restricted areas appears to be penalized more severely than aggressive begging. The average jail time served for aggressive begging was 1.2 days, with a range from one to three days served and the rest of the sentence suspended. In contrast, the average time served for violations of begging in restricted areas was four days, with a range from two to ten days served. An individual found guilty of aggressive begging was 40% likely to receive a fine ranging from $300-$500; however, an individual found guilty of begging in a restricted area was 60% likely to receive a fine ranging from $300-$500. Notably, an individual found guilty of begging in a restricted area had a 50% chance of receiving a $500 fine.

### Men are 75% more likely to be cited for violating anti-begging ordinances in Lakewood than women.

Demographically, men are 75% more likely to be cited for violating anti-begging ordinances than women in Lakewood. Specifically, thirty-eight of the citations were issued to males, while thirteen were issued to females. Interestingly, in 2017, 39% of unhoused individuals counted in Pierce County identified as female and 57% identified as male. If Pierce County’s demographics represent the unhoused population in Lakewood, this data suggests that men are disproportionately cited for violating anti-begging restrictions. Specifically, males account for 18% more of the unhoused population than do females, but men are 75% more likely to be cited for violating Lakewood’s anti-begging ordinances.

In fact, the data reveals that one white male in particular received numerous citations—eleven in total—accounting for 22% of all citations issued in Lakewood (ten citations

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281 Lakewood is located within Pierce County.

282 This assertion assumes that, based on the data provided by Lakewood, it is the same individual because the citation data showed that single individual with the exact same name and demographics was cited repeatedly over the four years.
for begging in restricted areas, and one for aggressive begging). He was cited twice in 2013, six times in 2014, and three times in 2015. Out of these citations, he was found guilty of begging in restricted areas five times (the aggressive begging citation was dismissed without prejudice), and the other begging in restricted areas citations were dismissed. The penalties for his citations were markedly severe: he was charged $1500 in fines (three separate $500 fines) and was sentenced to 90 days jail for each citation, totaling a cumulative of 450 days. He served twenty-five days in jail, receiving suspended sentences on the rest. This individual now has a lengthy criminal record for exercising his First Amendment right to ask for help.\textsuperscript{283} Because these are criminal charges, the impact of his record will follow him throughout his life.

Lakewood’s data suggests the danger of using anti-begging ordinances to respond to visible poverty. Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in 2016, Lakewood aggressively enforced its ordinances to deter and punish the free exercise of speech. Violators pay a heavy price for their refusal to be silenced. Many other cities throughout Washington may have taken—or are taking—the same stance. But Lakewood demonstrates the futility of punishing peaceful begging and its costly impact on both the City and its residents.

**PART III: BE SILENT: WASHINGTON’S RESTRICTIONS ON BEGGING**

Cities demonstrate considerable creativity in finding ways to restrict begging, but their efforts generally fall within these four categories: (1) restrictions on who can beg through permitting requirements; (2) prohibitions on when individuals can beg through time restrictions; (3) prohibitions on where individuals can beg through distance and place restrictions; and (4) prohibitions on how individuals can beg through aggressive panhandling. In each category, several laws stand out as particularly concerning examples of criminalization.

\begin{itemize}
  \item Nearly one-third of surveyed Washington cities have enacted laws prohibiting begging without a permit either in public parks\textsuperscript{284} or throughout the entire city.\textsuperscript{285}
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{283} HRAP was unable to obtain specific data surrounding this individual’s citation history due to time constraints. Specifically, it is unknown what exact provisions of Lakewood MC § 9A.04.020A the individual was cited under.


\textsuperscript{285} See Auburn MC § 9.18.050 (2002); Bellingham MC § 6.18.050 (1980); Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 (2010); Mukilteo MC § 5.04.120(A) (1995).
A. Restrictions on Who Can Beg: Permitting Requirements

It has long been held that streets and parks are traditional public fora, appropriately used for the purposes of peaceful assembly, whereupon public discourse and the exchange of ideas may take place.\textsuperscript{286}

Permitting requirements are the most common method of restricting who may solicit, whether they do so for organized causes or for individual charity. Nearly one-third of surveyed Washington cities have enacted laws prohibiting begging without a permit either in public parks\textsuperscript{287} or throughout the entire city.\textsuperscript{288} Obtaining a permit can be difficult, if not impossible, for someone experiencing homelessness as it usually involves a complex administrative process. This process often requires the applicant to provide an address, telephone number, other personal information, and a monetary fee that an individual experiencing homelessness might not be able to afford.\textsuperscript{289}

Functionally, permitting requirements can constitute a \textit{de facto} prohibition on begging. At the least, these restrictions have the potential to chill constitutionally protected speech by punishing individuals for failing to plan ahead by obtaining a permit prior to exercising their First Amendment right to ask for help. Some cities allow individuals caught while begging without a permit to face a combination of criminal, civil, and injunctive punishments for the same violation.\textsuperscript{290} Due to their potential to chill constitutionally protected speech, permitting laws have been successfully challenged in court.\textsuperscript{291} Preventing individuals from engaging in protected speech creates a prior restraint, and there is a strong presumption against the constitutionality of any such restraint.\textsuperscript{292} As shown in the following examples, the permitting schemes utilized throughout Washington can severely restrict an individual’s ability to exercise free speech.

\textsuperscript{288} See Auburn MC § 9.18.050 (2002); Bellingham MC § 6.18.050 (1980); Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 (2010); Kenmore MC § 5.70.020 (1998); Mukilteo MC § 5.04.120(A) (1995); Redmond § MC 5.08.030(A) (1926); Spokane MC § 10.42.030 (2007).
\textsuperscript{289} E.g., Burien MC § 5.10.080 (2002).
\textsuperscript{291} See \textit{City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co.}, 486 U.S. 750, 756 (1988) (recognizing “that when a licensing statute allegedly vests unbridled discretion in a government official over whether to permit or deny expressive activity, one who is subject to the law may challenge it facially without the necessity of first applying for, and being denied, a license”).
1. **Citywide Permitting Requirements: Lakewood**

The city of Lakewood criminalizes begging through several ordinances, one of which requires solicitors to register with the city's finance department ten days prior to soliciting within the city.\(^{293}\) The ordinance defines “solicitation” as a “request for contribution, including . . . any appeal . . . *made for a charitable purpose.*”\(^{294}\) Further, the ordinance exempts “[a]ny organizations which are...operated principally for charitable purposes, other than the raising of funds, when the solicitation of contributions is confined to the bona fide membership of the organization....”\(^{295}\) This law appears to apply to panhandling as it includes any person “having or purporting to have a charitable nature and [who] solicits and collects contributions for any charitable purpose.”\(^{296}\) Those registering must provide their contact information, purpose of solicitation, and dates of solicitation.\(^{297}\) They also must pay a $10 permit fee.\(^{298}\) As expected, soliciting without registering is prohibited.\(^{299}\)

Notably, all individuals soliciting must “provide personal identification of himself or herself upon demand by any law enforcement officer, and, upon demand, provide and exhibit a solicitor’s permit” from the city.\(^{300}\) In effect, this provision allows Lakewood police officers to interrupt and briefly seize any panhandler to demand to see their identification and permit. However, losing and replacing identification is a common struggle for people experiencing homelessness.\(^{301}\) Any violation of these permitting ordinances results in a misdemeanor.\(^{302}\)

Lakewood’s registration requirement is subject to a constitutional challenge because it targets a protected speech activity (charitable solicitation) for additional regulation not faced

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\(^{293}\) Lakewood MC § 9A.05.030 (2010). Further, the registration is only valid for 90 days.

\(^{294}\) Lakewood MC § 9A.05.010(D) (2010) (emphasis added). The statute further defines solicitation to also include “the solicitor's offer or attempt to sell any . . . thing in connection with which: (1) any appeal is made for a charitable purpose; or (2) the name of any charitable purpose is used as an inducement for consummating the sale.”

\(^{295}\) Lakewood MC § 9A.05.020 (2010).

\(^{296}\) Lakewood MC § 9A.05.010(A) (2010).

\(^{297}\) Lakewood MC § 9A.05.030 (2010).

\(^{298}\) Lakewood MC § 9A.05.040 (2010).

\(^{299}\) Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050(A) (2010).

\(^{300}\) Lakewood MC § 9A.05.060 (2010).

\(^{301}\) Teresa Wiltz, *Without ID, Homeless Trapped in Vicious Cycle*, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (May 15, 2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2017/05/15/without-id-homeless-trapped-in-vicious-cycle. Irreparable harm results from city-sanctioned encampment sweeps, including “harm to homeless people's security and dignity.” For example, people experiencing homelessness “lose medicine and health supplies; tents and bedding that shelter them from the elements; clothing and hygiene supplies; identification documents and other personal papers; the tools by which they try to make a meager income; and items of immeasurable sentimental value.” Without important identification documents, medication, clothing, and hygiene supplies, people experiencing homelessness are further hindered from finding and maintaining adequate employment. *Kincaid v. City of Fresno*, No. 106CV-1445, 2006 WL 3542732, at *40 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2006).

