Abstract
The global financial crisis came in the wake of significant reforms to the structures, processes, powers, and rules of the regulatory regimes for financial markets in many of the countries adversely affected by the crash. The global financial crisis came in the wake of significant reforms to the structures, processes, powers, and rules of the regulatory regimes for financial markets in many of the countries adversely affected by the crash. In this Article, I follow the logic of an argument that regulation necessarily has political dimensions, even where it may appear technical. I am asking questions about how we might best think about accountability processes that encompass both democratic and technical dimensions of regulation and how their respective concerns might be combined with-in accountability regimes. Conceiving of accountability as embracing both technical and political requirements draws us towards a parallel world in which the efficiency and effectiveness of regulation is a core part of oversight concerns, alongside the issue of democratic concern with procedures.
Recommended Citation
Colin Scott, Evaluating the Performance and Accountability of Regulators, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 353 (2014).
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