\(^{302}\) Lakewood MC § 9A.01.010(M) (2010).
by other speakers.\textsuperscript{303} A law enforcement officer would not know whether they have authority to stop a speaker and ask to see a permit without first examining the content of the speech to determine if it is a “charitable solicitation.”\textsuperscript{304} Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court found another Lakewood ordinance content-based because it did “not prohibit solicitation generally (it allows, for example, the solicitation of votes or customers), but only solicitation with the particular purpose: obtaining ‘money or goods as charity.’”\textsuperscript{305} Because Lakewood’s ordinance is content-based, it is therefore subject to strict scrutiny.\textsuperscript{306} Upon judicial review, Lakewood would have to show that the permitting laws are the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling state interest.\textsuperscript{307}

Whether Lakewood’s ordinance would survive judicial scrutiny depends on the compelling interest that motivated the statute. Although not required, the ordinance contains no statement of purpose or any compelling government motive behind the registration requirement. If the compelling interest behind Lakewood’s statute is the success of its business or tourism industry, courts have previously rejected such an interest, and the statute would fail to survive strict scrutiny.\textsuperscript{308} If the compelling interest behind Lakewood’s statute is public health or public safety, the city must present meaningful evidence-based data that the law is narrowly tailored to meet that interest.\textsuperscript{309}

However, the ordinance is unlikely to survive this heightened scrutiny because it criminalizes all charitable solicitation without connection to harmful conduct. The statute is a broad-based, rather than a narrowly tailored, prohibition on charitable solicitation. The registration requirements do not give panhandlers a chance to communicate their message without first registering with the city, and therefore, the law is more restrictive than necessary.\textsuperscript{310} Lakewood’s law effectively criminalizes the act of asking for help absent registration with the city.\textsuperscript{311} It is difficult to see how prohibiting all begging without a permit is “narrowly drawn” to achieve a “compelling state interest,” as this method of regulating begging fails to differentiate between peaceful

\textsuperscript{303} Under Lakewood MC § 9A.05.020, organizations “which are organized and operated principally for charitable purposes, other than raising funds, when the solicitation of contributions is confined to the bona fide membership of the organization and when the solicitation is managed and conducted solely by officers and members of such organizations who are unpaid for services” are exempt from these registration requirements.
\textsuperscript{304} McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2531 (2014).
\textsuperscript{305} Lakewood v. Willis, 375 P.3d 1056, 1063 (Wash. 2016).
\textsuperscript{306} Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015).
\textsuperscript{307} Id.
\textsuperscript{308} See, e.g., McLaughlin, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 189.
\textsuperscript{309} Id. at 187.
\textsuperscript{310} See id. at 177 (finding that a statute allowing panhandlers only one chance to convey their message, “without following or following-up, is more restrictive than necessary”).
\textsuperscript{311} Telephone Interview Jason McGill, YouthCare Engagement Manager (Oct. 10, 2017).
begging representing an individual’s exercise of free speech in a classic public forum and begging that is truly in the government’s interest to prevent.\(^{312}\) By any measure, Lakewood’s registration requirement is likely unconstitutional.

Setting aside the legal infirmities, Lakewood’s ordinance poses significant practical barriers to people experiencing homelessness. The permitting process is not suited to applicants needing to solicit immediate donations, and the application requirements such as providing an address, phone number, and application fee may not be feasible for homeless individuals.\(^{313}\) In addition, the limited nature of many cities’ permits (e.g., valid for 90 days)\(^{314}\) means an individual would endure a reoccurring administrative grind just to ask for the help they need.

2. Permitting Requirements in Public “Parks”

Many Washington cities prohibit all begging within public parks without a permit or similar authorization from the city.\(^{315}\) The definition of “park,” when it is explicitly defined, commonly includes “all public parks” but also includes other public areas of the city that are not obviously parks, such as “playgrounds . . . sidewalks and parking lots.”\(^{316}\) These permitting requirements effectively operate to restrict begging throughout large portions of public space.

Public parks are imperative to individuals experiencing homelessness because the parks often take on aspects of the home.\(^{317}\) Individuals experiencing homelessness rarely, if ever, have access to private spaces in which they can perform basic life sustaining activities such as sleeping and bathing. Not surprisingly, people experiencing homelessness are therefore forced

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\(^{312}\) *Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educ’s Ass’n*, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).

\(^{313}\) So, Scott, Olson & Mansell, *supra* note 47, at 35 (explaining that the realities of homeless mobility make providing a permanent address impractical, if not impossible). Even if food banks, shelters, and other service offices were used as a permanent address, people experiencing homelessness would not likely receive the actual notice due to the realities of homeless mobility.

\(^{314}\) *Lakewood* MC § 9A.05.030(A) (2010).


\(^{316}\) *Battle Ground* MC § 8.18.020 (1999); *see also* *Longview* MC § 13.01.005(1)(f) (1989) (defining “park” as “all public parks, public squares, golf courses, bathing beaches, and play and recreation grounds within the city limits”); *Puyallup* MC § 9.20.005(8) (2005) (defining “park” as “an area under the ownership, management, or control of the city used for public recreation, leisure, and park purposes”); *Spokane Valley* MC § 6.05.010 (2003) (defining “facility” as “any building . . . shelter . . . or other physical property including but not limited to . . . lawns, play equipment, tables, picnic areas, athletic fields, trails, or parking and pedestrian areas (including curbs, sidewalks and driveways or internal roads)’’); *Sammamish* MC § 7.12.010(10) (defining “facility” as “any building, structure, or park area operated by the City . . . department of parks and recreation’’).

to do these activities in public space. When cities place restrictions on begging within public parks, the possible areas of reprieve for the city’s most vulnerable population grows smaller and smaller. Despite the popularity of begging restrictions in parks, the U.S. Supreme Court has long held that parks are “quintessential public fora,” where the “government’s power to regulate speech is most constrained.” In such a public forum, governments may enact only limited regulations on speech. Park permitting requirements too often cross the line into impermissible content-based restrictions, resulting in the suffocation of speech in public fora.

For example, Des Moines’ park use regulations, enacted in 1988 and most recently updated in 2017, prohibits begging in all city parks. The ordinance reads, “No person shall take up collections, or act as or play the vocation of solicitor [or] beggar . . . without first obtaining a written permit from the Department.”

Recap of Applicable Law:

City of Lakewood v. Willis, established that a law that restricts a substantial amount of speech within traditional public forums is an unconstitutional restriction on speech.

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318 Id.
323 City of Lakewood v. Willis, 186 P. 3d 1056 (2016). In Willis, the court considered a ban on begging at freeway ramps and major intersections and held that the ban was facially overbroad and “imposed a content-based restriction in a substantial number of traditional public forums.”
324 Id.
The restriction is not likely to withstand judicial scrutiny. Just as with general permitting ordinances described above, park permitting requirements are a content-based restriction on protected speech. Not only does Des Moines’ prohibit the actual act of begging, it prohibits acting or playing the role of a “beggar.” An enforcing officer would have to listen to the content of the message being communicated to determine whether an individual violated Des Moines’ permitting ordinance.

However, even if Des Moines’ ordinance is a content-neutral law, it is unlikely to even withstand intermediate scrutiny. In Washington, cities must show a compelling state interest for their content-neutral laws to withstand intermediate scrutiny.325 With Des Moines’ park permitting ordinance, the city has stated that the law was enacted to further the “best interest of the public health, safety, and general welfare.”326 While public safety is a compelling interest, there is no connection between protected peaceful begging and any safety risk. Unless Des Moines can produce meaningful evidence-based data to support its assertion that the permitting ordinance is necessary for public health, safety, and general welfare, the ordinance is likely to be deemed unconstitutional.

Des Moines’ ordinance prohibits substantial speech within a traditional public forum. Regardless of whether Des Moines’ ordinance is categorized as content-based or content-neutral, the city would be unlikely to win a constitutional challenge to the ordinance because it is likely to be found overbroad for prohibiting substantial speech within a traditional public forum.

B. Restrictions on When Individuals Can Beg: Time Restrictions

Another common way to curb begging is to restrict when begging may be performed.327 Frequently, Washington cities designate a broad period of time when individuals may not beg.

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325 The Washington Supreme Court has raised the standard for content-neutral laws based on the State constitution. Collier v. City of Tacoma, 854 P.2d 1046, 1051(1993) (holding “[w]e diverge from the Supreme Court on the state interest element of the time, place, and manner test, ‘as we believe restrictions on speech can be imposed consistent with [the State constitution] only upon a showing a compelling state interest.’”).


For example, one law prohibited begging “on public property or in the residential area of the city between the hours of 9:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m.”328 Another law covered more than half the day, prohibiting begging within the city between the hours of 6:00 p.m. and 9:00 a.m.329 Other cities simply prohibit begging on public property “after sunset or before sunrise.”330

Issaquah’s Regulation of Solicitation ordinance, which includes a blanket prohibition on begging after sunset, is one example of a common time restriction.332 Specifically, the ordinance states it is “unlawful to make solicitation to pedestrians on public property after sunset or before sunrise.”333 Solicitation is defined as “any means of asking, begging, requesting, or pleading made in person, orally or in a written or printed manner, directed to another person, requesting an immediate donation of money . . . .”334

Issaquah’s ordinance is a content-based restriction on speech. The law does not prohibit all communications after sunset; rather, it prohibits sharing a very specific message—requests for immediate donations of money. The law further applies to all areas of public property, which unequivocally qualifies as a public forum. Accordingly, to survive judicial scrutiny, the law must be necessary to serve a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored to achieve that end.335 Like many of the surveyed cities, Issaquah’s anti-begging ordinance purports to serve a compelling public safety interest.336 Specifically, the ordinance aims “to regulate and punish acts of coercive and aggressive begging, and acts of begging that occur at locations or under circumstances . . . which create an enhanced sense of fear or intimidation in the person being solicited, or pose risk to traffic and public safety.”337 In essence, the city argues that every request for help made after sunset is inherently and unavoidably aggressive or coercive, a stunning claim for which the city can likely provide no scientific support.

Courts have long held that time-based prohibitions on begging are unconstitutional when the city cannot cite meaningful evidence establishing that blanket prohibitions on panhandling at night are necessary to advance public safety.338 Although Issaquah has a

328 See Auburn MC § 9.18.050(E) (2002); Sunnyside MC § 9.86.050(E) (1978).
333 Id.
337 Id.
significant interest in promoting safety in its public areas after dark, a court would likely find Issaquah’s content-based prohibition against begging between sunset and sunrise not narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose.\footnote{See id.; Browne v. City of Grand Junction, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1292–93 (D. Colo. 2015) (The court found that an ordinance that made it unlawful for any person to panhandle “[o]ne-half (1/2) hour after sunset to one-half (1/2) hour before sunrise” was not narrowly tailored to serve the city’s valid interest of public safety; the ordinance was over-inclusive because it prohibited protected speech that posed no threat to public safety).} The time restriction prohibits “any means of . . . begging . . . orally . . . or written” or “requests for items of service of value after dark.”\footnote{Issaquah MC § 9.45.020(B) (2008).} The ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad because it encompasses peaceful begging that does not threaten public safety without leaving alternate means of communication.\footnote{Issaquah MC § 9.45.020(B) (2008).}

Courts have considered and dismissed laws that make no distinction between harmful conduct and innocent behavior.\footnote{Thayer v. City of Worcester, 144 F. Supp. 3d 218, 235 (D. Mass. 2015) (holding that a blanket prohibition on soliciting from 30 minutes after sunset to 30 minutes after sunrise unconstitutionally overbroad).} Courts have also dismissed overbroad laws that prohibit protected speech that does not threaten safety.\footnote{See id. at 1292–93 (emphasizing that a prohibition on begging at night was “over-inclusive” because it prohibited “protected speech that poses no threat to public safety”); City of Seattle v. Pullman, 514 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Wash. 1973) (overturning Seattle’s curfew ordinance as an unconstitutional exercise of the city’s police power because it made “no distinction between conduct calculated to harm” and “innocent behavior”).} Because “[t]here is no indication that panhandling at night . . . is inherently dangerous or threatening to the public,” a blanket prohibition on begging after dark is overbroad and is not the least restrictive means of keeping the public safe.\footnote{Browne v. City of Grand Junction, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1292–93 (D. Colo. 2015) (emphasizing that a prohibition on begging at night was “over-inclusive” because it prohibited “protected speech that poses no threat to public safety”); City of Seattle v. Pullman, 514 P.2d 1059, 1061 (Wash. 1973) (overturning Seattle’s curfew ordinance as an unconstitutional exercise of the city’s police power because it made “no distinction between conduct calculated to harm” and “innocent behavior”).} The law does not mention particular conduct, instead presupposing that all requests for help after sunset inherently and incurably create an enhanced sense of fear or intimidation. The ordinance also excludes all forms of begging, including written requests for aid.\footnote{Browne v. City of Grand Junction, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1292 (D. Colo. 2015).} Between sunset and sunrise, a person who passively holds a sign asking for aid risks a criminal record, severe fines, and jail time.\footnote{Issaquah § MC 9.45.060 (2008).}

Laws that prohibit begging between sunset and sunrise are subject to vagueness challenges. Because these laws regulate expression protected by the First Amendment, there is a “heightened requirement for specificity.”\footnote{Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974) (demanding a greater degree of specificity when “a statute’s literal scope . . . is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the First Amendment”).} Without designating a specific time, a “person
of ordinary intelligence” might not know at what exact time begging is prohibited.348 “The hour of ‘sun set’ on any given day, as it might appear to different persons, could hardly be expected to be accurately observed. . . . One person might conclude the sun had set, and another might not think so.”349 This lack of clarity raises possible violations of due process because of the possibility of both discriminatory enforcement and lack of notice of the law.350

Finally, many individuals are heading to work before 9:00 a.m. and leaving work between the hours of 4:00 p.m. and 8:00 p.m. Time restrictions that prohibit begging during such periods of high foot traffic effectively prohibit begging when it is most likely to occur; these busy hours are the time when people are most likely to receive help when they ask.

C. Restrictions on Where Individuals Can Beg: Place and Distance Restrictions

[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.351

Besides restricting when individuals can beg, many cities go to great lengths to control where individuals can beg by enacting place and distance restrictions.352

A few ordinances outright prohibit begging throughout the entire city limits.353 Cities with such laws justify targeting the free speech of poor individuals by suggesting that even

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349 Id. at 135–36.
350 See Mass. Fair Share, Inc. v. Rockland, 610 F. Supp. 682, 690 (D. Mass. 1986) (concluding that the failure to define the term "sunset" and "daylight hours" in an ordinance raises the spectra of both chilling effect and discriminatory enforcement); West Virginia. Citizens Action Grp. v. Daley, 324 S.E.2d 713, 720–21 (1984) (concluding that the failure to define the term "sunset" in an ordinance rendered the ordinance unconstitutionally vague and that "[a] fine line drawn through dusk is too slender a thread upon which to hang the exercise of fundamental free speech rights").
351 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939).
352 See, e.g., Auburn MC § 9.08.010(B)(6)(b) (2002); Bremerton MC § 9A.44.140(b) (2014); Centralia MC § 10.37.050(C) (2014); Covington MC § 9.190.040 (2010); Lacey MC § 5.21.30 (1998); Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 (2010); Marysville MC § 6.37.047 (2014); Mountlake Terrace MC § 9.40.40 (2015); Pasco MC § 9.44.060 (2013); Redmond MC § 5.08.035 (1988); Spokane MC § 10.10.25(B) (2015); Spokane MC § 10.10.27 (2008); Sunnyside MC § 5.22.050 (2007); Sunnyside MC § 9A.86.050 (1978); Tacoma MC § 8.13A.030(A) (2007); Yakima MC § 6.75.025 (2013).
353 See Maple Valley MC § 5.05.080(A) (1999) (“No person shall solicit contributions for himself in or upon any public street or public place in the City of Maple Valley.”).
peaceful or silent requests for help pose a danger to the public simply because the request is made near a specific location.\textsuperscript{354} Laws that restrict individuals’ access to public streets and sidewalks for speech defy the “hallowed . . . [F]irst [A]mendment doctrine,” which protects the right to engage in speech in a traditional public forum.\textsuperscript{355} Much like public parks, traditional public fora include “streets, sidewalks, and roadways,” and are “subject to the strictest free speech protections.”\textsuperscript{356} As Justice Owen Roberts wrote:

Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and . . . have been used for the purposes of . . . communicating thoughts between citizens . . . . Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of citizens.\textsuperscript{357}

Cities can exclude a person from "a traditional public forum 'only when the exclusion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest."\textsuperscript{358} Throughout Washington, courts closely scrutinize and often strike down laws that restrict substantial speech in traditional public fora.\textsuperscript{359} For example, in City of Lakewood v. Willis, the Washington Supreme Court recently found two provisions of Lakewood’s “Begging in Restrictive Areas” ordinance unconstitutional because the provisions were facially overbroad “content-based speech restriction[s] in a substantial number of traditional public forums.”\textsuperscript{360} Specifically, Lakewood’s ordinance prohibited begging “(1) at on and off ramps leading to and from state intersections from any City roadway or overpass; (2) at intersections of major/principal arterials (or islands on the principal arterials) in the city....”\textsuperscript{361} The city defined begging as "asking for money or goods as charity, whether by words, bodily gestures, signs or other means."\textsuperscript{362} The court began its analysis of the constitutionality of the provisions by analyzing the type of forum in which the laws operated.\textsuperscript{363} The court found that the ordinance

\textsuperscript{354} See, e.g., Auburn MC § 9.08.010(6)(b) (2002) (prohibiting begging from people in vehicles at intersections controlled by traffic signals); Sunnyside MC § 9.86.050(B) (1978) (prohibiting begging within 10 feet of any entrance or exit of any building in use by the public); Sunnyside MC § 9.86.050(A) (1978) (prohibiting begging in public streets or alleys); Tacoma MC § 8.13A.030(A)(1)(g) (2007) (prohibiting begging within 15 feet of any parked vehicle where people are entering or exiting the vehicle); Renton MC § 6.25.1(B) (1997) (stating that begging within 25 feet of an ATM machine is presumptively aggressive).


\textsuperscript{356} City of Lakewood v. Willis, 186 P.3d 1056, 1059 (Wash. 2016).

\textsuperscript{357} Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).


\textsuperscript{359} See City of Lakewood v. Willis, 375 P.3d 1056, 1059 (Wash. 2016).

\textsuperscript{360} Id. at 1064.

\textsuperscript{361} Id. at 1057–58.

\textsuperscript{362} Id. at 1057.

\textsuperscript{363} Id. at 1064 (writing “[a] law restricting speech is subject to different levels of scrutiny, depending on the ‘forum in which it operates. Thus, in a First Amendment challenge, we begin by identifying the forum at issue. A law restricting expression in a traditional public forum is subject to the highest level of scrutiny: it must be ‘content
applied to locations that were “likely to have sidewalks, which are generally held to be traditional public for[as].” The court ultimately concluded that the provisions covered a substantial number of locations in traditional public fora because the provisions applied to every sidewalk at “on and off ramps leading to and from state intersections...” and “at intersections of major/principal arterials...in the city[.]” Next, the court stated that while cities can impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions, they cannot impose content-based restrictions on speech. After consulting the Supreme Court’s definition of content-based laws in Reed, the court concluded that Lakewood’s ordinance was content-based because it did not prohibit solicitation generally, but only prohibited solicitation with a particular purpose of obtaining money as charity. Lakewood’s provisions were found unconstitutional.

The concurrence in Willis also acknowledged that the city’s other location-based ordinances were vulnerable to overbreadth challenges. A law is overbroad when it restricts substantially more speech than necessary to achieve a legitimate public interest. Courts are concerned that laws prohibiting too many behaviors related to speech can “chill a substantial amount of activity protected by the First Amendment,” particularly when the law “imposes criminal sanctions.” But this extensive, overbroad application is precisely that which is common in cities throughout Washington.

Given Washington precedent, a court would likely find that prohibiting begging at such an expansive list of locations in traditional public fora (as seen in City of Lakewood v. Willis) is unconstitutionally overbroad. For example, laws that prohibit begging near bus stops or

neutral narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.”) (internal citations omitted).

364 Id. at 1062 (the court stated that a sidewalk can be a nonpublic forum in some circumstances, but the city did not meet its burden of showing that the sidewalks existed to solely facilitate access to a private locations).

365 Id. at 1063.

366 Id.

367 “[A] law is content based if ‘on its face [it]...define[s] regulated speech by particular subject matter...[or] by its function or purpose.” Id.

368 Id.

369 Id. at 1064.

370 Id. at 1064 (Stephens, J., concurring) (“[e]xamining the entire ordinance under which the City charged Willis, I conclude that LMC 9A.04.020A is facially overbroad. While the ordinance might conceivably have legitimate applications in nonpublic areas, on its face, it substantially restricts protected speech in a wide range of public for[a] traditionally open to First Amendment activity. And, on its face, it targets a particular category of protected speech, making it an unconstitutional content-based restriction under...Reed[.]” (internal citations omitted).


372 Id. at 878.

373 Id. (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113 (2003)); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (finding laws that impose “criminal penalties on protected speech . . . a stark example of speech suppression”).
business entrances might still fail judicial scrutiny because bus stops and business entrances are themselves within the public fora. Although some city officials might bristle at such critical review of begging ordinances, the fact remains that local laws must conform to constitutional requirements that protect all residents, not just residents with stable housing. \(^{374}\)

Once again, the City of Lakewood provides a specific example. In addition to the permitting requirements previously outlined, following \textit{Lakewood v. Willis}, the city of Lakewood continues to restrict range of distance for solicitors. The city has two ordinances with specific distances restrictions on soliciting within the city. \(^{375}\) The ordinances and the specific restrictions are detailed in the table below.

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050: Unlawful solicitations}\(^{376}\) & \textbf{Lakewood MC § 9A.04.020A: Restrictive Areas}\(^{377}\) \\
\hline
Defines solicitation as “any oral or written request for a contribution...any appeal is made for any charitable purpose.” & Defines begging as “asking for money or goods or charity, whether by words, bodily gestures, \textit{signs} or other means.”  \\
Exempts “any organizations which are...operated principally for charitable purposes, other than the raising of funds, when the solicitation of contributions is confined to the bona fide membership of the organization...” & No exemptions.  \\

Unlawful to solicit: & Unlawful to solicit:  \\
• in public streets/alleys or to solicit anyone who is “in or upon” public streets/alleys; & • within twenty-five feet of an ATM or financial institution;  \\
• within ten feet of any crosswalk or any entrance or exit of a building used by the general public; or & • within fifteen feet of any occupied “handicapped” parking space, bus stop, train station; or  \\
• from any sidewalk within ten feet of its intersection with an alley or driveway. & • in any public parking lot, structure, or walkway dedicated to such parking lot or structure;  \\
 & • before sunrise or after sunset at any public transportation facility or on any public transportation vehicle.  \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\(^{374}\) \textit{See Michael Simpson, ACLU Raises Concerns with Lakewood’s Rewrite of Panhandling Law, NEWS TRIBUNE} (Feb. 23, 2017). After the Washington State Supreme Court’s ruling in \textit{Willis}, Lakewood Mayor Don Anderson decried the Court’s “activist . . . attempts to legislate policy rather than interpret the law.” \textit{Id}. Such a statement reveals a common misunderstanding by elected officials as to the constitutionally protected nature of begging as speech and the court’s role in enforcing those protections.

\(^{375}\) Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 (2010) and MC § 9A.04.020A.  
\(^{376}\) Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 (2010).  
\(^{377}\) Lakewood MC § 9A.04.020A.
First, Lakewood’s restrictions close off many downtown areas and access points that, besides being traditional public fora, are the most logical places to beg. Specifically, the ordinances impose restrictions on begging in public streets and alley or attempting to beg anyone in public streets or alleys; they prohibit begging from any sidewalk within ten feet of a public driveway or alley, and they prohibit begging within fifteen feet of any bus stop or train station.

These restrictions are hardly intuitive; a person experiencing homelessness would have no reasonable way of knowing where they may ask for help or where they risk incurring a fine or incarceration. For example, the image below shows a satellite photo of a downtown area in Lakewood. Based on the ordinance, the image shows red boxes indicating peripheries within ten or fifteen feet of which an individual cannot beg. The blue lines enclose public streets that are also prohibited areas for begging. As illustrated below, when considering that Lakewood MC § 9A.04.020A also prohibits begging in any parking lot, much of the geographic area within Lakewood becomes a “restricted area” where individuals cannot ask for help without risking criminal liability.

Second, Lakewood’s ordinances impose content-based restrictions on speech. Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050, while at first glance may appear to be content-neutral because it appears to impose restrictions on solicitation in general, the separate provisions of the ordinance work together to create a content-based restriction. Specifically, Lakewood MC

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378 Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 (2010).
379 Id.
381 Id.
§ 9A.05.050 defines solicitation as a request for a charitable purpose. In analyzing whether Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 imposes a content-based restriction on speech, one need only look as far as Lakewood v. Willis, where the court found that Lakewood’s previous law was content-based because it did not prohibit solicitation generally, but only solicitation with a particular purpose of obtaining money as charity. Similarly, Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 prohibits solicitations requested for charitable purposes, not solicitation generally.

Third, even if both ordinances were content-neutral, a court would likely find they fail to leave open alternative channels of communications. For example, Lakewood’s ordinances prohibit both oral and written requests for help. Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 defines solicitation as “oral or written” requests for contributions, and Lakewood MC § 9A.04.020A defines begging as “asking for money...whether by words, bodily gestures, signs or other means.” The city’s ordinances fail to allow individuals alternative means of communicating their need for help. The city could allow for passive sign-holding in some locations rather than prohibiting both oral and written requests for help; however, the ordinances literally prohibit all possible means of communicating a message. In considering any compelling interest that the city may assert as justification for these laws, the only threat to public safety might come from forceful, repeated verbal solicitations. But the ordinances do not distinguish between harmful conduct and peaceful begging—leaving the city vulnerable to overbreadth challenges.

Fourth, Lakewood’s ordinances place “buffer zones” around crosswalks, intersections, ATM’s and financial institutions, parking spaces, parking lots, train stations, and bus stations. Courts have found that while buffer zones around facilities like ATMs may be appropriate if they are the least restrictive means of meeting the city’s interest, buffer zones are not always required to protect public safety. Here, Lakewood’s buffer zones around crosswalks, “handicapped” parking spaces, bus stops, and train stops are unlikely to withstand judicial scrutiny because they are unlikely to be narrowly tailored to meet the compelling interest of public safety. For example, panhandling within buffer zones around bus stops has been described as “more bothersome” but not as “demonstrably more dangerous.” Absent evidence to the contrary, a court would likely find that Lakewood’s buffer zones are not the least restrictive means necessary to achieve a compelling interest.

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382 Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 (2010).
383 City of Lakewood v. Willis, 375 P.3d 1056, 1063 (Wash. 2016).
384 Lakewood MC § 9A.05.050 (2010).
385 Id.
386 Id.
387 Id.
388 Willis, 375 P.3d at 1064 (Stephens, J., concurring).
391 Id. at 195.
392 Id.
Overall, place and distance restrictions raise serious constitutional concerns because they limit otherwise protected speech in traditional public fora—a cherished space for free speech protections. These place and distance restrictions do not try to hide the fact that they are entirely content-based restrictions, which stifle the exercise of one form of speech but not others. Although a resident may stand near a crosswalk or bus stop advertising local businesses or asking motorists to vote for an upcoming candidate, that same resident may face criminal penalties when the content of her speech shifts from business advertising or political lobbying to a request for help. Washington’s Supreme Court has already signaled its willingness to strike down such hopelessly unconstitutional ordinances.

D. Restrictions on How Individuals Can Beg: Manner Restrictions

The last category of anti-begging laws includes sweeping restrictions on how begging can be performed. These ordinances are often labeled to suggest they target “aggressive” or “coercive” begging. However, such categorization is misleading because these laws are often “designed to be enforced against people who are engaging in harmless activities when requesting a donation.”

Aggressive begging ordinances are typically not triggered by the intentionally aggressive or coercive behavior of the panhandler; rather, culpability is most often triggered by the “reasonable fear” of the listener. But as discussed above, studies show that society frequently responds to evidence of visible poverty and human desperation with fear. This fear is so common that even peaceful non-coercive begging can be interpreted as frightening or disturbing to people who witness it. Compelling sociological studies show that mere exposure to visible poverty triggers highly negative reactions from those who witness it. Thus, begging restrictions that turn on a witness’s perception—as opposed to some objective measure of conduct—are overbroad. People asking for help could be punished not because of anything they did but because of how their conduct was perceived.

1. The Problem with Perception-Based Definitions of Aggressive Begging

A core principle of criminal law is that culpability attaches based on conduct. It is our knowing and intentional decision to engage in wrongful conduct—the mens rea—that makes a bad act unlawful. Yet laws deriving culpability on the subjective perception of the victim turns this core concept of criminal law on its head, attaching criminal liability without the accused.

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393 See NAT’L LAW CTR. 2014, supra note 63, at 20.
394 See Ordinance Chart, supra note 180.
395 See Rankin 2015, supra note 55.
396 Id.
having any intention of wrongdoing. More important, speakers have no way of knowing what conduct is acceptable under the law. Individuals will inevitably be forced to censor or silence their speech out of fear it could be interpreted as a threat by the “reasonable” person who happens to hear, see, or read their message.

By far the most common, 96% of all aggressive begging laws in Washington include a subjective perception-based component. For example, many ordinances begin by defining “aggressive begging” as asking for help “with the intent to intimidate another person into giving money or goods.” But intimidation is most often defined as “engag[ing] in conduct which would make a reasonable person feel fearful or compelled.” Even attempting to ground the law in the accused’s “intent to intimidate,” the laws define intimidation wholly on the subjective standards of the listener. Such an approach to criminalization presents several constitutional concerns and erodes the breathing space that safeguards the free exchange of ideas.

Perception-based laws make it challenging to know whether a reasonable person feels fearful or compelled because of the speaker’s specific conduct or because a visibly poor person subconsciously elicits feelings of discomfort or even repulsion. Both the appearance of a visibly poor person and the circumstances of asking for help make one feel compelled, whether by fear or sympathy, to make a donation. When the mere sight of visible poverty triggers

397 Ordinance Chart, supra note 180.
398 Id.
399 Anacortes MC § 9.24.050 (1999); Arlington MC § 9.56.020(1) (2014) (“with the intent to intimidate or coerce ...”) (emphasis added); Auburn MC § 9.08.010(B)(1) (2002); Bellevue MC § 10.06.010(B)(1) (2005); Bonney Lake MC § 9.11.060(A) (2016) (“Aggressive solicitation’ means behavior that is intended to harass or intimidate ...”); Bremerton MC § 9A.44.110(b) (2014); Des Moines MC § 9.68.030(2), (1)(a) & (c) (1988); Everett MC § 9.52.010(A)(2) (1987); Federal Way RMC § 6.35.030(1)(a),(2) (1994); Lake Stevens MC § 9.08.030(b)(1) (2012); Marysville MC § 6.37.020(a) (2012) (“with the intent to intimidate or coerce ...”) (emphasis added); Moses Lake MC § 9.22.010 (2011); Mount Vernon MC § 9.21.060(A) (2011); Oak Harbor MC § 6.95.030(2), 020(1) (2013) (“with the intent to intimidate or coerce. ...”) (emphasis added); Port Angeles MC § 11.18.020(A) (2005); Renton MC § 6-25-1 (1997).
400 See, e.g., Arlington MC § 9.56.020(7) (2014); Bonney Lake MC § 9.11.060(c) (2016) (intimidate “means to coerce or frighten into submission or obedience or to engage in conduct which would make a reasonable person fearful or feel compelled to give the person money or goods.”); Bremerton MC § 9A.44.110(a)(1) (2014); Everett MC § 9.52.020(D) (1987); Federal Way RMC § 6.35.030(1)(e) (1994) (Intimidate “means to engage in words or conduct which would make a reasonable person feel compelled to give money to a person”); Port Angeles MC 11.18.020(B) (2005); Renton MC § 6-25-1 (1997) (intimidate “means to use words or engage in conduct that would likely cause a reasonable person to fear bodily harm, fear damage to or loss of property, or otherwise be compelled into giving money or other things of value”); Sammamish MC § 22.05.110(b) (2000); Seattle MC § 12A.12.015(A)(2) (1987); University Place MC § 9.55.010 (2)(A)(2) (2004); Vancouver MC § 7.04.030(3) (2003).
fearful reactions, how can a person experiencing homelessness hope to ask for help in conformance with the law? How can a police officer, responding to a complaint, be expected to reliably determine which impulse led to the donation? In these situations, even peaceful begging can trigger a conviction for aggressive begging based on the reaction of the person being solicited.\footnote{See NAT'L LAW CTR. 2014, supra note 63, at 20 (stating that laws “purportedly aimed at curbing threatening . . . behavior . . . are sometimes designed to be enforced against . . . harmless activities” like begging).} The Supreme Court has “explained [that] a regulation is not vague because it may at times be difficult to prove . . . but rather [it is vague] because it is unclear as to what fact must be proved.”\footnote{F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012).} While these aggressive begging laws are popular Washington ordinances, it is often unclear what facts support a conviction under an aggressive begging ordinance above and beyond the mere appearance of a visibly poor person and the peaceful exercise of free speech.\footnote{See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008) (asserting that the Supreme Court has “struck down statutes that tied . . . culpability to . . . wholly subjective judgments without statutory definitions, narrowing context or settled legal meanings”).}

The simplest solution to this problem would be to replace perception-based ordinances with objective conduct-based ordinances that specifically describe how a person cannot ask for help. But even then, such ordinances would impact the exercise of free speech and would need to be narrowly tailored to conform to the strict scrutiny standard. As illustrated below, manner-based components to aggressive begging laws are often overly broad and criminalize otherwise lawful conduct.

2. Not in that Way: Conduct-Based Begging Laws

Municipalities attempt to avoid judicial scrutiny of their anti-begging restrictions by prohibiting different conduct under the guise of protecting public health and safety.\footnote{See, e.g., Arlington MC § 9.56.010(1) (2014) (stating that its solicitation and camping regulations serve to “protect and preserve the public safety of pedestrians and to insure the safe and efficient movement of pedestrian and vehicular traffic in public places”); Lacey MC § 5.21.010 (1998) (stating that its begging regulations serve the purpose of promoting “the health, safety, peace, and general welfare” of its citizens and visitors).} However, these attempts fail when the prohibited conduct is attached to a regulatory scheme that targets a particular form of expression, like immediate requests for donations.\footnote{See, e.g., McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140 F. Supp. 3d 177, 185 (2015) (noting that a law purporting to regulate conduct accompanying expression will be subject to strict scrutiny when it “targets a particular form of expressive speech—the solicitation of immediate charitable donations—and applies its regulatory scheme only to that subject matter”); Thayer v. City of Worcester, 144 F. Supp. 3d 218, 221 (D. Mass. 2015) (interpreting a content-based prohibition that made it “unlawful for any person to beg, panhandle or solicit in an aggressive manner”).} In one example, a city in Illinois added a conduct-based element to an ordinance that prohibited oral requests for money after the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the ordinance was a
form of content discrimination and was subject to strict scrutiny.\textsuperscript{408} The new addition prohibited individuals from requesting a donation “while knowingly approaching within five feet” of the person solicited.\textsuperscript{409} When the modified ordinance was re-challenged, the city argued that the ordinance “regulate[d] activity, not speech.”\textsuperscript{410} However, the Seventh Circuit again held that the ordinance was a content-based restriction on speech because it restricted individuals from approaching a person while asking for a donation but allowed individuals to approach a person while engaging in other types of speech.\textsuperscript{411} Following the Court’s analysis in \textit{Reed}, the analysis of the Seventh Circuit represents a growing trend of courts invalidating aggressive begging laws.

Many begging restrictions target such a broad array of conduct they would fail judicial tests that require restrictions of speech to be the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmental interest.\textsuperscript{412} For example, many of the surveyed cities\textsuperscript{413} prohibit (1) approaching within a certain distance of a person without receiving that person’s consent;\textsuperscript{414} (2) persisting in begging after being given a negative response;\textsuperscript{415} (3) begging in the company of any other person;\textsuperscript{416} (4) begging with a child;\textsuperscript{417} (5) begging from anyone under the age of sixteen;\textsuperscript{418} (6) using false or misleading information while begging for the purpose of making a

\textsuperscript{408} Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 413 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1173 (2016).


\textsuperscript{410} Id. at *2 (quoting Springfield MC § 131.06(a)(1)).

\textsuperscript{411} “Although the language of the current ordinance has been modified, it still addresses the content of the plaintiffs’ speech. The plaintiffs can ask for the time, talk about the weather, ask someone to sign a petition, or even solicit support (either nonmonetary support or for a future contribution) for causes or organizations while approaching within five feet of the person being addressed. However, the plaintiffs are not permitted to ask pedestrians for ‘an immediate donation of money or other gratuity’ while ‘knowingly approaching within five feet’ of the individual. The ordinance subjects the Plaintiffs to criminal penalties for asking for immediate donations of money in those circumstances.” Id.

\textsuperscript{412} Supra Part I, Section B.

\textsuperscript{413} In addition to perception and conduct, most cities include the “place” and “distance” provisions, discussed in Section III, Part C of this Brief (e.g., near bus stops, ATMs, intersections, and gas stations) in their “aggressive” begging ordinances, which purport to serve as evidence of aggressive begging.


\textsuperscript{416} See, e.g., Lacey MC § 5.21.040(G) (1998).

\textsuperscript{417} See, e.g., Auburn MC § 9.08.010(B)(1) (2002); Bonney Lake MC § 9.11.050(B) (2016); Covington MC § 9.190.020(1)(h) (2010); Renton MC § 6-25-1 (1997); SeaTac MC § 8.05.740(B)(1)(d) (1995).

\textsuperscript{418} See, e.g., Lacey MC § 5.21.040(D) (1998); Longview MC § 9.23.040(4) (2008). This type of prohibited conduct is problematic. How is an individual supposed to accurately know the age of the person they are soliciting from?
solicitation;\textsuperscript{419} (7) engaging with the driver of a parked car;\textsuperscript{420} (8) begging and blocking or impeding pedestrian traffic;\textsuperscript{421} and (9) begging for the purpose of soliciting vehicular traffic.\textsuperscript{422}

Although each point listed above might appear to refer to conduct, they are tied to the content of the speech being communicated. Content-neutral laws already exist to prohibit many of the above behaviors.\textsuperscript{423} For a police officer to find a violation of the above laws, the officer must evaluate the message being communicated. Because these laws specifically target begging and have the potential of chilling peaceful constitutionally protected requests for donations, they are both content-based restrictions on speech and subject to strict scrutiny. A closer examination of each manner-based provision reveals the constitutional infirmities.\textsuperscript{424} But what qualifies as consent? Is a smile, a nod, a gesture, or a look of acknowledgment sufficient, or must consent be verbally expressed? Further, it is unclear whether the solicitor must obtain the consent of the person before or after making the request.\textsuperscript{425} Because these provisions do not provide fair notice of what is prohibited, they may fail under a constitutional challenge for vagueness.\textsuperscript{426}


\textsuperscript{420} See, \textit{e.g.}, Mount Vernon MC § 9.21.050(E)(1)(g) (2011); Lacey MC § 5.21.030(C) (1998); Tacoma 13.A.030(A)(1)(g) (2007).


\textsuperscript{422} Interestingly, these types of restrictions raise the question of why it is not illegal for business owners to solicit customers by waiving signs towards traffic.

\textsuperscript{423} For example, many cities have content-neutral ordinances that prohibit harassment, fraud, and pedestrian interference. These content-neutral laws target the harmful behavior without infringing on constitutionally protected speech.


\textsuperscript{426} \textit{But cf. id.} (finding that a law requiring consent before making a solicitation is not unconstitutionally vague under Due Process requirements because consent may be expressed via an affirmative statement or implied via action or inaction).
As another example, many of the surveyed cities prohibit individuals from (1) following a person to ask for money after that person has given a negative response and (2) continuing to beg from a person after that person has given a negative response. Aside from the vagueness of the phrase “negative response,” these “bans on following a person and panhandling after a person has given a negative response are not the least restrictive means available.” As the United States District Court of Massachusetts aptly explained:

A panhandler who asks for change from a passerby might, after a rejection, seek to explain that the change is needed because she is unemployed or state that she will use it to buy food. These additional post-rejection messages do not necessarily threaten public safety; their explanations of the nature of poverty sit at the heart of what makes panhandling protected expressive conduct in the first place. Likewise, a panhandler might follow someone in order to convey a longer message. Both behaviors might be utilized where a promising target—someone who might want to hear a panhandler’s message—walks by a panhandler without noticing him at all. If panhandling is truly valuable expressive speech, then panhandlers may have a right to more than one shot at getting their message across.

In a third example, at least one of the surveyed cities prohibits individuals from begging in a group of two or more people. Prohibiting individuals from begging together, “whose

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427 See, e.g., Bonney Lake MC § 9.11.060(A)(c) (2016) (“[f]ollowing a person for purposes of solicitation at a close distance where a reasonable person would be intimidated or in fear of their safety”); Federal Way RMC § 6.35.030(2)(a), (1)(e)(i)–(ii) (1994); Lacey MC § 5.21.040(E) (1998); Longview MC § 9.23.040(5) (2008) (“following a person who walks away from the panhandler, if the panhandler’s conduct is intended to or is reasonably likely to intimidate the person being solicited into responding affirmatively to the solicitation”); Spokane MC § 10.10.025(B)(1) (2015).
430 Id. (emphasis added).
431 See, e.g., Lacey MC § 5.21.040(G) (1998) (imposing criminal penalties for begging “in a group of two or more persons, except where one or more panhandler(s) is/are under the age of eighteen and is/are the dependent child(ren) of the other panhandler”); Lacey MC § 5.21.040(H) (1998) (imposing criminal penalties for begging “within fifty feet of any other panhandler, except where one or more panhandler(s) is/are under the age of eighteen and is/are the dependent child(ren) of the other panhandler”).
activity is otherwise permissible,” fails to satisfy strict scrutiny.432 Such prohibitions violate both the First Amendment’s protection of speech and protection of assembly.433 Even if the city attempts to prohibit group begging in an “intimidating manner,” the law will not survive strict scrutiny “in the absence of . . . evidence. . . that ‘intimidating’ group panhandling is more dangerous than ‘intimidating’ solo panhandling.”434

In many of the surveyed cities, begging prohibitions duplicate existing pedestrian interference provisions and obstruction of traffic laws.435 These laws commonly prohibit blocking or impeding pedestrian traffic and blocking, impeding, or distracting vehicular traffic while begging.436 Yet many cities already address the corresponding public safety concerns through facially neutral and constitutionally valid “obstruction of traffic” or “pedestrian interference” laws that apply to everyone regardless of the type of speech.437

For example, Tacoma has a Solicitation by Coercion438 ordinance duplicative of its Pedestrian Interference439 ordinance. The ordinances are described in the chart below:

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432 See McLaughlin, 140 F. Supp. 3d at 194-95 (holding that group panhandling restrictions cannot survive strict scrutiny “in the absence of record evidence that panhandling in a group of two or more is a greater threat to public safety than panhandling alone”).

433 Id. at 194 (holding that a prohibition on begging “in a group of two or more ‘in an intimidating’ manner” was vague because it did not define “intimidating,” and infringed upon the First Amendment’s protection of speech and of assembly).

434 See id. at 195.

435 For example, compare Mount Vernon MC § 9.21.050(F) (2011), which defines as a part of aggressive begging walking or standing “in such a manner as to block passage by another person or a vehicle,” with Mount Vernon MC § 9.21.045(B) (2012), which prohibits entering or being present in a prohibited roadway when the roadway is open to traffic.


437 Of course, even facially neutral laws may be disproportionately enforced against people experiencing homelessness such that the laws become another mechanism for criminalizing individuals with no reasonable alternative. See Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ordinance Language</th>
<th>§ 8.13A.040 Solicitation by Coercion</th>
<th>§ 8.13.030 Vehicular or Pedestrian Interference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| ▪ “It is unlawful for a person to solicit by coercion.”  
▪ Coercion means “to block, either individually or as part of a group of persons, the passage of a solicited person.” | ▪ Obstruct pedestrian traffic means to “walk, stand, sit, lie, or place an object in such a manner as to block passage by another person.”  
▪ A person is guilty of pedestrian interference “if he or she intentionally obstructs pedestrian traffic.” |

**Penalty**

| ▪ Gross misdemeanor.  
▪ Fine of $5,000, incarceration up to one year, or both fine and imprisonment. | ▪ Misdemeanor.  
▪ Fine not to exceed $1000, imprisonment not to exceed 90 days, or both fine and imprisonment. |

This table illustrates how Tacoma’s two ordinances overlap to prohibit almost the exact same behavior—blocking pedestrian traffic. However, the difference in the Solicitation by Coercion ordinance is that the behavior of blocking pedestrian traffic is combined with making a solicitation. Tacoma defines solicitation as “ask[ing], beg[ging]. . . whether orally or in a printed manner, for the purpose of immediately receiving contributions. . . .” Again, this is a content-based restriction on speech because an enforcing officer would have to listen to the solicitor’s message before determining if the solicitor violated the law, and because it allows solicitations for other means, such as registering others to vote. Further, Tacoma’s Solicitation by Coercion statute has a drastically different penalty for engaging in a constitutionally protected form of speech, causing due process issues to likely arise due to arbitrary enforcement.

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447 Tacoma MC § 8.13A.020(1) (2007). Tacoma defines solicit as “Solicit and all derivative forms of solicit means to ask, beg, solicit, or plead, whether orally or in a written or printed manner, for the purpose of immediately receiving contributions, alms, charity, or gifts of items of value for oneself or another person.” Id. (emphasis added). Only if the solicitor was asking for an immediate contribution would the solicitor be in violation of the law because the law regulates the solicitor’s “function or purpose.”
Overall, aggressive begging laws consistently raise constitutional and policy concerns. The perception-based component, in almost every aggressive begging ordinance, provides no guidance to people experiencing homelessness on how to conform their conduct in a manner consistent with the law. Adding enumerated lists of prohibited behavior rarely helps. More often than not, these enumerated lists raise questions of vagueness and are suspect to overbreadth challenges because they have the potential of chilling peaceful requests accompanying such behavior.

If public safety is the true aim of aggressive begging laws, these laws should be triggered only if someone begging is engaged in objectively aggressive, threatening, or harassing behavior—behavior that already constitutes a crime in virtually every jurisdiction. Given the scope of protection already afforded by existing criminal codes, aggressive begging laws are unnecessary and overbroad, especially because they so often apply to otherwise peaceful begging—a form of free speech. If particular conduct would not trigger liability under existing assault or harassment laws, then the conclusion is obvious: the conduct is not unlawful, even in the context of solicitation.
Part IV: Recommendations and Conclusion

Washington State’s pervasive policy of restricting begging as a form of disfavored speech prompts four key recommendations: (1) peaceful begging should not be criminalized; (2) cities should repeal laws that apply to peaceful begging; (3) aggressive begging laws should be repealed; and (4) cities should recognize peaceful begging as a legitimate plea for help.

A. Peaceful Begging Should Not Be Criminalized

First, as evidenced by the data collected, cities are criminalizing peaceful begging through implementing geographical, distance, time, and manner restrictions on begging. As demonstrated, these restrictions work to chill and prohibit First Amendment protected speech and violate individuals’ due process rights. The First Amendment and Due Process Clause are hallmarks of America’s society; any negative impact on these rights is a direct attack on the United States Constitution.

Research has shown that criminalization ordinances are ineffective at addressing the root causes of homelessness.\(^{449}\) Civil and criminal penalties charged by anti-begging laws are significant,\(^{450}\) hearings and jail time can lead to unemployment, probation conditions can be impossible to comply with,\(^{451}\) and a criminal record can prevent individuals from being eligible for housing subsidies and federal benefits.\(^{452}\) Cities can easily expend vast amounts of resources defending the legality of these ordinances, only to have courts repeatedly affirm that begging is a form of protected speech worthy of the highest constitutional scrutiny.\(^{453}\)

With these geographic, distance, and time restrictions, cities are punishing peaceful, constitutionally protected behavior. The data collected shows that cities often severely punish violations as misdemeanors. These misdemeanors carry real, collateral consequences that severely affect an individual’s ability to gain housing, employment, and government benefits.\(^{455}\) Even where begging is punished by fines, “civil sanctions do not provide for the

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\(^{449}\) NAT'L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 36.

\(^{450}\) NAT'L LAW CTR. 2014, supra note 63, at 34 (stating that “costs resulting from criminalization measures ... are present at multiple stages of the criminal justice process,” and people experiencing homelessness are often unable to pay, resulting in increased jail time, suspension of their driver’s license, and poor credit); see also Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, the Poor are Paying the Price, NPR.ORG (May 19, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punish-the-poor.

\(^{451}\) NAT'L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 37 (“[H]omeless people are more prone to violate their probation due to practical difficulties in complying with the ordered conditions. Maintaining a stable location where they can be monitored by probation officers, affording public transportation to and from required appointments, and remaining out of high crime areas can all be difficult, if not impossible, conditions for homeless people to comply with.”).

\(^{452}\) Id. at 32–33.

\(^{453}\) The exact cost of defending such lawsuits is worthy of further research. Unfortunately, some cities are highly resistant toward compliance with the Public Records Act and transparency in government overall. Poor public access to municipal data and records is a finding that has been noted by HRAP researchers for years. Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37.

\(^{454}\) Rhodan, supra note 7.

\(^{455}\) Id.
same due process protections as criminal penalties.” Further, these fines contribute to the debtor’s prison when individuals cannot pay them.

Ultimately, criminalization measures—including anti-begging ordinances—waste taxpayer dollars because they cycle people experiencing homelessness through the costly criminal justice system with no meaningful results. Providing reasonable housing options to those in need is more effective than processing people through the criminal justice system. This brief uncovers a consistent theme: cities are eager to circumvent the free speech and due process rights of homeless residents to lift pressure from business owners and residents. But local and national jurisprudence increasingly suggests that courts will not permit cities to restrict peaceful requests for help under the guise of public safety. Cities should work to create solutions to homelessness that will help individuals, rather than worsen the homelessness crisis.

Time, distance, place, and manner of begging regulations are the predominant means by which municipalities attempt to avoid strict scrutiny. However, these regulations are still subject to strict scrutiny if they facially restrict a particular type of expression, such as solicitation for donations. The Washington State Supreme Court recently demonstrated its own commitment to interpreting these laws as they are: content-based restrictions on speech in areas traditionally considered public fora. Put more simply, many of Washington’s begging restrictions would not survive judicial scrutiny. Municipalities should take careful note and begin repealing these laws that would not survive a costly judicial challenge.

Many of Washington’s begging restrictions would not survive judicial scrutiny.

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456 NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 37–38 (emphasizing that “a homeless person who has received a ticket does not have the right to an attorney or the right to secure a jury trial . . . even though the person may be incarcerated later for failure to pay the underlying fine”).

457 See generally Howard & Tran, supra note 91 (finding that investment in permanent housing in just two cities, rather than utilizing criminalization strategies, could save taxpayers over $2 million in criminal justice and other costs every year); see NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 38 (reporting that “[o]ver 11 million people are cycled through our nation’s jails each year, costing local governments approximately $22 billion annually”).

458 NAT’L LAW CTR. 2017, supra note 2, at 47 (explaining that research demonstrates “permanent supportive housing saves public resources, improves communities by reducing street homelessness, and improves the health and well-being of homeless people”); see also NAT’L LAW CTR. 2014, supra note 63 (summarizing that criminalization measures often “create additional barriers” to resources needed to escape homelessness); Sylvestre, supra note 73, at 1 (showing how “prevalent stereotypes and prejudice faced by homeless persons as they are policed and criminalized, both historically and in the present, are perpetuating disadvantage and have occluded consideration of the broader structural causes of homelessness”).


460 See City of Lakewood v. Willis, 186 P.3d 1056, 1063 (Wash. 2016). Although four justices in the lead opinion held that two particular “time, place, and manner” provisions of Lakewood’s ordinance were unconstitutional, two other justices determined that the entire ordinance was facially overbroad, “substantially restrict[ing] protected speech in a wide range of public forums traditionally open to First Amendment activity.” Id. at 228 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
B. Repeal Laws that Apply to Peaceful Begging

Second, cities should repeal ordinances that prohibit or restrict peaceful begging. Cities can act as gatekeepers for their resident’s constitutional rights, and they should treat that opportunity seriously. “Our [C]onstitution enshrines the principle that government exists to protect the rights of all citizens, and has no legitimate power to deprive any citizen or class of citizen of their rights without due process of the law.”461 Due to the nature of these laws and the influence of the fear of visible poverty, the laws are likely to be enforced in a discriminatory manner,462 infringing individuals’ due process rights.

Although businesses and cities receive complaints regarding the presence of panhandlers and the act of begging, cities must consider the true motivation behind these complaints. Cities respond to the fear of visible poverty by implementing these laws that restrict begging.463 However, cities and local governments have no power to deprive citizens of their constitutional rights, regardless of how strong the public’s aversion to visible poverty is. People experiencing homelessness are already marginalized; cities should proactively try to protect already vulnerable groups, rather than implementing and maintaining laws that reinforce stigma and isolation. As individuals experiencing homelessness “become more marginalized over time . . . they are by definition less able to access the resources needed to maintain stable housing.”464 These laws not only criminalize constitutionally protected behavior, but they work to further marginalize individuals experiencing homelessness and contribute to the cycle of homelessness.

The city of Olympia provides a proactive example of how cities can protect the constitutional rights of its residents. In Olympia, the city attorney’s office routinely reads court decisions that may affect Olympia’s municipal code.465 The attorney’s office will then discuss potential impacts within the legal department, and will suggest to the city manager that staff bring a proposed ordinance for the city council to amend the city code if necessary.466 After advice from the city attorney’s office, the Olympia city council recently decided to remove

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462 Supra Part I, Section C.
463 Supra Part I, Section A.
465 Interview with Annaliese Harksen, Deputy City Attorney/Police Legal Advisor, City of Olympia (Mar. 2, 2018).
466 Id.
references to panhandling from its municipal code in response to Lakewood v. Willis.\textsuperscript{467} Olympia’s municipal code had prohibited panhandling within twenty-five feet of an ATM or parking station and banned aggressive panhandling.\textsuperscript{468} Olympia defined panhandling as “any solicitation made in person, requesting an immediate donation of money or things of value...”\textsuperscript{469} The city noted that its definition was “problematic because of the Lakewood ruling given that our definition targets speech based on its content—a solicitation for a donation of money or thing of value—and prohibits that conduct in places historically recognized as a traditional public forum, such as sidewalks and other ‘public places.’”\textsuperscript{470} The city attorney’s office presented the city council with three options: “1. Approve the proposed ordinance amending OMC Section 9.16.180, Pedestrian Interference on second reading. 2. Direct staff to make different or additional amendments to OMC Section 9.16.180, Pedestrian Interference. 3. Decide not to approve the proposed ordinance. This option creates a potential liability risk for the City.”\textsuperscript{471} The city council subsequently voted to remove references of panhandling from its city code.\textsuperscript{472}

Olympia recognized that its ordinance imposed content-based restrictions on the freedom of speech,\textsuperscript{473} and that the Lakewood v. Willis rendered the ordinance unconstitutional.\textsuperscript{474} Olympia’s removal of panhandling from its municipal code illustrates that other cities within Washington can do the same thing—they can repeal ordinances that prohibit peaceful begging. Just as Olympia identified, cities can risk liability for having laws that restricting peaceful begging.\textsuperscript{475} At the least, that risk should motivate cities to revisit and repeal ordinances that restrict peaceful begging.

\textbf{C. Repeal Aggressive Begging Laws}

Third, aggressive begging laws that are duplicative of preexisting ordinances should be repealed unless they provide for a lower penalty for engaging in a constitutionally protected behavior. These overlapping ordinances often result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement while simultaneously infringing on individuals’ due process rights. Cities are prohibited from “[catering] to the preference of one group,” such as business owners or financially secure individuals, “to avoid the expressive acts of others,” such as begging.\textsuperscript{476}

\textsuperscript{467} Abby Spegman, Olympia Gets Rid of its Anti-Panhandling Rules Following State Supreme Court Decision, OLYMPIAN (Jan. 6, 2018, 4:49 PM), https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicupload/eclips/2018%2001%2008%20Olympia%20gets%20anti%20panhandling%20rules%20following%20Supreme%20Court%20decision.pdf.


\textsuperscript{470} Olympia City Staff Report 1 (on file with author).

\textsuperscript{471} Olympia City Staff Report 1 (on file with author).


\textsuperscript{473} Olympia City Staff Report 1 (on file with author).

\textsuperscript{474} Harksen, supra note 465.

\textsuperscript{475} As illustrated by the case studies contained in this brief. Supra Part III.

Because these ordinances disproportionately affect visibly poor people and are content-based restrictions on speech, they must be necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest.\(^{477}\) Cities should examine their aggressive begging laws and determine whether those laws target behavior already covered by other laws.

Objectively aggressive behavior is already addressed by existing laws via assault and harassment laws. For example, the City of Kennewick recognized that its own aggressive begging ordinance would not withstand judicial scrutiny and repealed its ordinance, noting that its municipal code already adequately addressed the public safety concerns that its aggressive begging law did.\(^{479}\) Kennewick recognized a distinction between peaceful constitutionally protected begging and objectively aggressive behavior. Accordingly, the city took the affirmative step of repealing its aggressive begging ordinance, both removing itself from risk of legal liability, while respecting the constitutional rights of its residents. Ideally, more Washington’s cities should follow and assess their anti-begging laws to determine whether their laws would pass judicial scrutiny. Further, when Olympia removed its references to aggressive panhandling, the city did not consider any potential negative pushback it might receive from residents or business owners because panhandling is protected by the United States Constitution.\(^{480}\) Similar to Kennewick, Olympia’s Deputy City Attorney noted there are other laws addressing the objectively unlawful conduct purportedly addressed by aggressive begging ordinances—laws such as disorderly conduct and harassment—which means there are other ways to target the unacceptable behavior “without eroding someone’s First Amendment rights.”\(^{481}\)

Perception-based triggers in aggressive begging laws sweep in a staggering array of otherwise peaceful behaviors. These triggers target the speaker or the message, not the conduct. Peaceful begging can trigger a violation because begging itself—or even just the presence of a visibly poor person—commonly provokes feelings of anxiety, fear, or compulsion in others. Such laws risk suppressing even lawful speech and leave cities open to vagueness

\(^{477}\) Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226–28, 2231; McLaughlin, 2015 WL 6453144, at *25; Browne, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 1288, 1287–90; see also NLCHP, Criminalization of Homelessness at 18; Olson & MacDonald, supra note 18, at 31.

\(^{478}\) Harksen, supra note 465.

\(^{479}\) Sena, supra note 89, at 306–07.

\(^{480}\) Id.

\(^{481}\) Id.
Aggressive begging ordinances are especially troubling because the majority of these impose criminal penalties.\textsuperscript{483}

Yet these laws represent a growing trend among Washington cities. Cities implement anti-begging laws to allegedly remedy a harm that occurs when individuals stand on the sidewalk with a sign asking for help; however, no harm actually occurs from asking for help.\textsuperscript{484} In reality, cities are using anti-begging laws to address visible poverty, not to address homelessness.\textsuperscript{485} Such a justification cannot support the broad curtailing of constitutional liberties, especially one as precious and central to democracy as free speech. Aside from constitutional concerns, Washington cities must grapple with the fact that as long as poverty exists, some people must ask strangers for help.

\textbf{D. Recognize Peaceful Begging as a Protected Plea for Help}

Finally, cities should recognize peaceful begging as a plea for help. Municipalities increasingly enact laws with the explicit or even unconscious impact of removing visible poverty from public view. This spike continues even though these laws are less effective and more expensive than non-punitive alternatives to poverty and homelessness, such as social services and affordable housing.\textsuperscript{486}

Cities should consider the implicit and unconscious biases that motivate these begging restrictions, and with that knowledge work to be strong advocates for individuals experiencing homelessness. Cities have the opportunity and the power to impact the lives of their residents, how we respond to human need and human desperation reflects our collective moral compass.

\textsuperscript{481} See, e.g., Browne, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 1286, 1297.  
\textsuperscript{482} See supra text and chart accompanying notes 187–189.  
\textsuperscript{483} Talner, supra note 17.  
\textsuperscript{484} Id.  
\textsuperscript{485} Id.  
\textsuperscript{486} Howard & Tran, supra note 91.
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APPENDIX

Part I: This Community Cares Flier

Referred to on page 8 of the brief, below is the flier distributed by Marysville and Arlington.

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**THIS COMMUNITY CARES**

- Arlington and Marysville have many generous people who want to help others.
- Please consider keeping your wallet closed when approached by panhandlers.
- Panhandling is a community-wide problem that adversely impacts our cities’ and neighborhoods’ images, local businesses, and perception of public safety.
- When you give money to a stranger, you can’t know how it will be spent.
- If we stop giving cash to panhandlers, their behavior won’t be rewarded and is likely to decrease.

Because you care, we want you to know that Marysville and Arlington have several free resources for people who need hot meals, groceries and/or clothing. *Feel free to share this information with those who may be in need.*

When you want to donate, please consider giving to a local charity instead of to panhandlers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community Resources</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arlington Community Food Bank</td>
<td>Mon 12-1 pm (seniors/disabled),</td>
<td>A2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360-435-1631</td>
<td>Wed 5:30-6:30 pm, Fri 12-1 pm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arlington Community Resource Center</td>
<td>Food &amp; resources: Mon-Wed 9 am-5 pm,</td>
<td>A4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360-386-7989</td>
<td>Thurs 9 am-6 pm</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Arlington Flex Fund</td>
<td>Mon-Fri 9 am-5 pm</td>
<td>A1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360-403-3421</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSHS Community Service Office</td>
<td>Mon-Fri 9 am-5 pm</td>
<td>A3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-877-501-2233</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marysville Community Food Bank</td>
<td>Mon 9-11 am (seniors/disabled), Tues 3-6 pm,</td>
<td>M3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360-658-1054</td>
<td>Fri 9-11 am</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marysville Community <a href="mailto:Lunch-marysvillecommunitylunch@gmail.com">Lunch-marysvillecommunitylunch@gmail.com</a></td>
<td>Lunch Mon/Wed/Fri 1-2 pm</td>
<td>M7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master’s Feast</td>
<td>Dinner Tues 5 pm</td>
<td>M1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360-659-6716</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reset Feeding Ministry</td>
<td>Dinner Sun 4-5 pm</td>
<td>M6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360-322-7725</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvation Army</td>
<td>Breakfast Tues/Thurs 9:30-11 am; Dinner Wed 5-6:30 pm; Clothing Wed 4:30-5:30 pm</td>
<td>M5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360-926-2228</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeds of Grace</td>
<td>Food &amp; resources: Sat 9-10 am (no 4th Sat), Wed 2-3 pm (seniors/disabled)</td>
<td>M4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360-659-7335, ext 212</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Joseph’s House</td>
<td>Clothing Tues/Thurs 10 am-Noon, 1-5 pm, Sat 9 am-Noon</td>
<td>M8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360-651-8246</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Table</td>
<td>Dinner Thurs 6 pm</td>
<td>M2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>360-659-0445</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* *see addresses and map locations on reverse*

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Part II: Graphical Comparison of the Rise in Begging Ordinances and the Rise in Criminalization

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**New Methods of Targeting Homelessness per Five Years**

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**New Begging Laws Passed**

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488 Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37, at 3.

489 See supra Part II.
Part III: Methodology

A. Master Chart Methodology

HRAP researchers analyzed municipal codes laws of sixty-four cities across the state of Washington, searching for ordinances that work to prohibit begging. At the time of selection, the sixty-four cities chosen were the most populous in the State, with an additional few chosen in an attempt to capture all geographic areas across the State. Researchers then used the Municipal Research and Services Center (MSRC), a nonprofit website, to locate the municipal codes for each city. The resulting “Master Chart” cited to throughout this brief was created and is on file with the authors.

Using the 2010 Census, researchers collected demographic data on each of the sampled cities. Researchers analyzed the data to determine whether there was any correlation between a city’s ordinances and its: population density, median household income, percentage of residents below the poverty level, and racial makeup. Researchers did not find any significant correlations.

Using MRSC, and the search function for each municipal code being sampled, HRAP researchers then searched the city code for references to panhandling, including key words such as

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panhandle</th>
<th>Solicit</th>
<th>Beg</th>
<th>Aggressive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Panhandling</td>
<td>Soliciting</td>
<td>Begging</td>
<td>Solicitation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panhandles</td>
<td>Solicits</td>
<td>Begs</td>
<td>Automated Teller Machine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panhandler</td>
<td>Solicitor</td>
<td>Beggar</td>
<td>ATM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Researchers then manually analyzed each ordinance containing a key word. Researchers also did a manual check of common code sections, including the criminal code, public health, park rules, public safety, and offenses against public order sections.
Once an ordinance was identified as a “begging restriction,” the ordinance was classified into one of four categories: (1) zone/geographic restrictions, (2) distance restrictions, (3) Time Restrictions, and (4) Manner restrictions (i.e. aggressive panhandling). Researchers created the master chart, with the following categories:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographic Data</th>
<th>Ordinance Specific Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>Total Anti-Panhandling Ordinances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (Persons per Square Mile)</td>
<td>Dates of Enactment-Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons Below Poverty Level, Percent, 2009-2013</td>
<td>Total Ordinances with Zone/Geographic Restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Household Income, 2009-2013</td>
<td>Total Ordinances with Distance Restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage Households Earning Less than $15,000</td>
<td>Specific Ordinances with Distance Restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veterans, 2009-2013</td>
<td>Dates of Enactment - Distance Restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic - Caucasian, 2010</td>
<td>Language of Distance Restrictions: How Far From Where?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic - African American, 2010</td>
<td>Total Ordinances with Time Restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic - Asian, 2010</td>
<td>Specific Ordinances with Time Restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demographic - American Indian or Alaska Native, 2010</td>
<td>Dates of Enactment - Time Restrictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Ordinances with &quot;Aggressive&quot; Panhandling Limitations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific Ordinances with &quot;Aggressive&quot; Panhandling Limitations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dates of Enactment - &quot;Aggressive&quot; Panhandling</td>
<td>&quot;Aggressive&quot; Panhandling Defined?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Aggressive&quot; Definition Based on Objective Conduct?</td>
<td>&quot;Aggressive&quot; Definition Based on Reception?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Penalties (Civil infraction or Misdemeanor)</td>
<td>Progressive penalties (one that worsens with each offense)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data from the ordinance was inputted into the master chart: a spreadsheet created in Microsoft Excel. Several researchers reviewed the chart at various stages to ensure accuracy. The last review was completed in March 2018. Researchers used the “sort” function in Microsoft Excel to sort the data in the master chart, allowing researchers to spot trends and possible correlations. Researchers then used the “chart” function in Microsoft Word to create the charts contained in this brief.
B. Enforcement Data Methodology

For the enforcement data, HRAP sent requests for public record information to eleven cities. The cities chosen were the cities used in the case study section of the brief, as well as eight additional cities in order to obtain enforcement data on ten “aggressive begging” laws. An example request is included in the appendix below. HRAP researchers followed up with cities via email and phone.

Once the requests were received, researchers discovered that many cities were not enforcing the ordinances via measures such as arrests and citations. A google search discovered that “move-along” orders were prevalent in Centralia. Researchers then contacted each city to ask whether the city had a routine of issuing “move-along” orders rather than formal citations. No cities stated that they had a formal policy. However, when considering the prevalence of move-along orders in other contexts, as well as the information discovered regarding Centralia, researchers concluded that cities are likely issuing informal “move-along” orders to individuals experiencing homelessness. Statements from professionals throughout the community confirmed that move-along orders are prevalent in Seattle.

C. Scope of Methodology

While HRAP’s methodology was effective, it is not without a few restrictions. First, HRAP researchers only considered codified ordinances. As HRAP researchers noted years earlier in Washington’s WAR, “there is a very real risk that ordinances may have been enacted or amended but not included in online databases.”\textsuperscript{490} Second, while researchers attempted to use key language that would trigger most ordinances, it is possible that some ordinances containing creative language were missed.

\textsuperscript{490} Olson & MacDonald, supra note 37, at 48.
Part IV: Example Public Records Request Letter

[Date]
[City Clerk]
[address]

[Via email: ]

RE: Public Records Act Request – Citation Information for [city] Municipal Code

To Whom It May Concern:

I am requesting that the records described below be made available for inspection, pursuant to the Washington Public Records Act (RCW §42.56 et seq.). In accordance with RCW 42.56.520, you must, within five business days of receipt of this request, respond and let me know the status of the request and how soon you will be able to produce all discoverable records.

I am requesting certain information (see specific questions below) pertaining to citations issued due to violations of the following [city] Municipal Code:

[specific ordinance];
[specific ordinance].

Specifically, I am requesting all relevant records related to the following questions for the time period between January 1, 2013, and January 1, 2018. Please separate each of the responses by ordinance and by year:

1. How many total citations were issued under each of the city codes specified above, for each year?

2. How many of these citations resulted in misdemeanor charges against the recipient?
   A. How many of these charges resulted in convictions?
   B. How many citation recipients spent time in jail as a result?
      i. How much time did each recipient spend in jail?
   C. How many citation recipients spent time in police custody as a result of these citations?
      i. How much time did they spend in law enforcement custody?

3. How many of these citations resulted in fines assessed against the recipient?
   A. What was the amount of fines assessed for each citation?
   B. How many fines were dismissed before payment?
   C. How many fines were paid in full?
D. How many fines resulted in a default?
   i. How many defaulted fines resulted in further charges, such as failure to appear or pay charges, against the citation recipient?

4. How many of these citations resulted in a failure to appear?

5. Do you maintain records that may indicate whether a citation recipient is homeless or staying in temporary housing such as a shelter or an encampment?
   A. How many of the citations (by ordinance and by year) were issued to people who were experiencing homelessness?
   B. How many of the citations (by ordinance and by year) were issued to people who were not able to provide a residential address?
   C. How many of the citations (by ordinance and by year) were issued to people who were staying in an encampment or temporary shelter?
   D. If you cannot produce the data in response to 5.A., 5.B, or 5.C, in how many instances did recipients of these citations provide the same residential address? Put another way, in how many instances was the same address recorded for recipients of these citations?

6. What was the race of each individual cited if identified?

7. What was the gender of each individual cited if identified?

8. For citations issued under [ordinance number], how many of those citation recipients simultaneously received citations for assault [applicable ordinance number], battery [applicable ordinance number], or harassment [applicable ordinance number].
   A. Among the results for request #8, how many of these defendants was offered (or accepted) a plea deal?

If the City of [city name] does not track the data related to any of the requests above, please let us know.

At this time, please refrain from making hard copies of any responsive documents. The production of data in electronic form is preferred. If the records are available electronically, please specify what electronic forms are available, as well as any cost associated with accessing this electronic form. You may send any written responses to this request by email to [name and email] or by mail to:

[mailing address]

If any documents or responses are withheld in whole or in part, please specify the reason for withholding such document or response or any portion thereof. To the extent that portions of the request are specifically exempted from disclosure, please provide all non-exempt portions as allowed for under the Washington Public Records Act. To the extent that any portion of the
requested records contain classified information, please redact such information and furnish the requested records.

We very much appreciate your attention to this request. If you would like to contact me with questions or concerns about the requested information, please feel free to do so as I am more than happy to clarify in any way I can. Please contact me with any questions at [contact information].

I look forward to hearing from you within five business days. Thank you for your assistance!

Sincerely,

[Name]
[Affiliation]